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ABSTRACT 
This thesis aims to examine the role of desert in Nozick's libertarian entitlement 
theory of justice. I shall argue that it is wrong for Nozick to exclude desert from his 
philosophical enterprise. For a reasonable political morality should take desert 
seriously. Disregarding the claim of desert in libertarian justice is unnecessary and 
undesirable even from a Nozickean internal point of view. To vindicate my claim, I 
shall first offer a general analysis of the notion of desert in Chapter 1. The distinctive 
features of desert will be carefully explicated. I then turn to discuss the moral 
significance of desert in Chapter 2. The central idea is that giving an agent what he 
deserves will express the moral ideal of autonomy and responsibility, and establish 
congruence between the basis of desert and the treatment of desert. Having set up this 
intellectual background, Chapter 3 evaluates Nozick's three objections to desert. 
These objections result from Nozick's viewing desert as a kind of patterned principle, 
which in turn has deep conflict with his commitments to freedom, negative rights as 
side-constraint, and the notion of self ownership. I reject these objections one by one 
by showing that they are either ungrounded or inconsistent with other parts of the 
entitlement theory. In Chapter 4, I attempt to offer two Nozickean positive arguments 
for the importance of desert. In a nutshell, a cooperative scheme in accordance with 
desert can promote social harmony and provide an ideal environment for people to 
realize a meaningful life. Since Nozick deeply recognizes the value of a meaningful 
life, he should include desert in the entitlement theory to make the theory more 
plausible and attractive. Finally, in the last chapter, I explore the theoretical 
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Desert is an important moral ideal in the tradition of social justice. Since 
Aristotle, it has been widely accepted that a just distribution should accord with 
people's desert. 1 The importance of desert is also supported by public perceptions of 
justice.^ According to empirical studies, a large number of people believe that people 
should get what they deserve. An undeserved situation would incline to create 
feelings of injustice. Our moral conviction and languages also testify that injustice 
would arise if one does not receive rewards or benefits that he deserves. 
Despite all these, the proper place of desert in distributive justice is far from 
clear. Philosophers constantly dispute about the proper role of desert in social justice. 
Some argue that justice is simply equivalent to giving what people deserve. For 
example, as Hosper asks, "justice is getting what one deserves; what could be 
simpler?"^ Some hold that desert should only partly decide what a just distribution is.4 
Others, including Rawls and Nozick, do not consider desert at all in their theories of 
justice. Rawls explicitly excludes desert from his theory because he believes that 
moral worth, the basis of moral deservingness, cannot be determined until the 
principles of justice are established.^ Moreover, Rawls is also thought to worry about 
the inegalitarian consequence because distribution according to desert would "allow 
some to have unfair disadvantages over others, in that some would have greater 
‘Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Terence Irwin trans., 2 " � e d . (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 
1999), Book V, Chapter 3. Aristotle's judgment is also shared by Adam Smith, J.S. Mill and Henry 
Sidgwick. See Louis Pojman and Owen McLeod ed., What Do We Deserve, (Oxford: OUP, 1999). For 
a brief review of contemporary debate on desert, see Serena Olsaretti, "Debating Desert and Justice", in 
Serena Olsaretti ed., Desert and Justice, (Oxford: OUP, 2003) 
2 David Miller, Principles of Social Justice, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), Ch. 4. 
3 John Hosper, Human Conduct, (NY: Harcourt, 1961), p. 433. 
4 Joel Feinberg, "Justice and personal desert", in Doing and deserving, (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1970); David Miller, Principles of Social Justice�and George Sher, Desert, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1987) 
5 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, rev. ed., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 275. 
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claims on the basis of better natural endowments and social circumstances, which 
they cannot claim credit for."^ Nozick's concern is different from Rawls. He rejects 
any claim of desert because he believes it would violate his right-based entitlement 
theory. He views desert as a kind of patterned principle which would have deep 
conflict with individual freedom, personal negative rights and the notion of self-
ownership. This explains why he entirely sets the concern of desert aside. 
It is quite unusual that the notion of desert has played such an insignificant 
role in Rawls and Nozick. After all, it is our considered judgment that desert should 
be an important element of social justice. The judgment of desert also deeply affects 
our moral sentiments. Therefore, both Rawls and Nozick owe us an account of why 
their theories are so hostile to the claim of desert. My focus of this thesis will be on 
Nozick's entitlement theory. My primary interest in this issue is triggered by a puzzle: 
how could Nozick entirely neglect the entrenched commitment to desert in developing 
his theory of justice? 
In recent years, literature on desert abounds. There are two broad types of 
studies. The first type is mainly concerned with the conceptual analysis of desert such 
as its meaning, structure and moral significance.? The second type focuses on the 
proper relationship between desert and justice. Not surprisingly, Rawls's theory of 
justice attracts most attention.^ A great deal of literature revolves around Rawls，s 
account of desert and its relations to justice as fairness. However, studies on Nozick in 
this regard are relatively few. 
My project starts with a central question: should Nozick include desert in his 
entitlement theory? My answer is yes. I shall argue that there are strong and justifiable 
6 Olsaretti, "Debating Desert and Justice" p. 3. 
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reasons for Nozick to take desert seriously. There is room to reconcile the claim of 
desert and the central tenets of entitlement theory. 
My reasons to choose this topic are twofold. First, this is an important but 
long-neglected issue. Nozick，s theory is perhaps the most important representative of 
contemporary right-based libertarianism. Although his philosophy has been 
extensively studied, few critics show interest in his account of desert. My research can 
shed some new light on this issue. Second, my research bears with a practical concern. 
As we know, Nozick，s theory offers strong support for a laissze-faire capitalism. 
However, the kind of economy is often blamed for creating gross injustice. I think one 
source of dissatisfaction comes from the fact that a free market easily fails to give 
what people deserve. Hence, a desert-inclusive entitlement theory may provide some 
intellectual and practical resources to resolve the problem. I will argue that it is 
plausible to reward desert without sacrificing some core values of free market. 
The structure of my dissertation is as follows. In chapter 1, I will delineate 
some features of desert and explain its meaning when it is applied to distributive 
justice. Having clarified the concept, Chapter 2 will turn to argue the moral 
significance of desert. If my argument is plausible, Nozick will have a prima facie 
reason to bring desert into his entitlement theory. But as a matter of fact, he does not 
do so. That poses a question for us. So, in Chapter 3, I will explore the reasons of 
Nozick’s objection to desert. I will show that the main reason is that desert is a kind of 
patterned principle. After elaborating Nozick's argument, I will rebut Nozick's claim. 
I will show that Nozick's objection to desert is unjustified because his argument 
against patterned principle is flawed. If my argument is valid, it opens a possibility 
7 An example is George Sher's Desert. Several articles about the general idea of desert can be found in 
What do we deserve? 
8 See Samuel Scheffler's argument in Boundary and Allegiance, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2003), pp. 173-196 
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that Nozick should include desert into his theory. I will offer two arguments to 
vindicate this even from a Nozickean standpoint. In chapter 4, I will start from two 
premises that Nozick himself endorses, and show why desert should be taken into 
account. These two internal arguments can make my claims even stronger. For if my 
claims are valid, Nozick has no reason not to consider desert because it is implicated 
in his own promises. 
Even though there are reasons to include desert in the entitlement theory, 
Nozick may argue that desert and the entitlement theory are still irreconcilable. For 
desert and the entitlement theory are inherently incompatible for some reasons. This 
means that bringing desert into the entitlement theory would violate some of its 
fundamental values. In response to this critique I will further show why and how 
desert and the entitlement theory can be reconciled with each other. This is the task of 
chapter 5. I will also demonstrate that including desert would bring about some 
adjustments for the entitlement theory. Yet these adjustments will not affect its core 
values and theoretical structure. In this way, Nozick's worries and critiques will be 
addressed. If my arguments in this dissertation are valid, we can then refute a 
predominant interpretation that desert is essentially incompatible with right-based 




A CONCEPTION OF DESERT IN DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 
This chapter aims to articulate a conception of desert that can be applied to 
distributive justice. Among many areas where desert can apply, I will specifically 
examine plausible grounds of desert for economic distribution. It consists of two 
sections. First, I shall argue for a conception of desert by delineating the structure and 
some important characteristics of desert. I show that desert is a distinct moral concept 
that shows the moral appropriateness of treatment to an individual. The distinct 
feature of desert is that it is an affective notion, namely, a judgment of desert embeds 
favor or disfavor on the subject who deserves the treatment, on the treatment and on 
the reason why the subject deserves certain treatment. Another distinct feature is that 
desert demands the congruence of good performance and good treatment, and the 
goodness of the treatment should be proportional to how good the performance is. The 
second section will examine the legitimate reasons for people to deserve treatments in 
distributive justice. I shall argue that the reasons to deserve benefits in different 
activities are different. They are not determined by institutions, but are specific to and 
dependent on the meanings of the activity. 
Before I start, let me briefly explain the approach that I adopt. I will articulate 
the conception of desert by reflecting how people use desert in our daily ordinary 
claims and criticizing some prominent views on desert. My analysis will substantially 
draw from ordinary claims because desert is widely valued and frequently used in 
ordinary usage. To look into how we use desert in everyday life will give us a more 
accurate and comprehensive account of a conception of desert. Furthermore, one of 
the purposes of this thesis is to rescue desert from being neglected in some 
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predominant theories of distributive justice, namely, Rawls's theory of justice, 
utilitarianism and Nozick's entitlement theory. The cause for this attempt is that 
ordinary people do use desert in daily life and do believe this concept is morally 
important. As a reasonable theory of justice should take people's moral sentiment into 
account, there are strong reasons for these theories to be revised to include desert. As 
a result, this project should primarily consider why desert in ordinary usage should 
affect and how it would alter some theories of justice. In this regard, the inquiry 
should be based on and start from ordinary claims about desert. 
1.1 The Structure and Features of Desert 
In this section, I will delineate the structure and features of desert. I will explain when 
and where desert claims usually apply and some main components of desert. The most 
important issue is concerned with the desert basis, i.e. the ground to deserve things. 
Different conceptions of desert contain different views on the characteristic of desert 
basis. Since this is an important point to illustrate the conception of desert I hold, I 
shall separate it from other issues and deal with it in section 1.2. In this section, I will 
examine other important issues in articulating a conception of desert. The first is 
about whether desert is an affective notion. The second is to argue that desert requires 
the proportional congruence of good performance and good treatment. The third is 
concerned with the areas that desert can apply. I argue against a view that desert is 
only moral and only moral attributes can be ascribed to the basis of desert. Ending this 
section, I will summarize some main features of desert. 
The notion of desert has a wide range of application in interpersonal relations. 
It is commonly used in rewarding honor and prize, punishments, distribution of grades 
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and income. For example, we often make the following judgments: a serial killer 
deserves death penalty; a virtuous person deserves our praises; the best football team 
deserves to win the game; and a diligent worker deserves a fair amount of income. 
What people deserve is different case by case, but these claims all appeal to the same 
concept of desert. Fundamentally, desert is a concept indicating that a treatment to a 
person is morally appropriate.^ “A deserves X" means that it is morally appropriate to 
let A have X. This implies that the world where A have X is morally better than 
another where A do not have X. On the contrary, “A undeserves X" means that it is 
morally fitting not to let A have X. If A have X, the state of affairs is less morally 
desirable than that of A do not have X . � � 
However, this does not imply that desert provides a conclusive reason as to 
whether A should have X. Some people may think that “A deserve X" is equivalent to 
saying that "A should have X". Yet this is not the case. By "should have" I mean a 
conclusive and final judgment of whether A should have X，after taking all 
considerations into account. However, desert is just one of many reasons that 
determine if A should have X. The claim of desert should be weighted against other 
reasons to draw the conclusive judgment. When desert conflicts with other moral 
ideals, desert does not necessarily override them." The concept of desert itself does 
not entail that it is conclusive and overriding. 
In this regard, desert is the same as other moral concepts like equality and 
right. They all provide reasons to argue for or against that A should have X. In certain 
situation that A has X may show a respect for right (of A or of other people). For 
91 confine the type of treatment to relationships between persons. I do not consider claims where the 
treatment is not made by other person and is out of human being's control. There are treatments to a 
person which is the result of the nature (e.g. natural disaster). An example of desert claim based on that 
kind of treatment is when a virtuous and brilliant youngster died from lightning, someone may 
comment, "he does not deserve to die so early". 
Miller, Principles of Social Justice, pp. 135-136 
1�Feinberg, p. 56 
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example, given A buys X from the market, that A has X shows a respect for A's 
property right. Therefore, from the perspective of protecting property right, A should 
have X. But the concept of property right itself does not imply that, all things 
considered, A should have X. For concerns and values other than right need to be 
considered before making a conclusive judgment. 
Following Feinberg's classic account, desert has a structure A deserves X on 
the basis of Z}^ Every desert claim should consist of three parts. The first is the 
subject to deserve (A). The second is the deserved treatment (X). The third is the 
reason why a person deserves that treatment, i.e. the desert basis (Z). There must be a 
reason for a person to deserve certain treatment. Without the desert basis, the 
treatment cannot be deserved and the claim is not a claim of desert, even though the 
treatment is morally appropriate. Indeed, some moral notions also tell when a 
treatment is morally appropriate. For example, the claim that "everyone has a right 
not to be killed" does imply that "it is morally appropriate that a person is not killed" 
and that "it would be a better world had a person not been killed". But this right claim 
is not a desert claim because it does not fit the structure of desert. It is not because the 
right to live seems to be self-evident and without a reason to support the claim, but 
because there is no desert basis. After all, that life is a ftindamental interest of a 
person and that our fundamental interest should be protected are plausible reasons to 
support the right to life. But supplementing the claim with these reasons does not turn 
a right claim into a desert claim because the reasons are not desert-based. 
Not every types of moral reason can be the basis of desert. One crucial point is 
that desert basis must be an action that is done by the subject to deserve, while the 
12 Ibid, p. 58 
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action must be sufficiently within the subject's control.'^ An agent does not have 
sufficient control over an action if he is coerced to do the action, or the action is the 
result of an accident, or he performs the action successfully largely because of luck. 
This understanding implies two things. First, the desert basis must be an action or a 
characteristic of a person. Secondly, a desert basis must involve facts about the 
subject. As Feinberg said, "the facts which constitute the basis of a subject's desert 
must be facts about that subject."^^ Hence I cannot claim to deserve a job simply 
because my family would starve if I remain unemployed. For the reason is not 
something about me. It is about my family. Perhaps the fact provides a humanitarian 
reason for the company to give me the job, but it is not because I deserve it. I can only 
deserve a job based on actions that I have done, for example, my performance. 
Someone may ask whether the preservation of life can be the qualified desert 
basis. After all, life is a basic characteristic of human being. But life itself cannot be 
such a basis. Only those actions or characteristics that are like or disliked, admired or 
despised, can meet the requirement. The reason is that, as Feinberg argues, desert is 
an affection notion. It is used to assign treatments that are either "favored" or 
“disfavored，，.】6 No one will deserve anything that is neutral in value. Deserts are 
either good or bad — people either deserve good things as reward or bad things as 
punishment. It is a concept to indicate whether certain rewards or punishments are 
morally appropriate. 
Then it is easy to understand why desert basis should be favored or disfavored, 
admired or despised. One should receive rewards because he has done something 
good while receiving punishments because he has done something bad. The case for 
13 Miller, Principle of social justice, p. 134 
14 Ibid. 
15 Feinberg, p. 59 
16 Feinberg, p. 61 
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punishment is the same. There is no neutral basis of desert. It is value laden. This 
implies that people deserve good treatment when desert basis are good and bad 
treatments when bases are bad. We believe that a liar deserves punishment because 
the desert basis, the act of lying, is disapproved. On the other hand, that an honest 
student deserves reward is because honesty is recognized as a good thing. We do not 
reward a liar or punish an honest student. In other words, desert requires a kind of 
congruence between desert basis and treatment received. Desert does not allow 
rewarding bad desert basis and punishing good desert basis. When a good desert basis 
combines with a bad treatment, or vice versa, the situation is unjust. 
This viewpoint on the structure of desert, a congruence view, is similar to 
Thomas Hurka's view, which he calls a consequentialist account of desert. This 
account sees virtue as good desert basis, pleasure as good treatment, vice as bad desert 
basis and pain as bad treatment. When virtue and pleasure are combined in one's life, 
the state of affairs is intrinsically good. Such good is a desert-good, a higher order 
good resulted from the congruence of good desert basis and good treatment. ^ ^ Besides, 
desert-good also exists when two evils, vice and pain, happen in one's life. Although 
both desert basis and treatment are bad, their combination in one's life results in a 
higher order desert-good. On the other hand, if a virtuous person suffers from pain or 
a vicious person enjoys pleasure, such combinations are intrinsically evil. This 
account of desert holds that a virtuous person deserves pleasure and a vicious person 
deserves pain; a virtuous person does not deserve pain and a vicious person does not 
deserve pleasure. 
But Hurka thinks that this is not a complete account of the congruence view. 
He realizes that virtues, pleasures, vices and pain have different degrees of intensity. 
17 Thomas Hurka, "The Common Structure of Virtue and Desert", Ethics, 112(2001): pp. 6-31 
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We can compare which person is more virtuous or vicious as if we can tell which state 
of affairs is more pleasant or painfiiL Degrees of virtues and pleasures are important 
in deciding if a treatment is deserved or not. Given there is a congruence of good 
desert basis and good treatment, incongruence in degrees of virtues or pleasure may 
still rule that the state of affairs is not deserved. For example, if a virtuous person B 
deserves pleasures Y, it implies that a more virtuous person A should deserve a 
greater level of pleasure X. Since B is less virtuous than A, B does not deserves X but 
only deserves a lower level of pleasure Y. In this case, although B deserves pleasure, 
he does not deserve X, because this amount of pleasure is too much to be an 
appropriate reward. The case is more obvious in punishing vices. It is a common 
practice that the level of punishment should match the seriousness of the crime. 
Criminal A who committed a serious crime should receive a harsh punishment X. 
Another criminal B who has committed lighter crimes should receive a less harsh 
punishment Y. B does not deserve punishment X because it is too heavy; and A does 
not deserve punishment Y because it is too light. 
Hurka explains that A and B does not deserve Y and X respectively because 
both cases do not meet the proportionality constraint of desert. The constraint is that 
"the best division of a fixed quantity of pleasure [or pain] among [individuals] is 
proportioned to their degrees of virtue [or vice].，,�8 It follows that the deserved 
treatment should be proportional to the degree of goodness or badness of desert basis. 
For example, imagine you are going to reward two children with sweets according to 
their obedience. Given you have 10 sweets and child A is approximately four times 
more obedient than child B. According to the proportionality constraint, A should get 
8 sweets and B should have 2 sweets. The state of affair will deteriorate if the 
丨8 Hurka, p. 16 
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treatment is not proportional to the desert basis. There are two possible scenarios. One 
is that the treatment is less than proportional. Another is that the treatment is more 
than proportional. 
Given the proportionality constraint, setting up a scheme to rank different 
degrees of virtue and vices, we would know what intensity of pleasure or pain should 
be matched with each degree of virtue or vice. Then, for every degree of virtue or vice, 
"there is an optimal intensity of pleasure or pain that is its ideally deserved reward or 
punishment”. 19 At the optimal point, desert good is the highest. The treatment is 
perfectly deserved by the subject. However, any slight deviation from the optimal 
point will reduce the desert-good slightly. Desert good will continue to reduce if the 
deviation becomes larger. At one point the value of desert good becomes negative, 
and desert good turns into desert evil. 
One puzzle about this model is whether all treatments at suboptimal points are 
undeserved. Although, strictly speaking, only treatments at the optimal point are 
deserved, we need not hold that all suboptimal treatments are undeserved. There are 
two reasons for this. One is that it will incorrectly depict that in each case there is only 
one morally acceptable mode of treatment. Any slight deviation is morally 
unacceptable. However, our judgment of desert is not that absolute, but rather a matter 
of degree. In deciding deserts, we have more options than judging a treatment either 
as deserved or undeserved. Apart from the perfectly deserved situation, there are 
treatments that are more or less deserved. We can compare different treatments with 
respect to the same desert basis. But we would think that even the less deserved 
treatment is still deserved. It is still morally acceptable, though less desirable than the 
perfectly deserved case. Yet, if moving along the line from the optimal point, the less 
' ^Hurka ,p . 17 
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deserved treatment will eventually become morally unacceptable. This is the point 
where the treatment is undeserved. Indeed, situation can continue to deviate from the 
optimal case and that the treatment will become more and more undeserved. 
One implication of this understanding of desert is that what people deserve is 
the result of comparison. We do not know what one exactly deserves simply by 
looking into his desert basis. We need to know how other people are rewarded so that 
one is not rewarded better than others who have a superior basis. What one deserves 
should be the same to those who have similar level of basis. All these involve 
comparison with other people. On the other hand, comparison is also involved in 
determining whose desert basis is better or worse. Back to the example that obedient 
children are rewarded sweets. We would not know who deserve more sweets without 
comparing the deservingness of A and B. This suggests that comparison is needed in 
determining both the degree of deservingness and the degree of deserved treatment. 
Although Hurka's model is useful in understanding the structure of desert, it is 
worth noting that his account of possible content of desert basis is seriously flawed. In 
his account, only a virtuous or vicious person can deserve. It means that virtue and 
vice are the only possible desert basis. Hurka defines virtue either as a positive 
attitude towards (by desiring, pursuing or taking pleasure in) an intrinsic good or a 
negative attitude towards, i.e. by desiring or pursuing the nonexistence of, or suffering 
from an intrinsic bad. 2® On the other hand, vice is defined as a positive attitude 
towards an intrinsic bad, or a negative attitude towards an intrinsic good.21 Hurka 
suggests that possible desert basis should be an action, a disposition or a character that 
embodies an attitude towards an intrinsic good or bad. 
20 Hurka, p. 9 
21 Ibid, p. 10 
21 
Such a conception of desert is, however, too narrow to explain much of our 
usage of desert. Desert is often used in ways that are not based on so-defined virtues 
and vice. For instance, it is often said that the best performing deserves to win the 
game. Or, in distributing academic grades, it is widely accepted that the candidate 
showing the greatest academic ability deserves the best grade. In these cases, 
performance is not an expression of attitude towards any intrinsic good or bad, nor is 
it virtue or vice. But they are genuine desert claims. The core idea of desert is to 
reward good and to punish bad. But there is no reason to define good or bad only in 
terms of virtues and vices, or believe that virtues or vices exhaust all our 
understanding of good. Hurka's understanding of desert is thus incomplete as it 
excludes many situations where we think desert is applicable. 
It can be argued that I have wrongly located the desert basis in those practices 
because the desert bases that I suggested are not ultimate. What we really want to 
reward is the virtues that people have, expressed through their performance. One 
suggestion is that the real desert basis should be diligence. This view holds that we are 
mistaken to believe that the best performer deserves reward. What we care ultimately 
is how diligent people are. We are mistaken to reward the best performance because 
we suppose that there is a positive relations between working hard and performing 
well. This view may be illustrated in the following: Suppose in a race, A is the fastest 
runner and B is the second best, losing marginally. As we find that B has paid much 
more effort in training than A has, we would feel that B deserves the gold medal more 
than A. therefore, whom we want to reward, ultimately, is not the fastest runner, but 
the most hard-working runner. Once we locate the most diligent runner, we should 
reward him rather than the fastest one. Critics thus conclude that desert basis is virtue, 
but not performance. 
22 
While the example is not implausible, the conclusion is problematic. What the 
critic oversees is that diligence alone cannot make one deserve reward. After all, there 
is no reason to reward an Olympic gold medal to a lOOM runner who is the most 
diligent in practice, or the most virtuous among all runners, but can only complete the 
race in 15 seconds. This counter-example shows that running fast remains an 
important, if not the most important desert basis. Although diligent may qualify as a 
desert basis for winning a race, it should be less important than running fast. The 
reason is that the point of a race is to find out the fastest runner and encourages people 
to run faster. Therefore running fast should be a key standard to judge what actions or 
characteristics are appropriate desert basis. In this case, effort is regarded as a 
plausible basis because it embodies an appeal that our fate should be affected by 
factors within our control. In the meantime, there is a general perception that the more 
effort one pays, the better performance one will be. The claim that moral virtue in 
general should not be counted in deserving a gold medal in a race would be obvious if 
we replace diligence with courage and generosity. Few would agree that a courageous 
or a generous runner should deserve the gold medal in a competition. 
My objection also extends to the belief that moral desert is the only type of 
desert. As David Miller defines, "desert is moral when bases upon qualities or actions 
of the individual which have moral value in themselves - courage, honesty, etc."^^ 
Defenders of this view consider moral virtues as the only type of desert basis.^^ They 
hold that the desert basis is grounded on different types of virtues or the moral worth 
22 David Miller, SocialJustice, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976) p. 87, note 8. 
23 Hurka and Kristjansson support this view. See "The common structure of virtue and desert" and 
Kristjan Kristjansson, Justice and Desert-based Emotions, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003). Rawls seems to 
endorse this view as well, as when he discuss the rejection of desert in distributive principle, he only 
mentions moral desert. See A Theory of Justice, section 48. For both defense and reservation of this 
reading of Rawls, see Thomas Pogge, Realizing Rawls, (Ithca: Cornell University Press, 1989), p. 77 
and Samuel Scheffler, "Justice and desert in liberal theory" in Boundaries and Allegiance. 
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of a person, namely, the overall balance of important virtues a person possessed.^'^ 
Despite this slight difference, the essential idea is that moral virtues are the only 
possible desert basis. Every type of rewards or punishments should be allocated 
according to a person's moral virtue. Yet, as I have argued that virtue should not be 
the only type of desert basis, this view does not hold. 
Three conclusions can be drawn from the above analysis. First, it is plausible 
that there can be more than one desert basis for a single treatment. Second, it is wrong 
to hold that virtue or vice is the only form of desert basis. While some kinds of virtue 
or vice may sometimes count, it is neither the only desert basis, nor the most 
important one. Thirdly, it is possible to judge what reason is an appropriate desert 
basis of a particular activity and what is not. As Feinberg believes, when an 
inappropriate reason is used to support a desert claim, the judgment of desert is 
infelicitous. 25 But when is a desert basis wrong? What are the criteria to judge 
whether a desert basis is right? I shall tackle this question in the next section. 
Ending this section, let me take stock of the structure and the characteristics of 
desert that I have illustrated. Desert is a distinct moral concept to show the 
appropriateness of certain treatments. To deserve a good or a bad treatment, we need 
to know the basis of desert. The basis shall be an action that the subject has done. 
Furthermore, desert basis must be something good or bad, liked or despised. It is 
value laden. This shows that desert is an affective notion, which distinguishes it from 
other moral concept like right, equality and freedom. The claim of desert requires that 
a person should receive certain good or bad treatment because the person has done 
something good or bad. Therefore, desert demands congruence between good desert 
basis and treatment. 
24 Kristjansson, p. 56. Also see Rawls, A Theory of Justice, section 48. 
25 Feinberg, p. 59 
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The congruence between desert basis and deserved treatment appears at two 
levels. One is that a good, admired or favored desert basis should match a good, 
admired or favored deserved treatment; a bad, despised or disfavored desert basis 
should match a bad, despised or disfavored deserved treatment. At another level, the 
amount of reward or punishment should be proportional to the degree of the goodness 
or badness of the desert basis. This is the proportionality constraint of desert, which is 
another distinct feature of the concept of desert. When the goodness/badness of the 
treatment is proportional to the goodness/badness of desert basis, the treatment is 
perfectly justified. When a deserved treatment deviates from the optimal point, then it 
is less deserved. Since the right proportion of deserved treatment must be obtained 
through comparing different desert basis and the goodness of treatments, judgment of 
desert is the result of comparison. In other words, how good a treatment a person 
deserves partly depends on how good other people have performed and how good the 
treatment they have received. 
I have also argued against a claim that desert is only moral. Instead, I hold that, 
besides moral aspect, desert can also apply to non-moral areas, like the reward of 
prizes in sports or music competitions. The bases for rewards in these areas are good 
performances, not virtues these people have shown. And I have briefly mentioned that 
it is more reasonable to think that the base for deserving good treatment is specific to 
different activities. Now, I shall turn to explain how desert base in each activity is 
determined. 
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1.2 Desert Basis 
In this section, I will explore how the basis of desert is decided. We want to know on 
what grounds we can deserve some treatments. A general answer is that to deserve a 
good treatment, we need to have a good desert basis. But this answer is not enough to 
explain why we come to deserve certain treatments in a particular activity. There is 
no single basis for different activities. For example, the primary desert basis in 
winning a race is running fast; in assigning grades to students, it is academic 
performance. How is a desert basis for a particular activity determined? I will show 
that, desert basis is decided by the purpose of the activity where distribution is located. 
If a desert basis does not relate to the point of the activity, it is wrong. Based on this 
principle, we can discern that what basis is appropriate and what is not, for a 
treatment in a particular activity. Before going into the details, I would like to argue a 
type of answer that is popular in the public discussion of desert. 
This is an institutional view of desert, which holds that desert basis is only 
decided by institutions where distribution is located. By institution I mean a system of 
rules that regulate an activity. Every rule prescribes under what condition people will 
be given a particular treatment. The condition stated in the rule is the only source of 
desert basis. People who meet the conditions deserve the corresponding treatment. 
Therefore, people can deserve something only after the institution has been set up. 
There is no desert prior to an institution (pre-institutional desert) and, logically 
institutions exist prior to any desert claims. 
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Two arguments are suggested to defend this view. The first is that the 
treatment to be deserved is always part of an institution.^^ Without an institution, there 
is nothing for a person to deserve. Thus desert claims can make sense only if it 
presupposes the existence of institution. For example, without a school and an 
examination system, there is no grade to be distributed. Claims of deserving grades do 
not exist until a school system is established. 
The second argument is that the content of desert basis is defined by 
institutions. Institutions are the ultimate only source of desert basis. Suppose the 
desert basis for a student to get grade A in an examination is to show the best 
academic ability in the class. But what counts as academic ability is determined by 
requirements of the examination and curriculum. We do not know the desert basis 
unless an institution is established. It means that desert is institutional and there is no 
conception of pre-institutional desert. 
Both arguments are problematic. First, the first argument wrongly holds that a 
sensible desert claim must presuppose what the deserved treatment exactly is. 
Deserved treatment is a necessary part of a desert claim. But treatment can be 
something general. A desert claim can make sense without specifying what the 
deserved treatment is. For example, we can make a general claim that capable 
students should deserve some rewards. Even if an exact treatment must be specified, 
desert does not necessarily presuppose institutions. Not all treatments are defined by 
institutions and can only exist after institutions are set up. For instance, rewards for a 
good student can be praise, teacher's recognition, good grades or scholarships. Only 
the latter two presuppose an institution. More importantly, the first argument has not 
argued for the core idea of the institutional view. Recall that the defining feature of 
26 Owen McLeod, "Desert and institutions" in Louis Pojman and Owen McLeod, Doing and Deserving, 
p. 187. Also, see David Miller, Social Justice, p. 92 
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the institutional view of desert is that the condition set in an institution is the sole 
source of desert basis. Based on this reason, it is concluded that institution exist prior 
to desert. But the first argument directly argues for the conclusion without arguing 
that desert basis is determined by the institution. Even if it successfully argues that 
institution must exist before what we know people exactly deserve, it cannot defend 
the institutional view. 
The second argument is wrong because institution does not create desert, nor 
can it explain what a correct desert basis is. ^^  Desert basis is fundamentally 
determined by the purpose of an activity and the goods to be distributed, but not rules 
that regulate and institutionalize the activity. For the sake of argument, let me assume 
that education is primarily an activity to promote and create knowledge. Education is 
good when it promotes high quality knowledge. A student is good when he, through 
education, comes to possess a lot of knowledge. The standard of assessing 
performance and deserving rewards for students should then be based on the degree of 
knowledge a student possesses. This is the most fundamental claim with regard to 
distribution of goods in education. This idea is decided by the purpose of the activity 
but not by the institution. Certainly, what knowledge means substantively can be 
different. The exact content of desert basis may vary with how institutions define 
knowledge. But any definitions of knowledge cannot alter the fundamental claim that 
a student who becomes knowledgeable is good and thus deserve rewards. 
The institutional view of desert has another problem that it fails to distinguish 
desert from entitlement. Entitlement is a purely institutional concept. One is entitled 
to a treatment if one has fulfilled the condition specified by a rule. The measure of 
treatment is also defined by the rule. Institutional rule is the sole source of 
27 Miller, Social Justice, p. 92 
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determining who is entitled and what can be entitled to. The rule and the institution 
are decided by external principle. The concept of entitlement does not provide any 
resource to decide the rule, the conditions to entitle, the amount of entitlement and the 
relationship between them. On the other hand, desert is a natural and pre-institutional 
concept. 28 Desert claims do exist prior to institutions. Desert basis and deserved 
treatment are not decided by institution. The reason why a person deserves certain 
treatment is independent of the rules of institutions, but primarily related to the 
activity and constraint by the concept of desert. Compared with entitlement, desert is 
a thick concept that it stipulates what a desert basis can be, as well as the relationship 
between the desert basis and deserved treatment, i.e. the amount of treatment must be 
proportional to the desert basis. 
Failing to distinguish desert from entitlement, institutional view of desert has 
to face following difficulties. First, the scope of the conditions to entitle is much 
broader than the scope of desert. Institutional desert includes claims that are in 
conflict with the concept of desert. This makes institutional desert an incoherent 
concept. For example, in many countries, there are certain laws stating that 
government will provide allowance to unemployed citizens. Thus, an unemployed 
citizen who meet other requirements of the law are entitled to that allowance. But we 
cannot say that the unemployed deserve the allowance because they have done 
nothing to make themselves deserve the allowance. Being unemployed is not 
something good which is congruent with the benefit. The allowance is best explained 
as serving the basic need of citizens rather than to reward citizens' desert. But an 
institutional view of desert may hold that an unemployed deserve the allowance 
simply because the rule states it as such. 
28 Feinberg, p. 56 
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Secondly, an institutional view of desert fails to consider two important roles 
played by desert. One is that desert can be used to criticize institutional rules or 
entitlements. Criticisms will usually take the form that an institution fails to reward 
what people deserve. I do think that this kind of criticism pose a challenge to an 
institution because, as I will show later, failing to reward what people deserve is 
undesirable. The failure provides a good reason to reform the existing institution. But 
an institutional view of desert cannot perform this critical function. Suppose in a 
country where the right to freely transfer properties is duly protected, Sam receives a 
large heritance from his father. If his father expresses a will to transfer his wealth to 
Sam when he dies, Sam is perfectly entitled to the heritance. According to the 
institutional view of desert, Sam deserves the money. However, if we adopt a pre-
institutional view of desert, Sam does not deserve the heritance because he has done 
nothing good to deserve the wealth. We can make critique of the institution on the 
good ground that it distributes benefits in a way that people get undeserved benefits. 
But I do not hold that an inheritance system is wrong simply because it fails to reward 
what people deserve nor do I claim that every institution must reward what people 
deserve. I have stated that desert is not a conclusive reason of whether certain 
treatment is appropriate. Yet, since desert is a distinct moral notion and, as I will 
argue, has its own moral force, failing to reward what people deserve may serve as a 
good ground to test if an institution is unjust. Desert gives a possible starting point to 
criticize existing institution. 
Apart from the critical function, pre-institutional desert also provides support 
for establishing institutions and guiding how institutions should be designed. An 
example is the establishment of an institution that rewards civic virtues and good 
citizenship. It is strange to think that the institution to reward good citizenship comes 
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before the idea of good citizenship. A more plausible explanation is to have the 
standard of civic virtue first, and then give rewards to those citizens who possess the 
virtues. Since the institution is set to reward good citizenship, conditions to earn the 
good citizenship award depend on what civic virtues are. The content of desert 
provides a direction on how the institution should be designed. The design of an 
institution cannot deviate from the desert basis. For instance, the institution cannot 
reward those who are handsome because appearance is not relevant to civic virtues at 
all. But an institutional view of desert cannot perform this function. This is because if 
what people deserve is determined by the condition stated in the institution, it is 
impossible that the institution is designed with reference to what people deserve. 
If it is not the institution to decide the desert basis, then what is it? As the 
example of rewarding good citizenship shows, desert basis is decided by the point of 
that activity. Recall that desert is an affective notion. One must have done good, 
favored or admirable actions to deserve good treatments. All desert judgments thus 
presuppose a standard of good. Since doing a good performance means to be able to 
deserve a good treatment, the standard of good also determines what actions or 
characteristics can be desert basis. It is the standard to judge what desert basis is 
appropriate. But the standard is not arbitrarily determined. It is heavily related to the 
point of the activity. Let me use an example to illustrate this point. Suppose the aim of 
education is to promote and create knowledge. Knowledge is a standard to judge what 
is good in education. For example, knowledge is the currency to judge the 
performance of schools and students. A school is good if it can promote and create a 
lot of knowledge. A student who acquires possesses and creates a lot of knowledge is 
a good student. 
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It is then easy to understand why running fast cannot be a basis of deserving 
rewards in education. Running fast is not a favored quality in education. Nor is it a 
standard to judge what is good in education. Running fast is simply irrelevant to the 
point of education. But it does not mean that running fast can never be a desert basis 
of anything. Running fast is an appropriate desert basis in a race because the point of 
a race is to distinguish the fastest runner and to encourage runners to run faster. 
Running fast is a favored and admired good in a race. Running fast is the standard of 
good that determines who is a good runner. Since rewards are distributed to good 
runners, running fast is the proper desert basis of rewards in a race. On the other hand, 
in a race, knowledge becomes an inappropriate desert basis. 
This understanding of desert basis is vindicated by fact that desert basis for 
different types of activity are different in everyday life. The argument I have made -
that the desert basis is decided by the meaning of the activity where the distribution is 
located - offers good explanation for this phenomenon. Such understanding shows 
that desert has a pluralistic and particularistic aspect. Desert basis for different 
activities are different. All of them are sensitive to the meaning or the point of that 
activity. Moreover, the desert basis is pre-institutional. What it presumes is only the 
purpose of an activity where distribution is located. It does not presuppose the 
existence of institution. Its content is not determined by institution. Under this view, 
desert can still perform the two functions I have suggested. 
Conclusion 
To conclude, let me summarize the relationship between desert basis, institution and 
the activity. I have argued that institution cannot properly decide what the basis of 
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desert is. This institutional view mixes up the idea of entitlement and desert. 
Entitlement entails that the condition to entitle and the entitled treatment are solely 
determined by the rules of an institution. On the other hand, desert is a natural and 
pre-institutional concept. It is decided by the activity where distribution takes place. 
However, desert and institution are related in some sense. On the one hand, desert 
provides reason to criticize existing institutions and establish new institutions. On the 
other hand, institutions offer support to realize - it states that what desert basis and 
deserved treatment exactly is. 
This chapter has accounted for a conception of desert, especially some 
important features of the concept and its usage in distributive justice. However, this is 
just half of the story. Another half is to explain why the idea of desert is morally 
important in distributive justice. Only if can we show the moral significance of desert, 
Nozick's exclusion of desert from his entitlement becomes a big issue. This is the task 
of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE MORAL SIGNIFICANCE OF DESERT 
In this chapter, I offer a general account of the moral significance of desert my 
account is general in two sense. First, it does not draw reference from Nozick's 
entitlement theory. It does not aim to argue against Nozick's rejection of desert. They 
are not raised because they hold assumptions I think more plausible than Nozick's 
theory. I raise those accounts because they are plausible in itself. The second reason I 
name this account general is to distinguish this chapter from a later part of my thesis. 
In chapter 4, I will argue that Nozick has sufficient reasons to put desert in the 
entitlement theory. Those reasons are more specific accounts of the moral significance 
of desert as they start from premises endorsed in the entitlement theory. I name those 
accounts in this chapter "general" so as to make a differentiation. 
The purpose of giving a general account of the moral significance of desert is 
to make sense of this project. It aims to persuade readers, whether a Nozickean or not, 
that desert is a significant moral concept and that it is worth discussing whether desert 
should be excluded from the entitlement theory. If my argument is plausible, Nozick 
should take desert seriously and consider to allow desert to play a role in this 
entitlement theory. 
I will give two arguments for the moral significance of desert. First, is that 
desert ensures that people's fate is decided by what flows from their voluntary choices. 
In this view, desert draws its moral force from the value of autonomy and the 
conviction that we should be responsible for our choice. Second, desert implies the 
congruence of good desert basis and good treatment. The congruence has two appeals. 
One is that the congruence fits our expectation of the consequence of doing good or 
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bad things. If there is no congruence, people will have resentment towards the current 
distribution. Another appeal is that the congruence can ensure that the meanings of the 
good to be distributed and the activity where distribution is located are not distorted. 
2.1 Emotional Response to Undeserved Treatment 
The key idea of desert is the congruence of a good desert basis and a good treatment. 
Therefore, to enquire the moral importance of desert it is useful to start with the 
importance of the congruence. The congruence seems to be matched with our moral 
experience. We have a natural desire to hope that a virtuous person deserves some 
good results, or a person who has done good deeds receives good results. If things 
turn otherwise, i.e. a good person suffers or fails to achieve what he has worked hard 
for, we feel uncomfortable with it. A worse case is that a bad person or a person who 
has never done any good obtains a lot of good results. We will probably feel great 
resentment, when a ruthless criminal is judged not guilty or an incompetent shoe-
shiner gets a reward higher than most of his hard-working colleagues. 
Resentment is a usual response to undeserved treatment. This can be explained 
by the nature of desert judgments. As David Miller said, "desert belongs together with 
'reactive attitudes' such as gratitude and resentment to what Peter Strawson has called 
the 'participant' perspective on human life, in which we regard others as freely 
choosing agents like ourselves, and respond to their actions accordingly."^^ But this 
resentment is different from ordinary reactive attitude towards an immoral act. When 
a person lies, we feel angry towards a liar, the doer of an immoral act. Yet, the object 
of resentment in desert claims is not the subject of desert, but the person or institution 
29 Miller, Principles of Social Justice, p. 136 
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who is responsible for determining the treatment. Although we may not like the act of 
the shoe-shiner if he is given an undeserved reward, we would not feel discontented 
with him. Rather, we would feel discontented with the boss of the company who 
decides to give him rewards. Certainly, institution is not a freely choosing agent. 
There is no point to resent it or blame it. If an institution rewards undeserved results, 
the targets of resentment are the people responsible for setting up the institution. 
The resentment resulted from incongruence of desert basis and treatment 
shows that desert is important in pubic conception of justice. This kind of resentment 
also has a practical implication. If a society consistently fails to reward what people 
deserve, people will be discontented about the current social system. Such situation 
will create social unrest. A system that has an aim to maintain social stability must 
give heed to desert. However, all these are not moral arguments. To go beyond 
practical reasons for taking desert seriously, we need to go beyond the resentment and 
study further why desert is morally important. 
2.2 Desert and Autonomy 
One central feature of desert is that the base must be, to a certain extent, within OUR 
control. Desert dictates that it is appropriate for us to keep results flowing from our 
own choice. These are two different claims. One is that if something flows from our 
own choice, we should be able to keep it (claim A); another is that if some good that 
we cannot sufficiently control, we should not keep it (claim B). At the surface, it 
seems that claims A and B are closely related. However, they have different appeals. 
The force of claim B derives from a deep belief that all of us are of equal worth and 
that no one is by nature inferior or superior to another. This belief rejects the idea of 
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deserving without doing any good. As I have argued, desert demands congruence 
between good desert basis and good treatment. If one shall deserve a good result, one 
must have done something good or possess some virtues. However, if one can deserve 
without doing anything good or showing that he is good, the only explanation is that 
the person by nature possesses some goods. But this contradicts against the belief of 
equal moral worth among people. Thus, given our belief that no one is by nature 
superior, one cannot deserve without doing anything good or showing one is good. 
On the other hand, the force of claim A resides in the belief that human beings 
are autonomous and that people should be responsible for their own actions. 
Autonomy implies responsibility. An autonomous being should be responsible for 
one's action. To express it in a concrete way, to be responsible for one's action is to 
be affected by the results flowing from our action. Therefore, an autonomous being 
should bear the consequence of one's own action. As Robert Simon says, 
Since our performances and appraisals express our choices, evaluations and 
decisions, since they are our actions, we would not be treated as persons- as 
autonomous agents - if they were to be dismisses as illegitimate or were totally 
ignored...[I]f an individuals is to be treated as a person...the individual's own 
purposes, goals, intentions and judgments should determine his or her fate, 
consistent with similar regard for others.^ ® 
To let people deserve the consequence of their choices is to let people's choice 
determine their own fate and to let people be responsible for their choice. Thus, the 
force of desert derives from responsibility and, ultimately, a belief that we are 
autonomous agents who can make our own choice. We value desert because we think 
we are autonomous and should be responsible for our own choice. 
30 Robert Simon, "An Indirect Defense of the Merit Principle", The Philosophical Forum 10’（1978-
1979), nos. 2-4, p. 237, cited from George Sher, Desert, p. 38 
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Although desert is close to the idea of responsibility, there is no reason to 
equate desert to responsibility. One crucial feature of desert is its demand on 
congruence between good desert basis and good treatment. This entails that one's fate 
and what one has done that leads to the fate should both be good or both be bad. But 
responsibility is different from desert as it does not command the congruence. 
Responsibility only dictates that we should bear the consequence of our choices. It 
does not demand that the consequence and choice be both good or be both bad. One 
has to be responsible for the bad results although one has done nothing wrong or bad. 
For instance, suppose Jack and Sam are the only two nominees for a best-
performance reward in a company. Jack is brilliant and diligent. He contributes a lot 
to the company. However, since he is too sharp, his boss, Tim, who decides who 
should win the reward, does not like him. Tim likes Sam a lot. Sam is neither 
outstanding nor hard working. He is only good at flattering the boss. And that is why 
Tim likes Sam. Most people in the company predict that Sam will win the reward, 
because they know that Tim is not magnanimous. Even Jack knows that if he tries to 
ingratiate Tim, he will win. But he chooses not to please Tim because he does not like 
Tim as a person. He wants to get the prize but not at the expense of his integrity. In 
the end, Sam wins the rewards and Jack loses. Since Jack has chosen not to please 
Tim, he should be responsible for the consequence. Jack has to accept that the reward 
goes to Sam. On the other hand, Sam is responsible for the reward because it flows 
from his voluntary choice — he just follows the latent rule and gives what Tim wants. 
However, no one should think that Sam deserves the reward. It is Jack who deserves 
the reward because his performance in the company is much better than Tim. This 
example shows the difference between desert and responsibility. 
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Some would argue that Jack does not deserve the reward because he chose to 
give up the reward. They may also argue that Sam does deserve the prize because he 
deliberately worked hard to earn the prize though the effort was directed to pleasing 
Tim. But I do not think this claims is valid because it has mistaken the idea of desert. 
As I have argued, the proper desert basis should be decided by the point of that 
activity, i.e. in this case the point of work. According to this, contribution and effort 
should be a desert basis of rewards in work. Jack is simply better than Sam in these 
two aspects. Jack deserves the reward much more than Sam. Another point they argue 
is that Sam has also paid great effort — the effort to flatter the boss and therefore he 
deserves the reward. But this kind of effort is not a proper desert basis for the reward. 
As mentioned, only effort that is contributive to work count as desert basis. Since the 
point of work is to create value for users, effort is contributive to work when such 
effort produce values for users. But effort used in flattering the boss is not this kind 
and it should be not counted. 
I do not judge whether Jack should lose the reward and if the moral demand of 
desert should override that of responsibility. I just want to show that, by this example, 
desert is distinct from responsibility, as desert requires congruence between good 
treatment and good desert basis but responsibility does not. Another, perhaps more 
important, implication is that the moral force of desert does not only come from 
responsibility, namely, the idea that one's choice should determine one's fate. For if it 
does, we would have no reason to argue that Jack should indeed receive the reward. 
However, considering desert alone, we would agree that Jack should have the reward. 
This judgment suggests that there are other moral reasons to account for the 
significance of desert. 
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2.3 Desert, Congruence and the Meaning of the Good 
I believe this appeal stems from the congruence between good treatment and good 
desert basis. The congruence of good treatment and good desert basis is simply 
attractive. What would be better than a saint who has a good life and a criminal who is 
duly punished? The congruence view matches one of our deepest convictions that 
good people should prosper and the vicious should suffer. This conviction is 
fundamental to our moral experience. We always employ this claim to persuade that 
we should be moral and justify why we choose to act morally. Nevertheless, the point 
is that this deep conviction creates an expectation that a good person should prosper 
and an evil person should suffer. When we have the chance to decide rewarding or 
punishing good a person, we are inclined, or even feel obliged to follow the 
expectation, as if to follow a rule, that we will choose rewarding a good person. The 
claim of desert is powerful because it fits this conviction. 
In distributive desert, another appeal of the congruence of good treatment and 
good desert basis is that it helps preserve the meaning of the good to be distributed 
and the meaning of the activity. We feel uncomfortable when the meanings of the 
activity and the good to be distributed have been distorted. Let us take education and 
distribution of grades as an example again. I have supposed that the purpose of 
education is to promote and create knowledge. A learner is good when, through 
education, he is able to manipulate a lot of knowledge. Generally speaking, the greater 
knowledge one will acquire, the better learner one should be. 
Now, imagine a teacher does not distribute grades according to students' 
knowledge, but according to their behavior. It turns out that the most obedient 
students get the best grade while the rebellious students, though they are very 
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intelligent and knowledgeable, get poor grades. Given our understanding of the 
purpose of education and grades, those naughty but knowledgeable students do not 
deserve their poor grades. The obedient students' good grades are also undeserved. 
The treatments are undeserved because the grades are distributed according to 
standard that is inappropriate. To grade student according to their obedience distorts 
the meaning of grade. Since grade is, broadly speaking, a kind of prize to reward good 
students. Such a standard also distorts what a good student, and hence what good 
means in education. Since the definition of good is determined by the meaning and 
purpose of the activity, defining good in terms of obedience will distort the meaning 
of education. The meaning or purpose of education is changed from promotion of 
knowledge to teaching student how to be obedient. 
The importance of desert lies in ensuring the goods are distributed according 
to the meanings of the activity. To distribute according to what people deserve can 
prevent the meanings of the goods and the activity from being distorted. It is not to 
say that the meaning of the good and the activity will not change, or there is one fixed 
meaning for every activity over time. In fact, people may give new meaning to an 
activity. But, without consensus on the new meaning, to distribute according to 
standards that have no connection with the meaning of the good and activity would 
destroy the expectation people have on the distribution of the good. 
Conclusion 
I have articulated two sources of the moral importance of desert. On the one hand, 
desert draws its force from the value of autonomy and the idea that we should be 
responsible for our own choice. On the other hand, the congruence demanded by 
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desert not only fits our deep moral conviction, but also help preserve the meaning and 
purpose of the activities where distribution is located. These two reasons are good 
enough to show that the claim desert does have an independent moral force. We have 
strong moral reason to reward what people deserve. And failing to reward what 
people deserve is morally undesirable. 
After establishing the moral significance of desert, we can now turn to 
examine the proper place of desert in Nozick's theory of justice. In the coming 




THE ENTITLMENT THEORY AND 
OBJECTIONS TO DESERT 
In last two chapters, I have articulated the conception and the moral significance of 
desert. From this chapter on, I will turn to examine the relationship between Nozick's 
entitlement theory and desert. In this chapter, I shall look into Nozick's account of 
desert and check whether his position is well justified in three parts. First of all, I will 
outline the structure and content of the entitlement theory. Then, I will analyze the 
place of desert in the entitlement theory. Lastly, I will examine if Nozick has provided 
justifiable reasons to support his position. 
Using his own philosophical framework, I argue that Nozick would classify 
desert as a type of historical patterned principle. Since he holds that patterned 
principle is unjustified, any claims of desert would not be considered in the 
entitlement theory. I shall show that there are three arguments against patterned 
principle. First, Nozick contends that desert interferes with people's liberty and 
voluntary actions. Second, desert violates the rights of property owners. Thirdly, 
desert contradicts the right of self-ownership, the foundation of the entitlement theory. 
I will refute these three arguments one by one 
3.1 Outline of the Entitlement Theory 
In Anarchy, State and Utopia, Nozick aims to construct a theory of state and 
distributive justice based on individual rights. In a nutshell, the theory takes the 
separateness of individuals seriously. People should not be forced to provide service 
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to others for whatever reason. They are only morally obliged to respect the rights of 
others and keep voluntarily made promises. He concludes that the state that fulfills 
those ideas is "a minimal state, limited to the narrow functions of protection against 
force, theft, fraud, enforcement of contract".^' 
In this minimal state, problems regarding distributive justice are dealt with by 
the entitlement theory of justice, which justifies a free market society. In that society, 
people have private properties protected by non-violable property rights. People are 
free to transfer their holdings in ways as they like on the condition that they respect 
other people's similar rights. He objects to any non-voluntary government-led 
redistribution and taxation in the name of justice, equality or humanitarian reasons 
because they infringe properties rights and the inviolability of individuals. Nozick 
only accepts a minimal level of tax for sustaining the function of the minimal state. 
The entitlement theory maintains that a distribution of holdings is just “if 
everyone is entitled to the holding one possesses in that distribution".^^ People create 
entitlement on holdings in two ways. One is to acquire previously unowned natural 
resources in accordance with the principle of initial acquisition. Another way is to 
receive owned holdings through transfers from other people in accordance with the 
principle of transfer. Holdings not arisen according to these two principles are 
illegitimate and unjust. They should be redistributed so as to rectify past injustice, 
according to the principle of rectification. In the entitlement theory, these three 
principles deal with all questions of distributive justice. No other standard is relevant 
to the requirement of justice. 
So long as a person abides the first two principles and is entitled to a holding, 
one has full property rights on the holding. Property rights grant the owner an 
Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (hereafter ASU), (New York: Basic Books, 1974), p. ix 
^^  Nozick, ASU, p. 151 
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exclusive power to decide what is to be done with the holding provided that it is not 
used to violate the rights of others.^^ Property rights are absolute and paramount so 
that no other moral reasons can override them. 
To give a fuller picture of the entitlement theory, it is necessary to elaborate 
on principles of acquisition and of transfer because they state the conditions under 
which entitlements are created. Let me begin with the principle of initial acquisition. 
This principle explains the very beginning of the creation of entitlement and an initial 
just situation on which later transfers are based. 
The basic idea of the principle is that one can freely appropriate any unowned 
resources and turn them into one's entitlement provided that certain conditions are 
satisfied. In the entitlement theory, one important condition is a weak version of 
Lockean proviso. 34 The weak Lockean proviso states that an appropriation of an 
unowned object should not worsen the situations of others. The situations of others 
are worsened if "others are no longer being able to use freely (without appropriation) 
what he previously could".^^ Nozick claims that any acquisition should not violate the 
weak Lockean Proviso. In other words, Nozick means that an appropriation is unjust 
and cannot create entitlement if others are no longer able to use that kind of resources 
freely after that appropriation. 
Let me discuss a bit further on this point in order to expose one weakness of 
Nozick's theory. Nozick distinguishes the weak version of Lockean proviso from a 
strong version, which states that others are worsen if they, not being unable to use, but 
"lose the opportunity to improve his situation by a particular appropriation".^^ He 
“Nozick , ASU.,^. 171 
^^  Nozick, ASU, P. 178 
^^ Ibid. p. 176 
36 Ibid. 
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refuses to adopt a strong version of Lockean Proviso because it is susceptible to the 
challenge of "zipping back". The argument runs as follows 
Consider the first person Z for whom there is not enough and as good left to 
appropriate. The last person Y to appropriate left Z without his previous liberty to 
act on an object, and so worsened Z's situation. So Y's appropriation is not 
allowed under Locke's Proviso. Therefore the next to last person X to 
appropriate left Y in a worse position, for X's act ended permissible 
appropriation. Therefore X's appropriation wasn't permissible. But then the 
appropriator two from last, W, ended permissible appropriation and so, since it 
worsened X's position, W's appropriation wasn't permissible. And so on back to 
the first person A to appropriate a permanent property right.^ ^ 
The conclusion of the challenge is that, according to the strong Lockean Proviso, 
every appropriation is unjust and therefore a system of private property rights cannot 
be established. This is a serious threat for Nozick's theory. But under the weak 
version, "though Z can no longer appropriate, there may remain some for him to use 
as before ”38 Thus, the weak proviso can avoid the zipping back criticism and is 
compatible with appropriation and permanent property rights. It is understandable that 
Nozick prefers the weak to the strong version of Lockean Proviso. 
This does not explain why a weak Lockean Proviso is justified, however. Why 
is the proviso an important element of the principle of acquisition? An immediate 
answer is that he thinks that worsening the situation of others is not permissible. 
Worsening here refers to being unable to use freely what one previously could. But 
what is the reference point of comparison? Worsening is defined in terms of what can 
be used. Though unspecified, I believe for Nozick, this category includes external 
physical resources and one's own body. Thus if one has less physical resources at 
their disposal, or being less able to use his body after a particular appropriation, that 
appropriation worsens his situation and is regarded as unjustified. 
^^  Nozick, ASU, p. 176. 
''Ibid. 
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Upon the question of reference point of comparison, Nozick, again, does not 
give an answer.^^ Some critics suggest that Nozick uses "pre-appropriation common 
usage" as the reference point.卯 Whether an appropriation worsens the situation of 
others depends on the situations beforehand, where everyone can use that resource. 
But I think Nozick can be open to a lot of possibilities here. Unowned resources could 
have been used in many ways if an individual does not appropriate them. For example, 
resources can be appropriated by a group of people (joint ownership), or used by a 
group of people or an individual without appropriation. It is reasonable to assume that 
Nozick does not exclude these possibilities. 
Nevertheless, there is a more fundamental question left unsolved. On what 
ground is worsening the situation of others (in the way described) a wrong act that has 
to be forbidden? Nozick does not give a clear and direct answer. This is a crucial flaw 
in the entitlement theory. Later in this chapter I should show how it undermine 
Nozick's objection to desert. Let me now turn to elaborate the principle of transfer. 
The principle of transfer deals with the question of how owned things should 
be distributed. The principle attempts to specify legitimate means by which a just 
distribution may move to another distribution that is also just. The principle of 
transfer is distinct from other theories of distributive justice in the sense that it does 
not deal with the result of distribution, but focusing on the process of distribution. 
This view is explained by Nozick's belief that "whatever arises from a just situation 
by just steps is i t s e l f just. ”斗】This notion means that, given a just initial distribution, a 
just process is sufficient to justify subsequent distribution. The result of the 
distribution is not an issue. Since the issue of just start is already dealt with by the 
principle initial acquisition, the principle of transfer only needs to explicate the just 
Nozick, AS77., p. 177 
40 Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy, p. 116 
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steps that give rise to a just distribution. It does not include any substantive standard 
independent of procedure. 
Thus the core of the principle of transfer is to define what a just step is. 
Nozick's answer consists of two components. On the surface, he simply advocates 
that a legitimate means is voluntary transfer. He claims when two parties reach an 
agreement to transfer voluntarily, the transfer is just and legitimate. Nozick illustrates 
this point with the famous Chamberlain example. He asks us first to imagine a 
supposedly just initial distribution, Dl . 
Now suppose that Wilt Chamberlain is greatly demanded by basketball team, 
being a great gate attraction... He signs the follow sort of contract with a team: 
In each home game, twenty-five cents from the price of each ticket of 
admission goes to him...The season starts, and people cheerfully attend his 
team's games; they buy their tickets, each time dripping a separate twenty-five 
cents of their admission price into a special box with Chamberlain's name on it. 
They are excited about seeing him play; it is worth the total admission price to 
them. Let us suppose that in one season one million persons attend his home 
games, and Wilt Chamberlain winds up with $250,000, a much larger sum than 
the average income and larger even than anyone else has. Is he entitled to this 
income? Is this news distribution D2 unjust? If so, why?...If Dl was a just 
distribution, and people voluntarily moved from it to D2, transferring parts of 
their shares they were given under Dl ...isn't D2 also just? If the people were 
entitled to dispose of the resources to which they were entitled (under Dl), 
didn't this include their being entitled to give it to, or exchange it with, Wilt 
Chamberlain?'^ 
Nozick maintains that D2 is just because it arises from an initial just situation 
through voluntary transfer? But why does voluntary transaction solely determine the 
principle of transfer? Let me explain. Recall that for Nozick a distribution is just if 
everyone is entitled to the holding one possesses. A new distribution is just if the 
process that brings it about preserves every entitlement. Entitlement is preserved if 
new owners also have entitlements over the newly obtained holdings. But how can an 
entitlement be given to a new owner? 
42 N o z i c k，观 p. 161 
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As one has entitlement to a holding, one possesses full property right over that 
holding. Full property right includes the right to transfer the holding, together with the 
property right attached to it, to others. It follows that the owner can pass the holding, 
with property right, to the receiver. The receiver then will obtain the holding with full 
property right and is entitled to it. After the transfer, as the receiver is entitled to the 
holding, ceteris paribus, everyone is entitled to the holding one possesses. The overall 
new distribution of holding thus remains justified according to the entitlement theory. 
The content of entitlement and full property right not only explain why 
voluntary transfer is sufficient to confer entitlement, it also explains why voluntary 
transfer is the only way to justify non-initial distribution. Property right is exclusive 
so that other parties cannot legitimately decide what to do with that holding, without 
the owner's consent. Unless the owner voluntarily transfers the right to other parties, 
the current distribution of entitlement should not be changed. Any distribution that 
violates the principle of transfer is illegitimate. A legitimate distribution arises only if 
owners transfer their property to other parties. 
For this part, the justification of the principle of transfer is right-based. It is the 
content and exclusiveness of property right that set the conditions of just transfers. 
Voluntary transfer is just because it preserves individual's rights. I shall further 
examine the content and the justification of Nozickean right in section 3. Now, I 
would like to account for another factor which constrains a just transfer. Nozick 
maintains that the principle of transfer, like the principle of initial acquisition, is also 
constrained by the weak Lockean Proviso. As he explains, 
"A theory which includes this proviso in its principle of justice in acquisition 
must also contain a more complex principle of justice in transfer. Some 
reflection of the proviso about appropriation constrains later actions. If my 
appropriating all of a certain substance violates the Lockean proviso, then so 
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does my appropriating some and purchasing all the rest from others who 
obtained it without otherwise violating the Lockean Proviso.，，43 
Including the weak Lockean Proviso complicates the principle of transfer. A complete 
principle of transfer states that a just transfer must be voluntary and must not worsen 
the situation of others. Following the complete principle, we cannot monopolize 
resources even if we purchase all of them through voluntary transaction because it 
will worsen the situation of others. For instance, we cannot purchase all drinkable 
water in the world. 
It is easy to see that the complete principle of transfer is self-contradictory 
because the weak Lockean Proviso may violate property right. While property right 
grants the owner the freedom to transfer the holding to other parties, the weak 
Lockean Proviso forbids voluntary transfers that would worsen the situation of others. 
Nozick may reply that the contradiction is misguided because of an incorrect 
conception of right. He would agree that property right does not grant the owner to 
use the holding in whatever way he likes. For example, we cannot use our property in 
ways that violate the rights of others. However, forbidding the owner to use the 
holding in that way does not violate his right. Arguing along this line, Nozick must 
assume that we have a right not to be worsened, or hold that it is impermissible to 
worsen the situation of others though we do not have a right not to be worsened. In 
section 3 I will show that both answers create consequences that Nozick cannot accept. 
The principle of initial acquisition and the principle of transfer determine what 
a just distribution of holdings is in the entitlement theory. They prescribe how 
entitlement arises. The third principle, the principle of rectification is concerned with 
how and to what extent injustice should be rectified. Although Nozick does not 
Nozick, ASU, p. 179 
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provide detailed account of this principle, its basic content is determined by the 
principle of transfer and of initial acquisition, because they are the goal of 
rectification. Since the principle of rectification does not affect the substantive content 
of the entitlement theory, I shall not elaborate it further. 
Having sketched the principles of the entitlement theory, I will now proceed to 
explain the justification of the entitlement theory. The Entitlement theory is founded 
on individual rights. It is the right to private property that defines entitlement and a 
just distribution of holdings. It also justifies the central tenet of the principle of 
transfer. Yet besides the right to private property, Nozick holds that we also have 
absolute rights to life and liberty. We have right not to be killed and the right to be left 
alone to do what we want. Minimal state and the entitlement theory are justified 
because they respect these rights. 
These rights are negative rights, or rights to non-interference. They form side-
constraints upon what others may not do to the right-bearer. People have duties to 
refrain from doing actions that infringe others' rights. For example, if I have a right to 
life, it entails that others have a duty not to do any action that will endanger my life. 
Negative right is different from positive right, which imposes a duty on others to 
proactively assist the right-bearer to achieve certain goals. If I have a positive right to 
life, then other people have a duty to assist me to sustain my life. 
Nozick's conception of rights is founded on the separateness of persons and 
self-ownership. He emphasized that we are separate individuals with our own lives to 
lead. There is no large social entity that can override individuals. We are not part of 
the social entity. Rather, we are our self-owners. We are owners of ourselves just like 
owners of other objects. To respect this fact, people should have right to decide their 
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own lives.44 No one should be forced to provide services to another individual. This 
commitment to self-ownership explains why Nozick believes that we have absolute 
rights that other people must not violate.*， 
Yet why should we treat people as separate individuals? This is because we 
are rational autonomous agent. As Nozick says, we are 
a being able to formulate long-term plans for its life, able to consider and 
decide on the basis of abstract principles or considerations it formulates to 
itself and hence not merely the plaything of immediate stimuli, a being that 
limits its own behavior in accordance with some principles or picture it has 
of what an appropriate life is for itself and others, and... [able] to regulate and 
guide its life in accordance with some overall conception to choose to 
accept.46 
In short, to maintain our separateness is important because we are rational and free 
moral agency, having the capacity to shape our lives. If we are not regarded as 
separate persons, we will not be able to utilize this capacity. Why is it so important to 
realize this potential? This is related to the meaning of life. For Nozick, “a person's 
shaping his life in accordance with some overall plan is his way of giving meaning to 
his life; only a being with the capacity to so shape his life can have or strive for 
meaningful life.”*? In other words, developing and exercising that capacity will enable 
a person to have, at least the opportunity of having, the meaning of life. This is the 
ultimate justification of the entitlement theory. 
In this section, I have briefly articulated the structure, some major components, 
and the foundation of the entitlement theory. In sum, the theory holds that the overall 
distribution is just if everyone can have his legitimate entitlement defined by his 
Wolff, Robert Nozick, p. 7 
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principles of justice. Entitlement is created by legitimate process, through initial 
appropriation and voluntary transfers. Having these backgrounds, we can now start to 
start to discuss the relationship between desert and the entitlement theory. Now let me 
begin with explaining how Nozick posits desert in the entitlement theory. 
3.2 Desert as a Patterned Principle 
This section will examine how Nozick posits desert. To begin with, I shall introduce 
the framework that Nozick employs to classify theories of distributive justice. The 
framework consists of two dimensions. The first dimension holds that a principle can 
be either historical or end-state. A principle is historical if past circumstances or 
actions of people can determine what holdings one person should have.^^ An example 
of historical principle is the entitlement theory. For the theory says that we should 
have what we are entitled to; and what we are entitled to are entirely created by past 
events, i.e. appropriation or transfers. Contrarily, end-state principle is ahistorical 
because it only accord with a given structure. It does not concern what happened in 
the past. Utilitarianism is a type of end-state theory. The general claim of 
utilitarianism, i.e. a distribution is just if it maximizes total happiness in society. A 
distribution is not justified by what happened in the past. 
The second dimension holds that, a distribution can be said to be patterned or 
non-pattemed. A principle is patterned if it specifies that a distribution should "vary 
along with some natural dimensions, weighted sum of natural dimensions, or 
lexicographic ordering of natural dimensions'''^^ A distribution according to I.Q. is an 
example of patterned principle. It is patterned because the amount of holdings we 
48 Nozick, pp. 155 
Ibid., p. 156 
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should have is judged by the level of I.Q. The higher the I.Q. we have, more holdings 
we should have, and vice versa. A principle that does not accord with any dimension 
is called non-pattemed principle. While Nozick claims that "almost every suggested 
principle of distributive justice is patterned", the entitlement theory is non-pattemed 
because the distribution does not vary along any natural dimension. 
According to this framework, Nozick should classify desert as historical and 
patterned principle. Desert is historical because a desert claim is justified by desert 
basis, which are actions or characteristics that one has done or shown in the past. As 
Nozick says "historical principles of justice hold that past circumstances or actions of 
people can create differential entitlements and differential deserts to t h i n g s . T h i s 
clearly shows Nozick holds that desert is historical principle. 
However, Nozick does not explicitly claim that desert is patterned principle. 
He comes close to discuss desert when he mentions two patterned principles, i.e. 
distribution according to moral merit according to benefits given to others. These two 
patterned principles are close to two interpretations of desert: desert as moral worth 
and as contribution.^' Both interpretations of desert require that the reward one should 
have should vary with the level of moral worth or contribution one has made. 
This conclusion is true even for other interpretations of desert. Desert is 
patterned not because it assumes particular pattern desert basis. Rather, the 
proportionality requirement of desert makes it patterned principle.^^ For this structure 
constraints that the rewards should vary with the desert basis. Desert is patterned 
because both have the same structure. 
50 必 " ’ p. 155 
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For Nozick, historical principle is more reasonable than end-state principle. ^ ^ 
And Nozick contends that patterned principle is unjustified. As we know, desert is a 
patterned historical principle. Therefore, Nozick's main objection to desert is 
probably grounded on his general challenges to patterned principle. In the following I 
will critically examine Nozick's argument against desert, based on his argument 
against patterned principle. As stated, Nozick's argument is three-fold. I will first deal 
with the liberty argument, followed by the right argument and self-ownership 
argument. 
3.3 Argument from Liberty 
The first contention Nozick makes against a patterned principle is that patterned 
principle conflicts with voluntary transfers and individual liberties. The argument runs 
as follows. Every individual has different desires and life plans. They will choose to 
use and transfer holdings in various ways. Suppose there exists a desired pattern. 
There is no reason to expect that every individual will choose to deploy their holdings 
in accordance with the pattern, because sticking to pattern will probably conflict with 
what they want to do. Even if people are willing to maintain a pattern, they would not 
know how to do it, because they cannot coordinate with each other to maintain the 
pattern. 
Therefore, even if at the start the distribution of holdings accords with a 
desired pattern, after numerous voluntary exchanges it will deviate from the pattern. 
Nozick concludes that every individual's liberty to act as they wish to will add up to 
disrupt any pattern. Patterned principle "cannot be continuously realized without 
Nozick, ASU, pp. 153-155 
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continuous interference with people's lives. Any favored pattern would be 
transformed into one unfavored by the principle, by people choosing to act in various 
ways•”54 To maintain patterned principle, people have to be stopped from using and 
transferring resources as they wish. This would be constraining people's liberty and 
their voluntary actions. Given the conflict between patterned principle and liberty, 
Nozick thinks that the latter should override the former. For the sake of liberty to act 
and transfer resources, patterned principle is unjustified and should be excluded in a 
theory of distributive justice. 
Nozick uses two arguments to support his claim.^^ I name them voluntariness 
argument and liberty argument respectively. Let me now discuss the voluntariness 
argument first. Nozick holds that voluntary transfer is sufficient to preserve justice. 
This view is exposed in his claim that "whatever arises from a just situation through 
just step is just", 56 where just steps refers to voluntary transfer. His view is that 
voluntary transfer is good enough in preserving justice. Patterned principle thus need 
not play any role in determining justice after a just initial situation. This argument 
seems appealing, as it fits our intuition that agreement between consenting adults 
should be respected and should not be interfered. But closer scrutiny shall expose its 
weakness. 
I suggest two critiques against this account. First, Nozick's interpretation of 
voluntariness is problematic. Even an act is as voluntary as Nozick interprets, it is far 
from a sufficient condition to warrant justice. First of all let us see how Nozick 
interprets voluntary action. He said, 
Nozick, AST/，p. 163 
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whether a person's actions are voluntary depends on what it is that limits his 
alternatives. If facts of nature do so, the actions are voluntary. (I may 
voluntarily walk to someplace I would prefer to fly to unaided.) Other people's 
action place limits on one's available opportunities. Whether this makes one's 
resulting action non-voluntary depends upon whether these others had the right 
to act as they did. ^^  
His view is that a person acts involuntarily only when one's options are limited by 
actions of other people and when others do not have right to perform those actions. He 
tries to support this interpretation with an example. There are 26 men and 26 women, 
each wanting to marry with one spouse. Suppose everyone agrees on the desirability 
of the opposite sex and creates two rankings, A-Z and A，-Z，. Given all are rational 
and choose to marry voluntarily, A will marry with A,. Although B wants to marry 
with A，，B cannot marry with A’ but B，. This scenario repeats to the end of the rank, 
where Z has no choice (because A’ to Y, have married) but to marry with Z，. 
Nozick uses this example to show two things. Although Z has no choice but to 
marry with Z，，Z still acts voluntarily (PI). Second, A to Y and A' to Y' have acted 
within their rights (P2). Then he wants to argue that Z acts voluntarily because A to Y 
and A’ to Y' have acted within their rights (CI). Generalizing this example, he can 
further conclude that one acts voluntarily when others have act within their rights. 
I think Nozick is mistaken, for PI and P2 cannot derive CI. We can accept that 
Z voluntarily marries with Z’ and that all other people have acted within their rights, 
without admitting the latter is the reason for the former. That Z acts voluntarily can be 
explained by other reasons. One is that no one coerces Z to marry with Z，. Z can 
remain single if Z does not want to marry with Z'. Nozick has neither argued against 
this reason nor for his reason. His interpretation of voluntariness is thus just assumed 
rather than justified. 
”Ibid., p. 262 
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In addition to this problem, Nozick's interpretation of voluntariness is also 
subject to another critique, i.e. the assumption about voluntariness as a sufficient 
condition of justice, for it admits improper acts like fraud can be sufficient conditions 
of justice. This makes the definition of voluntariness and hence the voluntariness 
argument unattractive. My critique rests on an idea that it is within our right to fraud. 
Hence if I choose A because I am defrauded, I still act voluntarily. My view that fraud 
is within our right is in line with Nozick's understanding. In Nozick's framework, we 
have the right to act as we wish unless our acts violate others' rights. Thus the point is 
that whether fraud violates others' rights. If it does not, then we have the right to fraud. 
Let me now show that fraud does not violate the rights of others. 
First of all, let me specify the right concerned is the right to private property. 
The right to private property is the right to determine what shall be done with the 
property.58 This includes the right to possess, use, enjoy, manage, control and dispose 
of the property.59 These rights are claim rights, which impose duties on others not to 
interfere with the ways owners do with the property.^^ These rights are violated if 
others interfere with how a property owner disposes of his property. But fraud, unlike 
force, is not interference. Giving an offer with misrepresentation, as one without 
misrepresentation, does not amount to stopping the owner from disposing of one's 
property. As fraud does not interfere with another person's liberty, it does not 
constitute a violation of rights. Hence I argue that it is within our right to fraud. 
Allowing fraud, Nozick's formulation of voluntariness is problematic. First, it is 
not a reasonable conception of voluntariness. Second, it is not a reasonable sufficient 
condition of justice. How can a transaction involving fraud a just and legitimate 
transfer? 
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As Wolff said, Nozick has two alternatives to respond. One is to insist his 
definition of voluntariness, but claim that voluntary transfer may not be a legitimate 
and just step to preserve justice. Yet this option admits that voluntariness is not a 
sufficient condition of justice. Then Nozick cannot claim that the entitlement theory is 
enough to maintain justice and patterned principle needs not play any role in it. 
Alternatively, Nozick can redefine voluntariness in a way that under conditions of 
fraud no transaction is voluntary^'. In this sense, a transfer is voluntary and just if the 
agents would have agreed to it if they have known the result of transaction.^^ The 
latter seems more plausible. But even so, it is still questionable whether voluntariness 
suffices for justice. For voluntary transfer may affect the well being of third parties. 
While it remains arguable whether these effects are fair and justified, it seems 
premature to say that whatever effects will be created, all voluntary transfers suffice 
for justice. 
In response, Nozick disagrees that voluntary transfers affect the well being of 
third parties. If before a transfer the third party has already had legitimate shares, 
those shares are not changed after transfer. The well-being of third party therefore is 
affected by the transaction.^^ However, as Cohen correctly points out, what matters in 
questions of distributive justice is the effective share, which should be measured by 
the purchasing power of holdings, rather than nominal shares. It is the effective share 
that affects the well being of everyone. Cohen then explains how third party's 
effective shares will be affected by others' voluntary transfer. He said, 
a person's effective share depends on what he can do with what he has, and 
that depends not only on how much he has but on what others have and on how 
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what other have is distributed. If it is distributed equally among them he will 
often be better placed than if some have especially large shared,* 
An example can help illustrate Cohen's point. Suppose a small portion of population 
in a city is very wealthy. Through voluntary and speculative exchanges with each 
other, they can raise the price of food in the city. Then although the holdings of 
ordinary people remain unchanged, they are put in a very unfavorable condition for 
they can buy much less food with the same set of holdings. And I think it is debatable 
whether these voluntary but speculative transfers are justified. 
Nozick can concede that voluntary transfers affects third party's effective 
shares. But he will insist that it does not render voluntary transfer unjust. For Nozick, 
the situation is just if all are entitled to the holdings they possess and everyone has 
one' rights are respected. Affecting the well being of others does not render voluntary 
transfer unjust because it does not violate anyone's rights, given Nozick's 
understanding of rights. 
Nozick could argue that to remain at the same level of effective welfare is not 
part of our negative rights. People thus have no duty to do it. But this defense depends 
on the desirability of that conception of right. This issue will be dealt with next 
section. Here, my point is that voluntariness alone is not enough to justify just 
distribution. The whole argument rests on a contestable conception of right. Without 
further argument, the claim of voluntariness is ungrounded. 
Furthermore, for the sake of argument, even if voluntariness suffices for 
justice, Nozick's claim that patterned principle is unjust does not follow. For the 
voluntariness argument does not prove that patterned principle is unjustified. Recall 
the logic of that argument. At first, Nozick tries to establish that voluntary transfer is 
64 Cohen, Self-ownership, Freedom and Equality, pp. 26-27 
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just. He then excludes any kinds of pattern principle because pattern has no role to 
play in the justification of justice. However, the claim that pattern principle is not 
needed does not entail that it is unjustified. While voluntary transfer suffices for 
justice, Nozick has not excluded that patterned principle may also suffice for justice. 
The voluntariness argument does not refute the latter claim. 
If Nozick wants to argue against patterned principle, he has to prove that 
patterned principle is unjustified. The way to argue for this point is to hold that 
patterned principle conflict with voluntariness, and argue that voluntariness is the 
necessary conditions of justice. Yet the voluntariness argument does not deal with 
necessary condition of justice. It only concerns the sufficient condition. Thus the 
argument is set to fail to draw Nozick's desired conclusion. 
Let me take stock of the discussion so far. I have shown that the voluntariness 
argument fails to justify Nozick's objection to desert and patterned principle. The 
voluntariness argument fails for two reasons. First, Nozick's understanding of 
voluntariness is problematic, i.e. according to it, unjust acts like fraud is also regarded 
as voluntary and sufficient for just actions. This renders the claim that voluntary 
action is sufficient to justify transfers unconvincing. The second critique is that 
Nozick's interpretation of voluntariness is based on a contestable conception of right, 
which weaken the foundation of voluntariness argument. 
Let me now turn to discuss the liberty argument, another argument Nozick 
proposes to justify that liberty and voluntary actions should override patterned 
principle. Its logic is as follows. Nozick argues that it is unjust to violate people's 
liberty. However, to maintain a patterned principle, people's liberties must be violated. 
Thus patterned principle is morally unacceptable as a principle of justice. On the other 
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hand, Nozick claims that the entitlement theory ensures that people have liberty to 
transfer resources and act as they wish. It does not suffer from the same critique. 
I shall show that this objection to patterned principle and defense for the 
entitlement theory are self-contradicting. For the entitlement theory also restricts 
other's liberty to transfer resources and act as they wish. Nozick therefore cannot 
consistently hold that patterned principle is unjustified simply because it restricts 
liberty. Nozick may employ different conceptions of liberty so as to evade this 
challenge. But I shall show that, after considering Nozick's defense with some 
possible interpretations of liberty, my argument is still valid. 
To begin with, I shall articulate which conception of liberty I am dealing with. 
For Nozick, patterned principle leads to violation of what is often called the "negative 
liberty". Under this conception of liberty, liberty is infringed if an external obstacle is 
placed to stop people from doing what they otherwise could. ^ ^ Patterned principle 
interferes with negative liberty, because it implies that the authority needs to stop 
people from acting or transferring resources as they wish, by means of law and 
coercive forces, if those actions or transfers do not fit the desired pattern. For example, 
in the case of Wilt Chamberlain, the authority may need to forbid the basketball team 
from entering that contract with Chamberlain, or it may stop the audience from 
watching the games where Chamberlain is playing. In either case, some party is 
forbidden to do what they could do otherwise and their liberties are therefore 
interfered. 
To vindicate his claim, Nozick needs to explain why it is unjust to violate 
liberty. For him, one fundamental reason is that violating liberty leads to infringement 
of right. As I mentioned, in Nozick's account, right ensures liberty. When we have the 
65 Isaiah Berlin, "Two concepts of liberty", in The Proper Study of Mankind, Henry Hardy ed., (New 
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right to do X, we should be ensured the liberty to do X. hence, by the same token, to 
interfere with people's liberty to do what they want violates their rights, if they have 
right to take those actions. 
However, justifying liberty argument with right would take away its 
independent force which amounts to giving up the liberty argument. For liberty 
argument has to rely on a theory of right to explain what counts as violation of liberty 
and why it is impermissible. The real objection to patterned principle is not liberty, 
but right. Moreover, Nozick needs to presuppose that we have a set of moral rights. 
The validity of the liberty argument thus is based on whether Nozick can justify we 
have the set of moral rights. 
I will leave questions related to rights in next section. But even if the right 
argument is valid, I want to argue that the liberty argument creates undesirable 
consequence for the entitlement theory. As liberty and voluntariness play important 
roles in Nozick's justification, giving them up will undermine the attractiveness and 
the foundation of the entitlement theory. 
First of all, the Chamberlain case is a central argument for the legitimacy of 
free transfer and against patterned principle. And I think the power of this case is 
more drawn from voluntariness than right. Certainly, a right argument can easily 
justify the case. One may argue that free transfer is legitimate because it respects and 
is endorsed by property rights. But Nozick does not seem to argue in this way in the 
Chamberlain case. From the text and the title of the section "liberty upset pattern", 
Nozick tries to convince us that free transfer is legitimate because it is voluntary, but 
not it respects rights.^^ On top of that, when explaining the problem of patterned 
principle, Nozick also puts the focus on negation of people's voluntary action, but not 
66 Nozick said, "If D1 was a just distribution, and people voluntarily moved from it to D2, transferring 
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violation of rights.^^ Although right has an important place in the entitlement theory, I 
believe that liberty and voluntariness do play a role in the Chamberlain case. 
Secondly, liberty and voluntariness are closely related with the thesis of self-
ownership. Recall the main idea of self-ownership is that we are separate persons who 
own ourselves. To respect this, people should be able to lead their own lives. They 
should not be sacrificed or used for the benefits of others without their consent^^ But 
we should note that sacrifice or being used is not unjustified in itself. Rather, they are 
wrong because they are involuntarily imposed. Once people freely choose to be 
sacrificed or used for the benefits for others, they become permissible. As Olsaretti 
comments, self-ownership commits to ensure that individuals make voluntary, not 
forced, choice.^^ 
Moreover, self-ownership is important because we are rational and free moral 
agency, who can autonomously choose which conception of life to follow. As the 
value of autonomy and liberty underlies self-ownership, it also underlies rights. It can 
be said that the inviolability of rights has its foundation in the value of autonomy and 
liberty. For these reasons, I do not think Nozick can eliminate the role of liberty and 
voluntariness in the entitlement theory. But how can he justify the independent force? 
He may argue that liberty helps promote well-being, as it provides a space in 
which people are allowed to pursue their conception of the good. This is how Nozick 
related liberty with the meaning of life. If liberty is violated, people's important 
interest are then under serious threat. This is why such a violation is unjustified. 
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Yet is it possible to grant such an importance to liberty as such or liberty in 
general? It seems not. Charles Taylor has convincingly argued that it is not 
appropriate to give a single account on the significance of liberty as such. Before 
elaborating his point, let us see how he illustrates this idea with an example.^^ In 
London, there are a lot of traffic lights, restraining people's liberty to cross the road. 
But Londoners enjoy extensive religious freedom. They can freely choose to believe 
in many religions or remain infidel. In Albania, there is much less traffic lights. 
Albanians have greater liberty to cross roads. Yet Albanian are forbidden to worship 
any god as they wish. They have less religious freedom than Londoner. Given people 
cross roads much more frequently than we go to church, can we say that Albanian 
enjoy more liberty than Londoner? 
Taylor's answer is no. For to judge whether a person or society is free, we 
cannot only consider quantitatively how many number of acts are limited. The more 
important measurement is qualitative, the significance of freedom. A freedom is 
significant if the activity that freedom protects is significant to the well-being of 
human being. As Taylor said, "freedom is important to us because we are purposive 
beings. But then there must be distinctions in significance of different kinds of 
freedom based on the distinctions in the significance of different purpose."^' His point 
is that freedom is not important in itself. It is important as it helps ensuring that we 
have room to achieve what is important to us. It follows that the significance of 
different types of freedom is not the same, depending on the significance of the 
activity that liberty protects. 
Following Taylor's analysis, to argue violating liberty is wrong, Nozick 
should hold that the liberties patterned principle violates and his entitlement theory 
70 Charles Taylor, "What 's Wrong with Negative Liberty", in David ed., The Liberty Reader, (Colorado: 
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protects are important. But beforehand we should be clear about what kind of liberty 
is at issue. As in the case of Wilt Chamberlain and other examples, the types of 
liberties Nozick concerns include liberties to watch a basketball match, to enter into 
contracts, to give gifts, to take prize from gambling, to donates, These are what 
Waldron called "ordinary freedom". They are liberties to do what we do in ordinary 
lives, like "freedom to step this way or linger in this spot"/^ These liberties may not 
be as important as basic liberties as suggested by Rawls But they not unimportant. 
Unlike basic liberties, these liberties are important not because "any particular action 
he or she is restrained from performing is important", but because the cumulative 
impact of these restrictions on one is comprehensive.74 If a person loses all these 
ordinary freedom, his lives will be in great misery. 
However, even Nozick's account of ordinary freedom is convincing, he cannot 
consistently use this argument to argue against patterned principle. For the entitlement 
theory also interfere with people's negative liberty. The entitlement theory says that 
people have an absolute private property right over entitlements. Private property 
rights grants the owner exclusive power to decide how the entitlement is used. But it 
is this exclusiveness that infringes the negative liberty of non-property-owners, as 
they are forbidden to use those properties without the owner's permission. 
Let me use an example to illustrate this. Suppose there is a government-owned 
park which everyone is free to enter into. Now, the government decides to privatize 
the park and finally sells it to millionaire Q. After transaction, Q has absolute property 
rights over it, legitimately sets rules to forbid ordinary people from entering the park. 
He rightfully sets up guards and fences to stop people from trespassing the park. Thus, 
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people can no longer enter into park as they wish. They are interfered by the action of 
Q. In this way, people freedom to enter into the park is obviously curtailed after the 
park is turned into a private property. This shows how private property rights infringe 
the liberty of non-property-owners. 
The entitlement theory not only protects absolute private property rights, but 
also allows unilateral encroachment of unowned resources. Both imply that many 
resources will be at the exclusive disposal of the property owners and that there are 
many non-property-owners, whose liberties are restrained by private property right 
system. But this restraint on liberty does not only affect people without any property. 
Thus, following the above argument, individual liberties are greatly constrained by 
the libertarian state. Nozick cannot hold the argument that it is never acceptable to 
infringe people's negative liberty because it is inconsistent with his own theory. 
One way to retain the liberty argument is to hold that the entitlement theory 
can secure more liberties than any patterned principle. Yet without proving this 
premise, it is premature for Nozick to objects to all patterned principles. Moreover, it 
is unlikely that in a free market society which the entitlement theory envisages, people 
enjoy more freedom that any other economic arrangements. Those private property 
rights that the entitlement theory grants totally deprive non-owners the freedom to use 
others' properties. The freedom curtailed should be much more extensive than other 
economic regimes where property right system is less absolute and private, e.g. 
properties are jointly owned or property right hold only has the right to transfer the 
object, but not the right to use it exclusively. 
Alternatively, Nozick may save the liberty argument by arguing that the 
liberty that will upset pattern, he would say, is not the liberty to do what one wants to, 
but the liberty to transfer resources as one wants to. For Nozick claims, "to maintain 
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a pattern one must...continually interfere to stop people from transferring resources as 
they wish He may think that the liberty to transfer resources as one wish is 
important. Hence any violation to transfer resources is wrong. Put it another way, 
what Nozick objects to is restricting people's liberty to transfer resources as they want 
to, but not their liberty to act generally. He only needs to hold that the former is 
morally impermissible, without enforcing the latter. 
Interpreting liberty in this way, Nozick can avoid the challenge made by 
Cohen, for private property right does not inhibit the liberty to transfer resources as 
people want to. This is true for property-owner. But does private property right not 
inhibit the liberty of the propertyless to transfer resources as they wish? I do not think 
so. At first, it is dubious to say that the propertyless do not have liberty to transfer 
resources. They cannot transfer resources, for they have no resources at all. This does 
not amount to a violation of liberty as no human constraints are placed on it. Even if 
we concede that propertyless do not have liberty to transfer resources, the claim still 
does not stand, for their liberty is not inhibited by private property right. Even if there 
is no private property right system, be it in under schemes of common ownership, 
joint ownership or state of nature, the propertyless still do not have the liberty to 
transfer resources. The underlying reason is that they have no resources to transfer, 
but no that private property right inhibits them from doing so. 
Even though the revised argument from liberty can evade the self-
contradiction with private property right, it still has two problems. Firstly, this 
argument contradicts with the Lockean Proviso. Lockean Proviso states that we 
cannot transfer resources if the transfer worsens the situation of others. This amounts 
to restriction of people's liberty to transfer resources as they want to. Without 
75 Nozick, AS" , p. 163 
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amending Lockean Proviso, Nozick cannot consistently hold that it is morally 
impermissible to restrict people's liberty to transfer resources as they want to. 
Secondly, the revised liberty argument loses its original appeal. The appeal of the 
liberty argument lies in that ordinary freedom is essential to our lives. But it is 
difficult to argue that the particular freedom to transfer resources is as significant as 
ordinary freedom. This reduces much attractiveness of the whole liberty argument. 
Hence although Nozick can hold that liberty and voluntariness are important, 
he cannot use them to defend the entitlement theory and argue against patterned 
principle. What is his alternative then? As I have argued, Nozick may employ a right 
argument to help defend the entitlement theory and argue against patterned principle. 
The validity of this argument will be examined in the next section. 
Before turning to the right argument, let me take stock of the discussion in this 
section. I have examined one objection Nozick uses to argue against patterned 
principle. The objection is that to enforce patterned principle, people's liberty to act as 
they wish will be interfered. For the sake of liberty and voluntariness, patterned 
principle is unjustified as a theory of distributive justice. 
I argue that Nozick uses two different arguments to support this claim. Firstly, 
Nozick argues that voluntary transfer is sufficient for preserving justice and hence 
patterned principle is not needed in a theory of justice. I have shown that Nozick's 
right-defined conception of voluntariness is problematic as it allows improper acts 
like fraud. I then argue that even Nozick alters the conception of voluntariness, the 
conception rests on a contestable conception of right. Thus the idea that voluntary 
transfer is just is not as reasonable as it appears. Moreover, even the conception of 
right is justified, the voluntariness argument cannot argue against patterned principle, 
for it does not argue that patterned principle is unjustified. Rather, it just states that 
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patterned principle is not needed. Nozick should argue for the necessary condition, 
rather than the sufficient condition of justice if he wants to use voluntariness as an 
argument against patterned principle. 
Another argument is to assume that liberty is non-violable and then claim that 
the exercise of patterned principle would compromise liberty. I showed that Nozick 
has grounded the inviolability of liberty on right. However, doing this would deprive 
the power of the liberty argument. Furthermore, giving up the value of liberty is not a 
desirable move for Nozick. It is because the appeal of the Chamberlain case and the 
thesis of self-ownership both are related to the value of liberty. Giving up liberty will 
undermine the attractiveness and foundation of the entitlement theory. 
I suggest that Nozick can hold that liberty is important as it protects our 
important interests. For liberty gives us room to do what we want and lead our desired 
lives. 
However, even if Nozick can justify the non-violability of liberty in this way, 
he cannot take it because his entitlement theory would also violate liberty in the same 
way. As Cohen illustrates, the exclusiveness of private property right will interfere the 
liberty of non-owners. Since the entitlement theory endorses only absolute private 
property right, the free market society it envisages will severely violate liberty of the 
propertyless. Nozick may evade Cohen's challenge by narrowing the liberty in 
question to the liberty to transfer resources. But this reply is not workable, since 
narrowing ordinary freedom to the liberty to transfer resources will reduce the appeal 
of the liberty argument. Therefore, I conclude that the only way out is to turn to the 
right argument. 
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3.4 Argument from Right 
The structure of the right argument is simple. First, it maintains that certain rights are 
non-violable. It then argues that to implement desert, those rights must be violated. 
Lastly, for this reason, Nozick concludes desert is unjustified. Yet to justify the 
argument, and make it substantial, Nozick needs to answer the following questions: 
What kinds of right are involved? What are the content of those rights? What is/are 
the source(s) of those rights? When are those rights violated? Why are those rights 
non-violable? This section will start with explicating Nozick's conception of rights 
and his answer to these questions. After explaining why Nozick thinks that part of 
those rights conflict with desert, I will examine some problems in Nozick's 
justification of those rights. I will then show that Nozick's cannot justify his 
conception of rights and hence the right argument against desert is invalid. 
In the last section, I have mentioned that the entitlement theory is right-based. 
I shall begin to elaborate Nozickean rights with explaining in what sense the 
entitlement theory is right-based. According to Mackie, a right-based theory is a 
system in which right claims are basic and give the whole point to the theory. Other 
statements in the theory are derived from right claims.76 Right is the foundation and 
ultimate pursuit of a theory. As Dworkin says, a right-based theory primarily aims to 
advance or ensure a state of affairs that “an individual has a right to some opportunity 
or resource or l i b e r t y . T h e theory endorses a state of affairs in which rights are 
advanced, “even when no other political aim is served and some political aim is 
disserved thereby". Contrarily, the theory disproves situations where rights are 
76 John Mackie, "Can There Be a Right-based Moral Theory", in Jeremy Waldron ed., Theories of 
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violated, even when some other political aim is thereby served7^ It means that right 
can override other values or claims but they cannot override right. 
The entitlement theory is right-based that Nozick builds the theory of state and 
of justice on the basis of individual rights. Nozick holds that right is non-violable. 
They do not only prescribe what persons should do to each other, but also restrict 
what a state may do to its citizens. As Nozick writes at the beginning of the book, 
individual have rights, and there are things no person or group may do to 
them (without violating their rights). So strong and far-reaching are these 
rights that they raise the question of what, if anything, the state and its 
officials may do. How much room do individual rights leave for the state?^^ 
From this passage, as some critiques claims, it is clear that for Nozick rights are 
overriding and exhaustive of all moral obligations enforceable by the government.^^ 
For it says that right alone defines what can and cannot be done. State can only do 
what is not forbidden by individual rights. Whatever values state may advance, or 
whatever disvalue they can avoid, they should not do so if in the course rights are 
violated. Yet I want to make it clear that Nozick does not think right is the only moral 
concern. He admits that there are other moral values that individuals and society 
ought to pursuit. It is just that these moral obligations are not enforceable by the state, 
as it would violate right.^' Hence while it is worthwhile to pursue those moral values, 
it is not the job of political philosophy and a state. For Nozick, all enforceable 
obligations derive from rights.^^ 
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Given the importance of right in Nozick's project, he should provide solid 
justification for the inviolability of right. We have seen that the justification is 
founded on the fact that we are rational and free beings who are able to strive for a 
meaningful life. I shall examine whether this can justify Nozickean rights later. Now, 
I want to further elaborate Nozick's conception of, or Nozickean right. 
The first feature is that Nozickean right is natural right. It is not exactly the 
same as Locke's conception of natural right, though I think Nozick has borrowed a lot 
of ideas from Locke. In Locke's thought, right is natural because it has natural ground 
and could be possessed in the state of nature, preceding civil society and conventional 
Q T 
set up. In Nozick's case, people in the state of nature do enjoy rights. But they do 
not share the natural ground as that of Locke presumes. For Locke, the natural ground 
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of right is simply natural law. The source of natural law is related to God. In other 
words, in Lock's view, people have right as they are granted according to the natural 
law. Yet Nozick does not endorse any natural law or any assumption of God in the 
justification of right. His rights are natural in Rawls's and Hart's sense. Rawls holds 
that natural rights "depend solely on certain natural attributes the presence of which 
can be ascertained by natural reason pursuing common sense i n q u i r y . T h e natural 
attribute of persons in Nozick's system is the fact that human beings can search for a 
meaningful life. This natural capacity is in-bom in human being's mind. It exists 
before any artificial social set up. 
Nozickean right also corresponds with Hart's conception of natural right. Hart 
argues that natural right has two features. One, people have these rights because they 
to the value of desert. Hence problem of desert is not that it is not valuable, but that it conflicts with 
rights. 
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are man qua man and not only if they are members of some society or stand in some 
special relations to each other. Two, "natural rights are not created or conferred by 
men's voluntary a c t i o n . T h u s it is said that natural rights are non-contractual and 
non-conventional.87 In Nozick's theory, people possess rights in the state of nature, 
prior to any political association. This fits the first feature of natural right. On the 
other hand, although people may transfer their natural rights to other people by 
voluntary actions, Nozickean rights are not results of voluntary agreements, contracts 
or bargaining. In the state of nature, people do a lot bargain so as to find means to 
protect oneself.88 But they do not bargain what rights they have. Rather, they have 
rights before they come to bargaining. And these rights set the conditions and 
constraints of bargaining. 
About the scope of right. These natural rights do not cover everything. The 
kinds of rights people have in the state of nature are partly derived from Lockean 
rights. Nozick asserts that people have the right to "life, health, liberty and 
possession". ^^  The right to life and health protects people from being assaulted, 
attacked or murdered. The right to liberty ensures that individuals are in "a state of 
perfect freedom to order their actions and dispose of their possessions and persons as 
they think fit.. .without asking leave or dependency upon the will of any other man"^ ® 
They cannot be forced to do things they do not will. The right to possession is a 
general right to form specific rights to property.^' It is a right to "form secure private 
property rights by going through certain procedures such as exchange, or receipt by 
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gift, and, in certain circumstances, appropriating from nature." ^^  The right to 
possession also indicates what rights an owner of a property have. Once formed as 
private property, non-owners have a duty not to unilaterally use or seize that property. 
If these rights are violated, Nozick holds that people have the right to punish 
transgressors of right to such a degree as may hinder its violation.^^ Besides these 
general rights, people also have special consensual rights which arise out of 
agreements or transaction.94 For example, promise is a process that would create 
special right. Once a promised is made, the promisee possesses a newly generated 
right to claim what have been promised from the promiser. If the promiser fails to 
realize what have been committed, he has violated the right of the promisee. 
It seems that all these kinds of right are equally important in Nozick's theory. 
At least Nozick does not intend to classify some of these rights as more fundamental 
than others. All these rights form side constraints that are non-violable. They are, as 
mentioned, negative rights and rights against interference. Mackie's formulation of 
right best captures the idea of negative right. 
A right, in the most important sense, is the conjunction of a freedom and a 
claim-right. That is, if someone, A, has the moral right to do X, not only is 
he entitled to do X if he chooses - he is not morally required not to do X -
but he is also protected in his doing of X - others are morally required not 
to interfere or prevent him.^ ^ 
Side constraints specify a boundary within which the right bearer is free to do what he 
wants. And other people have a duty not to cross that boundary and interfere with 
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Natural Right?", pp. 84, 87 
95 Mackie, “Can There Be a Right-based Moral Theory?", p. 169 
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what the right-bearer want to do. Once the boundary is cross and the right-bearer 
interfered, the right is violated. Nozick holds that these rights are absolutely non-
violable, even for the sake of avoiding greater violation of rights. This is the special 
feature of side constraint view. Nozick distinguishes this side constraint view from a 
goal-directed view and preferred the former. A goal-directed view treats the 
inviolability of right as a goal, not as side constraint. Its aim is to minimize the 
violation of rights. Hence it is permissible to violate right, if it would help minimize 
the total violation of right. Yet Nozick think that the goal-directed view does not 
respect the fact that individuals are separate and non-violable, since it allows violation 
of right.96 Nozick holds that only the side-constraint view is justified. 
I have outlined some features of Nozickean rights in general. Establishing the 
background, I will proceed to discuss the conflict between desert and right. The 
following discussion will not discuss all kinds of rights. The focus will be on property 
right, as it is the main subject of the entitlement theory and what desert conflicts with. 
To begin with, let me delineate what issues are involved. The concept of property 
right entails that what the owner can do with the property and what non-property 
owner cannot do with the property. We have seen that Nozick holds that property 
rights give the owner the freedom to determine what shall be done with the property. 
It usually includes the freedom to use, possess, transfer, and destroy the property. On 
the other hand, legitimate property in Nozick's theory is simply entitlement. And a 
holding is an entitlement if it is obtained in a way according to either the principle of 
initial acquisition or the principle of transfer. 
Desert conflict with both parts of Nozickean property rights. On the one hand, 
desert defines legitimate property as what one deserves. Holdings resulting from 
96 Nozick，/4577, p. 29-31 
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undeserved appropriation or free transfers are not legitimate and are subject to 
redistribution. On the other hand, desert forbids some uses and transfers. For example, 
when the holdings are used or transferred as rewards, then the property owner cannot 
distribute rewards as he wish. He should distribute them in accordance with people's 
desert. 
It is obvious that desert conflicts with Nozickean property rights. Yet I do not 
agree that desert is thus unjustified, as Nozick would claim. It is because the 
Nozickean property right is itself unjustified. I do not mean that the entire idea of 
property right is unjustified. What I object is the absolute inviolability of property 
right, i.e. the side-constraint view of right. If property right is no longer a side-
constraint, then it could be argued that, in some occasions, violation of it is 
permissible. In the coming discussion I shall show when such a violation is 
permissible. 
The problem of the side-constraint view does not lie with that the foundation 
of Nozickean rights is unjustified. Instead, the problem is that Nozick cannot derive 
his conception of rights from that foundation. I suggest that one possible response is 
to add the thesis of self-ownership into the foundation. I will only examine the 
plausibility of this response in next section. Alternatively, I will argue that, even if the 
strategy is successful, Nozickean property right still faces another problem. The 
problem is that property right conflicts with the principle of initial acquisition. Hence 
he cannot consistently justify his conception of property right and employ the 
principle initial acquisition in the entitlement theory. 
Recall that the foundation of rights as side constraints is that human beings 
can pursue a meaningful life. And what gives meaning to a life is a person's "shaping 
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his life with some overall plan".^^ Nozick says that this is a valuable characteristic 
which can justify Nozickean rights. It seems reasonable to claim, if the meanings of 
life can justify Nozickean right, rather other conception of rights, it must be that 
Nozickean right do better in ensuring or conducing that people lead meaningful lives. 
Otherwise, there is no point to argue that for the sake of meanings of life, Nozickean 
right, rather than other conceptions, is justified. However, I shall show that Nozickean 
right cannot meet this requirement. 
Let me restate that I do not think that the foundation itself is implausible. Even 
though Nozick does not explain why the idea "meanings of life" is attractive or 
desirable. He just holds that the importance of the notion meaningful life self-evident. 
It requires no further justification to prove side-constraint is correct. He says, 
This notion, we should note, has the right 'feel' as something that might 
help to bridge an ‘is-ought’ gap; it appropriately seems to straddle the two. 
Suppose, for example, that one could show that if a person acted in certain 
ways his life would be meaningless. Would this be a hypothetical or 
categorical imperative? Would one need to answer to further question: 'But 
why shouldn't my life is meaningless?'^^ 
Nozick assumes that the meaning of life is such an important notion that 
undoubtedly grants the legitimacy of Nozickean rights. Yet, however plausible the 
foundation is, that it can justify Nozickean rights is ungrounded. For the side-
constraint view is not connected with the foundation, i.e. the view cannot conduce, let 
alone ensure that people have the necessary conditions of leading a self-shaping life. 
A person can have self-shaping life only if the person has a life and the 
opportunity to plan his life. By opportunity I mean the person should be free from 
other people's interference and be given room to form life plans. The latter is exactly 
the point of Nozickean right. But Nozickean right cannot fulfill the first condition - it 
97 Nozick, ASU, p. 50 
98 Nozick, ASU, pp. 50-51 
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cannot ensure or conduce that people can sustain their life. Nozick holds that people 
have the right to life. The right is only negative that it only forbids murder and 
physical aggression. On top of these, people do die from other reasons, e.g. poverty or 
lack of food. Nozickean right does not protect people life's from these problems, as it 
denies positive right, the right to be assisted. 
The reason is that positive right would conflict with the negative particular 
right on holdings. 
The major objection to speaking of everyone's having a right, to various 
things such as equality of opportunity, life, and so on, and enforcing this 
right, is that these 'rights' require a substructure of things and materials and 
actions; and other people may have rights and entitlements over these. No 
one has a right to something whose realization requires certain uses of things 
and activities that other people have rights and entitlements to particular 
things (that pencil, their body, and so on) and how they choose to exercise 
these rights and entitlements fix the external environment of any given 
individual and the means that will be available to him...even to exercise his 
right to determine how something he owns is to be used may require other 
means he must acquire a right to, for example, food to keep him alive. 
There are particular rights over particular things held by particular persons, 
and particular right sot reach agreements with other, if you and the together 
can acquire the means to reach an agreement. No rights exist in conflict with 
this substructure of particular rights. Since no nearly contoured right to 
achieve a goal will avoid incompatibility with this substructure, no such right 
exist. The particular rights over things fill the space of rights, leaving no 
room for general rights to be in a certain material condition. The reverse 
theory would place only such universally held general "rights to" achieve 
goals or to be in a certain material condition into its substructure so as to 
determine all else...99 
Negative right on particular holding is preferred to positive right to life because of the 
side-constraint view of right. Yet the latter is clearly more important for ensuring or 
conducing meanings of life, since it ensures that one necessary condition of leading 
meaningful life is satisfied. I do not see why the negative right to particular holding 
would be equally important. Here, it shows that the side-constraint is not connected to 
the meanings of life. What the latter implies is exactly what the former rejects. For 
99 Nozick, ASU, p. 238 
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this point, side-constraint view can hardly be justified from the idea of meanings of 
life. 
Scheffler argues, if the basis of right is that right can help people lead a self-
shaping or meaningful life, then the set of right cannot be Nozickean. A better 
alternative includes 
a natural right to sufficient share of every distributable good whose 
enjoyment is necessary condition of the person's having a reasonable 
chance of living a decent and fulfilling life, subject only the following 
qualification. No person has a natural right to any good which can only be 
obtained by preventing someone else from having a reasonable chance of 
living a decent and fulfilling life. A sufficient share of a necessary good is 
defined as a share of that good which is large enough to satisfy the 
necessary condition.— 
To put it simply, if Nozick insists on founding right on the meaning of life, the 
conception of right should include the positive right to resources that is necessary to 
sustain a decent life. 
To respond to Scheffler, it is argued that Nozick can hold that these welfare 
rights would not give but only take the possibilities to live meaningful lives a w a y . � � � 
It is because giving people positive rights to aid "creates a dependence culture in 
which, far from shaping their own lives, people depend on others even for their day-
to-day needs.，，i°2 xhis assumption needs to be verified by empirical evidence. Indeed, 
the possibility is not likely. For positive right to welfare only acts like a safety net, 
allowing people in need to live a decent life. If people have other pursuits, they still 
can and will have the motivation to form and realize their life plans. Moreover, even 
if there is such dependence of state-provided welfare, it may conduce, rather than 
obstruct people to shape their lives. People may want to shape their lives the material 
100 Samuel Scheffler, "Natural Right, Equality, and the Minimal State", in Reading Nozick, Jeffery Paul 
ed., (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982)，p. 153 
Wolff, Robert Nozick, p. 33 
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returns of which are too low to sustain their lives. It is only because there are welfare 
rights, they can pursue their life plans. 
After all, the most important point is that, even if Nozick or others can 
persuasively argue that welfare rights Scheffler suggests are incompatible with the 
idea of meanings of life, this does not help rescuing Nozickean rights. Failing to meet 
the necessary condition of the foundation still makes Nozickean right unjustified. 
What Nozick needs to do is to amend his conception of right so that it can ensure or 
conduce that people would be able to sustain their lives. 
Despite this weakness, Nozick may emphasize that the side-constraint view is 
still morally desirable. At least it should not be abandoned, because it can secure 
another necessary condition of self-shaping life, i.e. freedom from interference from 
other people. For this point, the side constraint conception of right is superior to other 
conceptions of rights that include welfare right, since, in Nozick's view, this 
conception endorses redistribution would interfere other people's live and violate the 
property rights. 
Yet I do not think Nozick's attempt to save side-constraint view of right is 
justified. For a side-constraint view is not the only conception of right that can 
provide people with freedom from interference to the extent that is necessary for 
leading a self-shaping life. To be the necessary condition for leading a self-shaping 
life, the kinds of interference concerned are only limited to those that would impede 
people leading a self-shaping life. In other words, not all kinds of interference need to 
be forbidden. Hence if other conceptions of right can show that redistribution only 
requires interferences that do not impede people leading self-shaping life. Then 
103 In section 4 ,1 have demonstrated how redistribution would interfere with people's lives. 
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Nozick has no reason to claim that they are unjustified and that only the side-
constraint view of right can ensure that necessary condition of self-shaping life. 
Indeed, the welfare right Scheffler suggests and even desert do not require 
interference that would impede people leading self-shaping life. They may require 
taxation and prohibition of some t r a n s f e r s . Y e t they do not stop people from 
having life plans and realizing those plans. For the case of taxation, they do not ask 
people not to have any life plans. Even they may create difficulties for people to 
realize expensive life plans, they do not directly ban them. And people still have 
chance to realize those plans. Moreover, prohibiting some transfers also does not stop 
people from having life plans. At the first place, it seems that it would directly forbid 
people from realizing some plans, if those plans can be fulfilled only if those transfers 
can be made. But this is not true. What desert requires is prohibiting some 
specifications of transfers, but not that type of transfer. Hence the transfer can still be 
made, if some conditions of transfer are altered. And altering those conditions would 
not change the nature of that transfer and affect the plans which are made possible 
only by those transfers. For instance, suppose a person has a life plan to start a 
business and the person needs to transfer some money as wages to his labour. Desert 
may forbid him contracting with the labours, if the wages he offers are undeserved. 
Yet desert does not object any wage relationship to contracts. What it objects to is 
only the terms of the contract. Changing the terms would not render the person unable 
to start or maintain the business. Hence the businessman can still take part in those 
transfers and realize his life plans, if he adheres to some requirements of desert. 
I can concede that taxation or prohibition of transfers may create small 
obstacles to realize life plans. But I conjecture that these obstacles are not significant 
For example, desert may forbid distribution of reward that is not accorded with desert. 
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to a degree that they should be forbidden to allow people to lead a meaningful life. I 
agree with Nagel and Scanlon that, in the justification of right, we cannot only 
consider the importance of the foundation of right. We should also consider the 
consequence of forming such rights. 
Let me elaborate Nagel's view here. Nagel argues that this demand is justified 
by the structure of Nozickean right. Nozickean right not only ensures that certain state 
of affairs (failure to lead meaningful life) would not happen to the right bearer. They 
instead are rights that prescribe other people should not deliberately treat or interfere 
with the right bearer in certain ways. Hence "the relation between the possessor of the 
right and the actor, rather than just the intrinsic nature of the possessor and of his life, 
must enter into the analysis of the right and the explication of its b a s i s . O n c e the 
actor is considered, the intentions and goals of his act enter into the analysis, so that 
we have a clearer picture as to whether the actor is justified to do those actions. It is 
therefore necessary to "explore the interaction between those constraints and the goals 
whose pursuit they c o n s t r a i n . S u c h an exploration is more or less a comparison 
between the importance of that right and that of the goal. And whether such a 
violation of right is permissible is "a function of the gravity of the violation and the 
desirability of the ends".'®^ Yet Nagel denies that the comparison is a simple balance 
between value and disvalue brought by violation of right. For that would amounts to a 
goal based view of right, which allow "violation of right if doing so one could prevent 
more numerous or more serious violations of the same right by others.，，應 Echoing 
Nozick, Nagel thinks that the goal based view is flawed, as the view would permit 
some undesirable and unjustified cases. For example, the goal-based view would 
105 Thomas Nagel, "Nozick: Libertarianism Without Foundation", in Other Minds: Critical Essays, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 145 
慨 Ibid. 
107 Ibid, p. 146 
Ibid, p. 146 
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permit killing an innocent person, in order to avoid deliberate killing of three other 
innocent persons. He thinks that such utilitarian calculations are unjustified and 
violate the basic spirit of right. Although Nagel is obscure in the way of comparison, 
one conclusion is clear from his analysis. 
There is no reason to think that either in personal life or in society the force 
of every right will be absolute or nearly absolute, that is, never capable of 
being overridden by consequential considerations. Rights not to be 
deliberately killed, injured, tormented, or imprisoned are very powerful and 
limit the pursuit of any goal. More limited restrictions of liberty of action, 
restriction on the use of property, and restrictions on contracts are simply 
less serious and therefore provide less powerful constraints.'^ ^ 
Nagel，s point is that there is no reason to assume only the meaning of life can enter 
into the justification of right. There is also no reason to think rights are absolutely 
non-violable. For realization of welfare right or desert, which is supposedly 
significant goals, taxation and ban on some transfers should not be forbidden simply 
because they interfere with people's r i g h t . " o 
I think Nagel's point is plausible. There is no reason to grant that rights, 
especially the right to use property, are absolutely non-violable in every circumstance. 
Whether rights are violable should also depend on other considerations, such as the 
consequence or goal of violating those rights. Let me suggest an example to illustrate 
this point. Imagine that a person saw a boy drowning in a lake. It seems that the boy 
was going to die but the person cannot save him, as he does not know how to swim. 
There is nobody around who can help the boy. He only saw a life ring nearby that 
could save the boy. The life ring is hung on a yacht. To get the life ring the person has 
to board the yacht. It means that to save the boy, the person has to violate the property 
Ibid., pp. 145-146 
11° Scanlon holds a view similar to Nagel. Scanlon thinks that whether a kind of right should be 
justified depends on the importance of having control over things in that category, and how that power 
would affect other people. See Scanlon, "Right, Liberty and Property" in Reading Nozick. pp. 107-129 
84 
right of the yacht-owner. For the yacht-owner has the property right not to let other 
people to board the yacht, and to use anything on the yacht, including the life ring. 
Nozick would say that the person should not take the life ring to save the boy, 
even the boy would die as a result. Or he would say that the state should punish the 
person if he has used that life ring to save the boy without the yacht-owner's 
permission, because the person has violated the right of the yacht-owner. Yet I think it 
is obvious that both claims are unreasonable. Not only does the person should not be 
punished for saving the boy, what he did should even earn our respect and praise. 
That he has violated the right should not matter, because the reason why he violates 
the right is significant and meaningful. Also, the state should not enact a law that 
punishes every violation or property right. It should, as in this case, allow property 
right to be violated, if there are good justifications. 
I have shown that Nozick cannot justify the side-constraint view of right based 
on the idea of meaningful lives. But the view can be saved. Nozick can evade this 
challenge by adding another premise into his justification, by arguing that side-
constraint view is based upon, in addition to meaningful lives, the idea that we are 
separate individuals, owners of ourselves. To respect this fact, "people should be 
treated as ends and not merely as means; they may not be sacrificed or used for the 
achieving of other ends without their consent.""' There should be no problem for 
Nozick to add this premise in the justification of Nozickean right. He indeed agrees to 
it, and even claim that the side-constraint view reflects this principle.''^ 
川 N o z i c M « S " ’ p . 31. 
112 Ibid. It is interesting why Nozick would base the side-constraint view of right only on the meanings 
of life and does not put "thesis of self-ownership" into justification, especially when he explicitly 
claims that side-constraint view reflect such a thesis. One possibility is that their relations are not 
parallel, but in a justificatory structure. Nozick may intend to use the meanings of life to justify why 
self-ownership and to respect we are separate individuals are important. Or Nozick may think that the 
thesis of self-ownership is not a valuable characteristic that is as self-evident as the meanings of life. 
Whatever the reason, it does not matter here. For there should be no objections to interpreting the thesis 
of self-ownership as the foundation of Nozickean rights. 
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Then, a justifiable conception of right should meet the two following 
conditions. On the one hand, it should be conducive to allowing people to lead 
meaningful lives. On the other hand, it should forbid any coercion that aims to 
provide welfare or services for others. Adding the second condition, Nozick can argue 
that any suggestion to welfare right that endorses redistribution cannot pass the 
second test and is therefore unjustified. For Nozick believes that taxation amounts to 
"forced labour" and it does not respect the fact that we are self-owners and separate 
individuals. 113 In this respect, Nozickean right is superior to welfare rights and desert. 
But Nozickean right still fails the first test. In reply, Nozick can admit that his 
conception of right may not be able to ensure that everyone's life is protected and has 
the possibility to lead meaningful life. Yet it is not Nozickean right which requires 
such a violation. It just fails to ensure that such a violation does not happen. It is 
entirely possible that people would not die from inadequate material resources. This is 
true because the Lockean Proviso in the principle of initial acquisition and the 
principle of transfer ensures that appropriation and transfers would not worsen every 
person's material condition. It means that every person should have a certain amount 
of resources. After all, even though there are certain setbacks for Nozickean rights, it 
is less serious and less undesirable than welfare rights and desert, because these 
conceptions directly require the violation of the second condition. Comparing both 
types of rights, it seems that Nozickean right is superior, although it may not be 
perfect with respect to fulfilling the two foundations. 
To maintain that welfare right or desert is justified, I have to argue that the 
thesis of self-ownership cannot be used to argue against welfare rights and desert. 
There are two possibilities. The thesis of self-ownership is either not as it looks, or it 
Ibid., p. 169. I shall discuss whether taxation amounts to forced labor and whether the thesis of self-
ownership can be used to defend Nozickean right and argue against desert theory in the next section. 
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is not incompatible with redistribution. I shall explore the possibility along this line in 
the next section. However, now I want to make a final critique on Nozick's 
conception of right. 
My challenge is that even if the private property right is granted, it is still 
undesirable for Nozick adopt such a conception of right in the entitlement theory 
since it creates internal inconsistency. A side-constraint view of right conflicts with 
the principle of initial acquisition and the principle of transfer. The reason is that the 
Lockean Proviso in the principle of initial acquisition and the principle of transfer 
violate the right to liberty and the right to private property right respectively. Let me 
examine the principle of initial acquisition first. When I earlier explicate the 
application of Lockean Proviso in principle of initial acquisition, I already note that 
the principle conflicts with personal right to liberty, which grants individuals 
"freedom to order their a c t i o n s " . " 4 Recall that the proviso indicates a person is not 
free to appropriate any natural resources. The proviso forbids any appropriation that 
worsens that situation of other. The proviso hence restricts people's freedom to order 
their action. 
To defend, Nozick must argue that worsening others violates Nozickean rights. 
Then the side-constraint view demands such restricting and there will be no 
contradiction with Nozickean right. Yet it seems that Nozick cannot hold that 
worsening the situation of others violates their rights. Worsening, as I have explained, 
amounts to making others no longer able to use the resources freely. Worsening will 
violate the right of others only if Nozick assumes people have right not to be made 
less free to the use natural resources. But this right is just a general welfare right not 
to have one's material condition worsened. If Lockean proviso is used to restrict the 
�i4Nozick,/i5T/,p. 10 
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right to order action freely, it means that the Lockean Proviso gives a priority to this 
general welfare right over the particular right. This will add a general welfare right to 
the entitlement theory that Nozick explicitly rejects. 
As Waldron suggests, Nozick can reply that the Lockean proviso is not exactly 
the same as positive general right. For Lockean proviso 
is not a claim to be and to remain at that level of well-being: it is only a 
claim not to be moved down from it by an appropriation. If one's well-
being declines for other reasons, the Lockean proviso does not generate a 
claim to have it restored. ‘ ‘ ^  
Perhaps an example Nozick uses can further illustrate this point. What Nozick intends 
to argue is slightly different. He wants to hold that Lockean Proviso is not an "end-
state principle", but the example he uses can also be used to justify that Lockean 
proviso does not imply any general right. Suppose a medical researcher invents a new 
medicine which can save millions of people by synthesizing some abundant and easily 
obtained substances. Nozick claims that even if the researcher owns the total supply 
of that new medicine, he does not violate the Lockean proviso. It is because the 
researcher has not made other people in a worse situation than the appropriation or 
synthesis happens. This example shows that Lockean proviso does not entail a 
positive right to welfare. For, if otherwise, it would require the medical research to 
give some of his medicine to the needy. 
Recognizing this fact, it does not reject that Lockean proviso implies a priority 
of general welfare right over other rights. For the principle of initial acquisition and 
the principle transfer still assume the formation and justification of entitlements must 
be responsive to concerns about material condition and well-being that are not 
115 Jeremy Waldron, "Nozick and Locke: Filling the space of rights", in Natural Rights Liberalism from 
Locke to Nozick, Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller, Jr., and Jeffrey Paul ed., (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), p. 100 
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embodied in property rights."6 it still implies that the entitlement theory does not give 
priority to the side-constraint view of Nozickean rights. 
In order to avoid the contradiction, can Nozick give up the Lockean Proviso? 
Yet it is no different from giving up the principle of initial acquisition altogether. 
For, as Nozick claims, Lockean proviso is almost the whole of the principle. Giving 
up the principle of initial acquisition means that people have total freedom to 
appropriate natural resources. But I do not think this move is desirable. For I think 
Nozick needs some restrictions on initial acquisition to make his theory plausible. 
Without some restriction on appropriation, the entire world will be soon appropriated. 
Since the ability to appropriate resources are different among people, especially some 
are so incapable to capture any resources, I conjecture that some people would have 
no holding. Every bit of land would be owned by somebody. And non-owners are 
forbidden to step on every piece of land. I do not think Nozick would like to see that 
situation. For at that time, the right to liberty no longer bears substantial meaning, 
since people have no liberty to move or stand on any place at all. The meanings of life 
would also become an impossible ideal. 
On the other hand, when the Lockean proviso is applied to the principle of 
transfer, it demands that transactions cannot render other people unable to use the type 
of resources freely. For example, the proviso would exclude a person from purchasing 
all drinkable water in the world. But if the parties enter into the transaction voluntarily, 
forbidding them to trade would violate the seller's right to transfer the property to 
other people. As for the case of initial acquisition, keeping the Lockean Proviso is 
inconsistent with Nozick's claim that his theory does not give priority over a general 
116 Waldron, “Nozick and Locke: Filling the space of rights", p. 100 
One attempt has been made to argue “there is no such thing as an unjust initial acquisition". See 
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welfare right and that the right he endorses are only negative right of side-constraint. 
What then can Nozick argue to reject desert basis on the inviolability of Nozickean 
right? As I mentioned, Nozick can substantiate the inviolability and the foundation of 
Nozickean right by arguing that right is non-violable because it conflicts with the 
thesis of self-ownership. Let me now turn to examine if the thesis of self-ownership 
stands to justify libertarian right and Nozick's rejection of desert. 
3.5 Argument from Self-Ownership 
In the last section, I have shown that Nozick cannot justify a side constraint view of 
right based on the idea of meaningful lives. Hence Nozick's objection to desert 
remains unjustified. I have suggested that Nozick can defend the side constraint view 
of right by adding one more foundation, the thesis of self-ownership. However, my 
main argument in this section is that, even though the “control right part" of the thesis 
of self-ownership can justify the side constraint view, it cannot justifies forbidding 
redistribution. On the other hand, while the "income right part" of the thesis of self-
ownership may conflict with redistribution, this part does not have an appeal of 
absolute inviolability. As a result, the thesis of self-ownership cannot justify the side-
constraint view of property right that forbids all forms of redistribution. Hence Nozick 
cannot use the thesis of self-ownership to argue against desert. 
To achieve this end, I will first explicate the idea of self-ownership. I will 
show that self-ownership has two components, control right and income right. Then I 
will show how Nozick has these two rights in mind in forming two separate 
arguments against redistribution. Then I proceed to argue that both arguments cannot 
justify forbidding all forms of redistribution. 
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I shall begin with a brief note of the idea of ownership. Ownership is a moral 
notion which indicates that an owner is morally justified to hold the object; and that 
the object morally belongs to the owner. Ownership entails that the owner has certain 
special privileges or moral claims upon the object owned that the non-owner does not 
have. So construed, ownership is different from possession, which only notes a 
descriptive relation between a possessor and an object. Possession implies that a 
person is de facto in control of an object, without implying who is entitled to the 
object. Hence a possessor does not have any normative claims on the object. 
Self-ownership is a notion indicating that a person owns his or her self. As 
Cohen notes, self-ownership "signifies that what owns and what is owned are the one 
110 ^^ 
and the same, namely, the whole person." The self is owned by a person as if an 
external object is owned by a person. Hence the thesis of ownership is not a particular 
construal, but only a kind of right to property ownership that we are familiar with. It is 
one kind of property right in the sense that self is just one kind of property, as if land 
is one kind of property and land-ownership right is a kind of property right. The thesis 
of self-ownership is similar to rights in external properties. That the right to self-
ownership is just one case of right to property can be seen in Nozick's description of 
the idea property. He says, 
this notion of property helps us to understand why earlier theorists spoke of 
people as having property in themselves and their labor. They viewed each 
person as having a right to decide what would become of himself and what 
would do, and as having a right to reap the benefits of what he didV^ 
The parallel between right to self and right to property is endorsed not only by 
'early theorists', but also Nozick. For the content Nozick's right to self-ownership 
also parallels property rights. The thesis of self-ownership says that an individual has 
Cohen, Self-ownership, Freedom and Equality, pp. 68-69 
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certain rights over his or her own self that other people do not have. There are two 
broad types of right. The first type is the control right of self, which refers to the right 
“to decide what would become of himself. This parallels Nozick's interpretation that 
property right is the right to determine what shall be done with X. Owner of a self has 
the freedom to decide what should happen to the self. And it prescribes other people 
not to force the self to do anything without the self s consent, unless the self violates 
the rights of other people. Cohen provides a good illustration of control right by using 
rights on slavery as an analogy. He says, control right include 
all those rights that a slave holder has over a complete chattel slave as a 
matter of legal right, and he is entitled, morally speaking, to dispose over 
himself in the way such a slaveholder is entitled, legally speaking, to 
dispose over his slave... If I am the moral owner of myself, and, therefore, 
of this right arm, then, while others are entitled, because of their self-
ownership, to prevent it from hitting them, no one is entitled, without my 
consent, to press it into their own or anybody else's service, even when my 
failure to extend service voluntarily to others would be morally wrong. 
I believe foil control right over self has great appeal, which flows from people's fears 
of being slaves of other parties, including the state. Since control right includes rights 
to dispose over a self like a slave, losing control right means that other people can to a 
certain extent treat a person as a slave. Even conceding part of that right means that 
one becomes a partial slave of other people. Hence flill control right is hardly able to 
compromise. 
The second type is what is often called income right, which means the right 
"to reap the benefits of what he did". But precisely it is not the action that one has 
income right to. Rather, it is the mind and body which generate the action that a 
person has income right to. Nevertheless, this interpretation is still not accurate, for it 
120 Cohen, Self-ownership, Freedom and Equality, p. 68 
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has no restriction on the ways that generate the benefits of one's action. For example, 
this interpretation allows a thief to claim the stolen goods as his property, as it is the 
benefits of his action (stealing). To avoid this problem, it is better to employ Otsuka's 
interpretation of income right. For him, income right is "right to all of the income that 
one can gain from one's mind and body (including one's labor) either on one's own or 
through unregulated and untaxed voluntary exchanges with other individuals."'^' This 
right says that if one has labored to produce anything or provided any services with 
one's mind and body, the person has the right to whatever other people are willing to 
pay for the product or service. 
Let me turn to examine how Nozick use the idea of self-ownership to argue 
against patterned principle. He uses what I term the "forced labor argument", 
whether it is done through taxation on wages or on wages over a 
certain amount...patterned principles of distributive justice involves 
appropriating the actions of other persons. Seizing the results of 
someone's labor is equivalent to seizing hours from him and directing 
him to carry on various activities. If people force you to do certain 
work, or unrewarded work, for a certain period of time, they decide 
what you are to do and what purposes your work is to serve apart from 
your decisions. This process whereby they take this decision from you 
makes them a part-owner of you; it gives them a property right in you. 
Just as having such partial control and power of decision, by right, over 
an animal or inanimate object would be to have a property right in it.'^ ^ 
Nozick's argument consists of three steps. First, taxing income earned by a person's 
labor is the same as forcing the person to work for others. Second, forcing the person 
to work for others deprives him of control right he should have as a self-owner. Third, 
depriving a person's control right is morally undesirable. Nozick then concludes that 
taxation is morally undesirable. 
121 Michael Otsuka, "Self-ownership and Equality: A Lockean Reconciliation", Philosophy and Public 
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I presume it is widely accepted that forced labor deprives one's control right 
and is morally undesirable. Thus if taxation is the same as forced labor, taxation 
would also be morally undesirable. However, Nozick's argument is wrong as the first 
premise is flawed. As seizing the results of someone's labor is not equivalent to 
seizing hours from him and directing him to carry on various activities, taxation is not 
equivalent to forced labor. 
Let me treat the first and second condition separately. Using income tax as an 
example, tax does not direct the taxpayer to carry on any activities. Directing the 
taxpayer to carry on any activities means enslavement, in which taxpayer has no 
choice but follows government orders to work. But this is not true. Tax is to be paid 
so long if one has chosen to work and if the reward of that work exceed a certain level. 
Taxation does not ask an idle person to start to work so that he can pay tax. On the 
contrary, even a worker is forced to pay tax, he is not forced to work. Taxation does 
not ask the worker not to quit the job. The worker may quit it and stop to pay tax. 
Even if the worker does not quit, he still has the freedom to choose what work to do. 
The worker is not tied to any particular type of work. 
Second, tax does not seize hours of a worker either. Nozick may think that tax 
seize hours of work for the following reason. Suppose a person works for a company 
and the salary is $100 per hour. If the person earns $10000 and tax rate is 10%, it 
turns out that he has worked 100 hours but received rewards for only working 90 
hours. That 10 hours is useless to the person as it does not benefit him. Since $100 is 
equivalent to an hour work and the government seizes ten $100 from the person, it 
seems that the government has seized that 10 hours from the person. 
Yet the analogy between $100 and an hour is not correct. For it begs the 
question to presume that the person is fully entitled to what the company has agreed 
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to pay him. This kind of full entitlement and the objection to redistribution is 
supposed to be proven by the self-ownership argument, but not used as a premise of 
the argument. However, if ftill entitlement is not presumed, then taxation does not 
seize hours from the labor. Although the company is willing to pay $100 per hour for 
the worker's labor, it does not infer that the worker is entitled to the entire sum. It is 
possible that, for some moral reason, e.g. desert, $10 is to be taxed by the government 
and the worker is only entitled to $90 per hour. The forced labor / control right 
argument alone cannot argue against taxation. It needs to be supported by a 
presumption that one is folly entitled to the reward of one's labor. This presumption is 
exactly the income right argument. Let me now turn to examine whether this 
argument is plausible. 
To begin with, I shall explicate further how the income argument runs. As 
mentioned, income right argument says that people should have "the right to all of the 
income that one can gain from one's mind and body (including one's labor) either on 
one's own or through unregulated and untaxed voluntary exchanges with other 
individuals." Non-voluntary taxation violates this right as it unilaterally takes part of 
the income away. To repsect income right, non-voluntary taxation should be 
forbidden. For instance, suppose a person has made a stone axe out of a raw stone 
found in the wild. As the person has laboured to create that stone axe, he should be 
able to "reap the benefit" of and gain in the making of the axe. This means, first, the 
product of the making, the axe, should belong to the person. Second, the person 
should be able to gain all income that flows from the axe, for instance by selling it, 
lendng it, or using it to work for other people. Both the axe and generated earnings 
should not be taxed away, or it violates the income right of the person. 
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Income right thus implies that the result of labouring is the property of the 
subject and the subject has property right over that property.^^^ Otherwise, it cannot 
be said that the axe should belong to the person. More importantly, it cannot explain 
why the person has right to the income obtained by selling or lending the axe in a 
voluntarily exchange. For the person can only sell things he owns. If so, Nozick has to 
explain why the result of labouring should be the property of the labour. One possible 
explanation is that labouring is sufficient to turn a previously unowned or non-
existing object into one's property protected by a flill set of private property right. 
I think the income right argument is not defensible, for three reasons. First of 
all, it is inconsistent for Nozick to accept income right, since he rejects that labouring 
alone can turn something into one's property while discussing initial acquisition. 
Second, income argument is justified only if the material to be transformed into 
results of labouring is unowned. If other people previously have claims on the 
materials, the labor cannot transform them into his own property. Third, even if I 
grant that materials are previously unowned, Nozick has no reason to claim income 
right overrides reasons that demand taxation. He needs further argument to establish 
the inviolability of this right. 
For the first reason, Nozick objects that labouring can turn something into 
one's property when he discusses Lockean theory of acquisition; thus it is inconsistent 
for him to argue that a person has income right to the results of labouring. Locke 
thinks that as a person mixes labour with an unowned or non-existing object, that 
object would become a property of him. But Nozick disagrees with this view, because 
mixing labour is not a clear notion that it is difficult to distinguish between it and 
losing labour. As he questions, 
123 By labouring I mean using one's mind or body. 
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but why isn't mixing what I own with what I don't own a way of losing 
what I own rather than a way of gaining what I don't? If I own a can of 
tomato juice and spill it in the sea so that its molecules (made radioactive, 
so I can check this) mingle evenly throughout the sea, do I thereby come 
to own the sea, or have I foolishly dissipated my tomato juice?丨 
As labor mixing is not a sufficient condition of initial acquisition, Nozick cannot 
consistently endorse the income right on property. Indeed, the same worry also exists 
in the income right argument. Why a person has income right over the result of his 
labour? Why is it not that the person has just lost his labour, so that the result of 
labouring is not anyone's property and cannot be exchanged? Contrarily, if Nozick 
insists his justification for income right is correct, i.e., labouring alone can justify 
income right, I do not see why he adds Lockean Proviso to restrict initial acquisition. 
Adding other restriction is to refute that labouring is sufficient to turn things into 
property. 
In defense, Nozick can argue that there are other reasons to support his claim. 
One possible option is to borrow the justification from the principle of initial 
acquisition. The question of income right is how can one justify turning the result of 
labour into one's property. This is similar to initial acquisition, where both concern 
how to own previously unowned things. However, it is not sensible if Nozick use the 
justification of initial acquisition to justify income right. The principle of initial 
acquisition is just irrelevant to one's labouring. What justifies initial acquisition is a 
limited impact of an act of appropriation on other people, but not that acquisition 
involves labouring. Indeed, an act of acquisition that barely involves labouring may 
qualify as legitimate acquisition. But that act cannot justify income right, because 
there is labouring at all. 
Nozick,/^S^y, pp. 174-175 
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The second objection is that Nozick fails to prove that people do not have 
claims over materials in the state of nature; thus he cannot hold that a person has 
income right of the result of labouring. The proof is necessary because if a person has 
laboured on another's property without the owner's permission, no matter how much 
value or labour he has added, the owner of the material should retain his ownership of 
the product. Indeed, such labouring is just an act of stealing, for the person takes and 
uses the property without the owner's approval. Nozick would not want to justify 
stealing. 
Moreover, Nozick does not recognize, if not refute, other possibilities. For 
example, Otsuka claims that, for the sake of equality, everyone in the world has 
claims to an equal share of world r e sou rces .� Accepting this claim, Nozickean 
income right is restricted. As other people have claims over those natural resources. 
Any person cannot claim they have right to every result of laboured natural resources. 
They only have claims to a legitimate share of, i.e., an equal amount of, laboured 
natural resources. Unless Nozick argues that no one has claim to natural resources, his 
argument for income right is not well-supported. 
For the third objection, granting that income right is justified and that 
all natural resources are unowned, Nozick does not show why income right is 
inviolable and should override other moral concerns. The right to self-ownership has a 
great appeal of inviolability, since, probably, we think that loss of this right allows 
room for forced slavery. However, this does not mean that the inviolability of income 
right is correct. The reason is that income right, strictly speaking, is not a right to 
protect self, but to protect the property created by self. In other words, violating it 
would not lead to any damage or infringement of self, not leading to fears of forced 
125 Otsuka, "Self-ownership and Equality: An Lockean Reconciliation" 
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slavery. Without this relationship, it seems that income right does not have the appeal 
of inviolability that control right has. The consequence of losing this appeal is that 
Nozick needs to provide more proof and support for the justifiability of income right 
than he does now. Otherwise, it is implausible to hold that income right is inviolable 
and should override other moral concerns. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a negative argument against Nozick's objections to desert. I 
start with outlining the general picture of Nozick's entitlement theory. Using his own 
framework, I argue that desert is a historical patterned principle. Since Nozick objects 
to patterned principle, he would also object to any principles of desert, for three 
reasons. I argued that all three reasons fail. The first argument is that patterned 
principle conflicts with people's liberty and liberty is inviolable because it will violate 
people's right. This implies that liberty argument is not an independent argument, but 
a right-based argument. Alternatively, Nozick can argue that liberty is important 
because it ensures that people have room to lead their own lives. Employing this 
conception of liberty, however, Nozick is inconsistent because property right will 
undermine people's liberty. Hence he cannot use the liberty argument to argue against 
desert. 
The second reason is a right-based argument. Libertarian rights do conflict 
with desert. But it does not mean that desert is unjustified, because Nozick has not 
proved that right is absolutely non-violable. Nozick has based the inviolability of right 
on the meanings of lives. I have shown that other conceptions of right, e.g. one that 
contain positive right to life, can better serve that foundation. Moreover, objecting 
welfare right, Nozickean right is not compatible with other parts of the entitlement 
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theory. It is because the Lockean proviso in the principle of initial acquisition is a 
kind of welfare right. 
Despite this contradiction, it seems that Nozick can employ the thesis of self-
ownership to justify the absolute inviolability of rights. This is the third argument, the 
argument of self-ownership, that Nozick uses to argue against desert. I hold that self-
ownership contains two different rights, control right of self and income right. Control 
right has the appeal of absolute inviolability, it alone does not justify forbidding 
redistribution. Moreover, when income right is in conflict with redistribution, it does 
not have the appeal of inviolability. As a result, I hold that the self-ownership 
argument is not strong enough to defeat the claim of desert. 
Holding out all objections against desert, this chapter opens the possibility that 
Nozick has no reason not to accept desert. The next chapter will continue this line by 
offering positive arguments for desert. It aims to argue that, based on what Nozick 
values, he has strong reasons to include desert in the entitlement theory. 
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CHAPTER 4 
TWO NOZICKEAN ARGUMENTS FOR DESERT 
In the last chapter, I have shown that it is unreasonable for Nozick to exclude 
desert from his entitlement theory. It then opens a possibility that, given desert is 
morally significant, Nozick has reason to integrate the claim of desert into his doctrine. 
This chapter aims to argue for that possibility. I shall offer two Nozickean arguments 
to support my claim. They are Nozickean in the sense that the premises are drawn 
from Nozick's own moral commitment. I call the first argument "individual 
argument". Its central claim is that a distributive scheme in accordance with desert 
will encourage people to strive for a meaningful life. Nozick would accept this 
argument because pursuing a meaningful life is a fundamental value of his theory. 
The second argument is called “social argument" which claims that not rewarding 
desert would create widespread anger and social instability that would have deep 
tension with Nozick's picture of good society. 
4.1 Individual Argument 
The individual argument has the following steps. First, it holds that having a 
meaningful life for each rational individual is a fundamental value. Second, it claims 
that self-respect is a necessary condition of leading a meaningful life. Third, it 
contends that the system of desert can provide a solid social basis for self-respect. For 
rewarding desert can publicly recognizes the worth of different life forms. We can 
then conclude that including desert in entitlement theory is actually an internal 
demand of entitlement theory. In this section, I shall first reiterate how Nozick 
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perceives the significance of leading a meaningful life and how it can be striven for. I 
will then delineate the concept of self-respect and explain why it is a necessary 
condition of leading a meaningful live. Then I go on to articulate how rewarding 
desert would help promote self-respect. 
4.1.1 The Importance of a Meaningful Life in the Entitlement Theory 
To begin with, let us recall how Nozick conceives the importance of a meaningful 
life. In Chapter 3, I have shown that Nozick holds a side-constraint view of right. He 
believes that the side constraint can protect people to pursue their meaningful lives. 
We can see that the idea of a meaningful life is very fundamental in Nozick's project. 
Moreover, the value of leading a meaningful life is also non-violable. While he does 
not explicitly arrive at this conclusion, he seems to take it as self-evident when he 
questions whether meaningful lives can be ruined. 
And even with so, why not destroy meaningful lives? Or, why no replace 
"happiness" with "meaningfulness" within utilitarian theory, and maximize the 
total "meaningfulness" score of the persons of the world? Or does the notion of 
the meaningfulness of a life enter into ethics in a different fashion? This notion, 
we should note, have the right "feel" as something that might help to bridge an 
"is-ought" gap; it appropriately seems to straddle the two. Suppose, for 
example, that one could show that if a person acted in certain ways his life 
would be meaningless. Would this be a hypothetical or categorical imperatives? 
Would one need to answer the further question: "but why shouldn't my life be 
meaningless?”i26 
The clue is that for Nozick, the idea of a meaningful life has the right feel to bridge 
the is-ought gap. The problem of the gap may be like this. Person X has a meaningful 
life (IS). Person X should have a meaningful life. (OUGHT). If Nozick believes that 
the is-ought gap with regard to a meaningful life does not exist, he can hold that a 
126 Nozick, ASU, p. 50, my emphasis. 
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person having a meaningful life entails that person should have a meaningful life. As 
libertarian rights are non-violable, the values that those rights aim to protect will also 
be non-violable. Since everyone in a Nozickean state of nature has an obligation not 
to violate other people's rights, it follows that everyone should not ruin other person's 
meaningful lives. Therefore, Nozick thinks that a meaningful life is a self-evidently 
important value that cannot be violated. 
For Nozick, leading a meaningful life is not something in-bom or accidentally 
achieved. It requires certain abilities. As he says, "only a being with the capacity to so 
shape his life can have or strive for meaningful life，，.】27 In other words, the agent 
should be able to shapes his life in accordance with some overall plans that he 
1，R 
rationally chooses. This consists of two components. First, the person should his 
own conceptions of good life and design long-terms plans of what to do for himself. 
Second, he should regulate his actions according to his life plan and avoid being "the 
plaything of immediate s t i m u l i " . S i n c e having a meaningful life is important in the 
entitlement theory, Nozick must take the capacity for striving for meaningful life 
seriously and make sure that people can develop that capacity. Strangely, Nozick does 
not address this issue. In the following, I shall demonstrate that a distributive scheme 
grounded on desert can play a positive role in cultivating people's abilities to leading 
a meaningful life. The logic of argument is that the development of such capacity 
requires X，and desert can promote X. 
4.1.2 Self-respect and the Meaningful Life 
127 Nozick, ASU, p.50. my emphasis. 
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This section will argue that self-respect is needed to develop the capacity for a 
meaningful life. I do not hold that self-respect is the sufficient condition of having 
such capacity. It is a necessary condition. Besides self-respect, there are other traits 
that are important for developing such capacity such as like rationality, free will and 
moral a g e n c y . I single out self-respect because it is relevant to desert. 
Before going into the argument, let me use Rawls's account to illustrate the 
idea of self-respect. According to Rawls, self-respect has two aspects. First, "it 
includes a person's sense of his own value, his secure conviction that his conception 
of his good, his plan of life, is worth carrying out.,’�� ' Second, self-respect means "a 
confidence in one's ability, so far as it is within one's power, to fulfill one's 
i n t e n t i o n . ’ ’ 132 Both interpretations are related to confirmation of oneself, but the 
subject is different. The former emphasizes the confirmation of one's value while the 
latter stresses the confirmation of one's ability. Since rewarding desert is based on the 
worth of what one has done, but not one's ability per se, I will focus on the first 
aspect in the following discussion. The term "self-respect" also refers to the first 
aspect of self-respect. 
I will now explain the importance of self-respect in striving for a meaningful 
life. According to Nozick, a meaningful life obtains when a person formulates some 
overall plans of life and acts according to them. Since those plans deeply affect one's 
life and constitute an important part of his identity, he will carefully scrutinize 
different possibilities. Whatever plans the person chooses, he should understand their 
values and identify with them. For a rational agent, the plans he chose must be 
worthwhile, e.g. they are right, good, pleasurable or desirable. He will evaluate 
different possibilities and make value judgment with reference to his conception of 
'30 Nozick, ASU, p.49. 
Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p.386. 
132 Ibid. 
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the good. He must believe that from his rational point of view, what he choose is 
better than other alternatives. This does not mean that he would never change his 
mind. If he finds that his existing plan is not good, he would change for another one. 
If a person finds no plans worth pursuing, his life will have no direction. He 
lacks a conception of good life. In this sense, the first capacity to have a meaningful 
life is lost. Even though he can think of something to do, they are not his plans of life. 
He would not believe that those endeavours are truly worthwhile. He may not explain 
why he would do such things. He can hardly regulate his actions according to a 
rational project. As a consequence, his second ability to have a meaningful life is also 
lost. He would probably become a "plaything of immediate stimuli" as Nozick calls. 
Whatever he would be, his life turns out to be meaningless. Such life is miserable as 
Rawls describes, 
when we felt that our plans are of little value, we cannot pursue them with 
pleasure or take delight in their execution. Not plagued by failure and self-
doubt can we continue in our endeavours. It is clear then why self-respect is a 
primary good. Without it nothing may seem worth doing, or if some things 
have value for us, we lack the will to strive for them. All desire and activity 
becomes empty and vain, and we sink into apathy and c y n i c i s m . � 
We can now understand why self-respect is necessary for striving for a 
meaningful life. If a person has self-respect, he has faith about the worth of the plans 
that he opts to carry out. He will also have the power and determination to act 
according to it. That determination stems from a considered belief that his conception 
of life is worth carrying out. Without self-respect, a person would lose the power to 
choose his conception of good life and effectively execute it. He would not convince 
himself that he is leading a meaningful life. 
Recognizing the importance of self-respect, the next question is how one can 
have self-respect. In the beginning, it must be that the person believes that some life 
Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 386 
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forms or projects are desirable. He may find them comfortable, good, right or 
pleasurable. He wants to realize them. Also, he is willing to identify himself with 
those life forms and projects. It is because they are very important to him. They shape 
his identity and direct his life. Put it another way, the person needs to have a 
conviction that those life forms or tasks are worthwhile. This conviction is not a 
purely subjective or spontaneous feeling. It does not come to a person as directly as 
pain, but has to be found and ascertained by the person. People need to search for it 
and reconfirm it through rational deliberation. The reflection will go on even if they 
have formed their life plans because they may make mistakes. They cannot risk taking 
worthless plans. 
Since the conception of good life is the result of constant reflections, the 
search for good life needs public recognition. We do not live alone. We cannot define 
the meaning of our life independent of the community. On the contrary, our 
confidence in our life project always comes from the publicly recognized values and 
social practices. By public recognition, I do not mean the recognition from the whole 
society. That is impossible. Rather, it may come from the significant others around us, 
or the community where we belong to. Recognition is particularly effective if it comes 
from a community which we share the similar values and beliefs. 
Recognition that supports the search for conception of the good is needed for 
two reasons. First, public recognition makes a person more confident in his 
conception of the good. As I have mentioned, people would keep on questioning the 
worth of their life plans. A deep understanding of their projects would give solid 
support for their choices. The more an agent affirms his conception of life, the more 
secure his conviction will be. This will enhance a person's ability to strive for a 
meaningful life. 
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Public recognition also deepens people's understanding of the worth of their 
conceptions of good. Public recognition is any expression of the worth of that 
conception of life by members of a community. Such expression may directly provide 
reasons to explain why such conception of the good is worthwhile; or it indirectly 
illustrates a good image of such life forms, stimulating a person to think and feel the 
worth of his life plan; or it, in the form of dialogue, offers a chance for people to 
exchange opinions with others. Whatever these expressions are, they provide people 
with new and deeper understandings of their life. 
There is a second way in which public recognition can support our self-respect. 
Public recognition enables a person to have secure conviction of the worth of the 
conception of life by mutual support. Apart from the understanding of the worth, as 
one reflects, it is possible that a person gets lost and lacks confidence over his own 
judgment. Any more reflection on the worth of that conception may not solve the 
confidence crisis because the person no longer believes in his own judgment. At this 
point, he needs support from other people to affirm the value of his life plan. This 
kind of support may be in the form of dialogue. It may simply be an example of 
another person who has successfully realized that conception of the good. The 
example will show him that his conception of the good is reachable, fulfilling and 
worthwhile. This will help the person regain confidence over the worth of his choice. 
The impact of public recognition can be shown in the following example. 
Sumo is a popular sport in Japan. A good sumo player is perceived by many Japanese 
as honourable and meaningful. Sumo as a conception of life is also perceived by 
many Japanese as worthwhile. However, the situation in Hong Kong is different. We 
can imagine that far less Hong Kong people perceive that being a sumo player is a 
worthwhile conception of life. One reason is that there is no public recognition of the 
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worth of sumo in Hong Kong. People in general do not have deep understanding of 
the value of sumo. Even if some have the interest to be a sumo player, that interest 
can hardly develop into a conception. Or even if it can, the conviction that sumo is 
worthwhile is not secure and stable. It is because there is no communal support for the 
worth of being a sumo player. 
4.1.3 Desert and Self-respect 
I now turn to explain why rewarding desert can help people obtain self-respect. 
The main reason is that rewarding desert is a social mechanism to offer public 
recognition on the worth of different activities. As illustrated in Chapter 1, desert 
prescribes that rewards should be distributed according to the worth of an activity. In 
explaining why the standard of desert is chosen, it provides an account of the worth of 
that activity and explains why it is a reasonable standard of desert. Even if the 
authority does not explicitly explain the worth of the activity, participants can still 
leam it by their reflection. Even if they do not reflect, people may unconsciously form 
norms according to standard of desert as rewards repeat. Perhaps people may have 
different understanding of the worth of that activity. They can discuss and exchange 
their views on it. Furthermore, since the worth of activity has always been 
institutionalized, it will be recognized by the public. It will boost people's confidence 
in the worth of that activity. In these ways, rewarding desert has a function to give 
public recognition of the worth of that activity. 
Let me illustrate this point by an example of work and salary. I hold that the 
worth of work is to contribute to the tasks and goals of companies and organizations. 
Then desert in the field of work is to be rewarded according to how much contribution 
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an employee has done. Now suppose that the principle of rewarding work has been 
institutionalized. It has been written in the law that salary, as a reward for work, 
should be given according to the contribution that a worker has made. Government 
may set up a committee to examine the salary of different job positions. It can order 
companies to reward workers according to their contribution. It can set up a tribunal 
to handle complaints about undeserved payments. It can set an example for the non-
public sectors to follow by giving deserved salary to her employees. 
The above policies will give a clear and firm public recognition on the worth 
of work as contribution made to companies. The government needs to justify its 
policies to her citizens. She has a duty to explain why the worth of work is important 
and why it is measured in terms of contribution. In the process of legislation, 
government's viewpoint may be challenged. As discussion goes on, the understanding 
of the worth of work and the importance of desert will be deepened. Moreover, the 
institutionalization of the worth of work sets an example to show that work is 
worthwhile because it achieves the tasks set by companies. Regarding it as a social 
practice, workers would perceive that the worth of work is recognized by other 
members of the community. Hence they would reconfirm the judgment that the worth 
of work is to help achieve companies' goals. If they believe that their work can have 
this function, they would be more confident in what they are doing. Rewarding 
employees according to contribution will build up their confidence and convictions. 
Obtaining such conviction, they would know that an important part of their life is 
worthwhile. 
Concluding this section, I would like to make a remark about the relationship 
between desert and self-respect. 1 argue that self-respect is a necessary condition of 
striving for a meaningful life, and desert is an important means to promoting self-
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respect. However, I do not claim that rewarding desert is a necessary condition of 
self-respect. Nor do I say that it is a sufficient condition. It is immature to say that if 
certain things are obtained, everyone in society will have self-respect and lead a 
meaningful life. Obviously, there is no guarantee for such things. 
To have a worthwhile conception of life depends on many factors. Even if a 
society rewards desert, people may fail to obtain self-respect. For example, people 
may not have clear thought of forming their conceptions of life. Or they may be 
situated in a society which is not prosperous or diversified enough for them to find 
worthwhile options. 
I understand why Rawls deems social basis of self-respect, rather than self-
respect itself, as a primary good. It is too demanding to expect a government to ensure 
that every member in the society can actually acquire self-respect. Self-respect is a 
personal good. What a government can do is to ensure that the society provides a 
favourable environment for people to search for their own worth of life. That 
favourable environment is the social basis of self-respect. Desert can be part of that 
basis because it will allow members in the society to know the worth, if any, of many 
activities. Therefore, it is reasonable for us to conclude that Nozick have a good 
reason to incorporate desert into his entitlement theory. Now, I will turn to examine 
another Nozickean argument for desert, the social argument. 
4.2 Social Argument 
The main idea of the social argument is that eliminating desert will produce 
undesirable social consequences, including wide spread anger and weakening of 
social bonding. I shall argue that Nozick should not let these consequences happen, 
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not only because they are simply bad, but also because Nozick's entitlement theory 
entails an obligation to avoid these consequences. That obligation is derived from the 
conception of person that Nozick endorses, i.e. a person is a rational being who is able 
to form meaningful plans of l i f e . T h e derivation is casual in the sense that to realize 
this conception of person, the agent is required to belong to certain forms of society 
and culture. In other words, it requires a person to avoid undermining those forms of 
society and culture. Since rewarding desert can reduce those undesirable 
consequences, people in a Nozickean state have reason to reward desert. 
To illustrate my argument, I will first lay down how the assumption of being a 
rational and free person entails an obligation to belong to and sustain certain forms of 
society and culture. I will borrow Taylor's argument in "Atomism" to elaborate my 
point. My argument is summarized as follows. Since rational and free persons must 
live in certain forms of society and culture, they would make sense of social activities 
only by interpreting the worth of social activities. Taking work as an example, I will 
establish that, given a certain background condition, it is reasonable for people to 
have certain interpretation of the worth of a particular activity. That interpretation is a 
reasonable basis of desert with regard to that activity. I will then argue that society's 
rewarding mechanism cannot radically deviate from that reasonable basis of the desert. 
Otherwise, it would create wide spread anger and weaken social bonding among 
citizens. The consequence of these problems is the undermining of the integration of 
society, which Nozick would not allow. I will then show how the inclusion of desert 
can avoid this problem. 
4.2.1 Libertarian Rights and the Obligation to Sustain Society 
I shall thereafter call this kind of person "rational and free person". They are free in the sense that 
they can form their rational life plans. 
I l l 
To begin with, let me restate the core idea of entitlement theory. The theory is 
founded on a valuable feature of human agency that a rational person is able to give 
meaning to his life through shaping his life with some overall plans. Since 
interference with a person's freedom to shape his life will undermine his ability to 
lead a meaningflil life, Nozick thus impose very little constraints on individuals. For 
this reason, people in a Nozickean state have side-constraint rights to freedom, life 
and property. These rights give people freedom to do what they want and to hold 
private property. They warrant that people's life should not be taken away at others' 
will. People enjoy these rights as long as they do not infringe other people's similar 
rights. 
These rights are core foundation to justify political arrangements in 
entitlement theory. They cannot be compromised for other values. The preservation of 
these rights is the most important goal of a state. Moreover, people do not have any 
non-contractual obligation to other people. Any obligation other than respecting other 
people's rights can only be created through consent. 
Following Taylor's argument, I shall hold that the last statement is flawed. In 
order to ensure that all citizens can lead a meaningful life, people should have non-
contractual obligation to promote that capacity. I agree with Taylor that the capacity 
can only be developed within certain forms of culture and society. Hence people 
should have a non-contractual obligation to sustain and promote those cultural forms. 
The argument starts with a premise that we ascribe certain rights to human 
beings because they command our respect. The ascription shows that human beings 
lay a moral claim to each other based on certain features about them. One 
Nozick, AS" , p. 50. 
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fundamental feature, as illustrated in the individual argument, is that human beings 
have the capacity to strive for a meaningful life. 
Since those properties confer rights and place heavy restrictions on other 
people's action, they must be of great moral worth. Taylor adds that if something is of 
great moral worth, it implies a commitment to foster it. If those properties can be 
developed, those properties "ought to be fostered and developed in a host of 
appropriate ways, and not just interfered with". As he claims, 
To say that certain capacities command respect or have worth in our eyes is 
to say that we acknowledge a commitment to further and foster them. We 
do not just acknowledge people's (and/or animals') right to them, and 
hence the negative injunction that we ought not to invade or impair the 
exercise of these capacities in others. We also affirm that it is good that 
such capacities be developed, that under certain circumstances we ought to 
help and foster their development, and that we ought to realize them in 
ourselves. 
Arguing that people have an obligation to realize the capacity to become a rational 
and free person, Taylor adds that a rational and free agent can only be nurtured 
against certain social background. Thus, people have an obligation to belong to and 
sustain that social background. This is what he calls a social thesis. The thesis 
includes two claims. First, that capacity is a potential that needs to be developed. 
Second, that capacity cannot be developed on one's own, but only against certain 
social background. As he said, 
The claim is that living in society is a necessary condition of the 
development of rationality, in some sense of this property, or of becoming a 
moral agent in the full sense of the term, or of becoming a fully responsible, 
autonomous being. These variations and other similar ones represent the 
different forms in which a thesis about man as a social animal have been or 
could be couched. What they have in common is the view that outside 
society, or in some variants outside certain kinds of society, our distinctively 
human capacities could not d e v e l o p . 
136 Charles Taylor, "Atomism", in Philosophy and the Human Sciences, Philosophical Papers 2, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 194. 
137 "Atomism", p . l91 . 
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The social background that supports the development of those human capacities, 
in Taylor's view, includes a civilization of arts, philosophy, theology, science as well 
as social and political p rac t i ce s .They are important because it creates an aspiration 
to freedom and an image of autonomous life that people believe that they can achieve. 
In practice, such images and aspirations are obtained gradually in day-in and day-out 
activities, like political debates, visits to museums, history lessons, newspaper and 
economic exchange. Since the build-up is gradual, those activities have to take place 
continuously. Only society that contains stable institutions and practices provide such 
supports. Without all these, people may not realize what an autonomous life is and its 
value. They will then lose the ability to lead an autonomous life. Taylor then argues 
that there is no point to grant them libertarian rights if they cannot benefit from 
exercising those rights. 
It is unlikely that those activities would be sustained in spontaneous voluntary 
associations which, according to Nozick, people would form in the state of nature. For 
those associations are usually small, short-lived and formed for a few clear purposes. 
Thus it is impossible that an individual can, as Nozick assumes, act in the state of 
nature like a rational and free person without assuming such social backgrounds. 
However, even if we concede that those spontaneous voluntary organizations can 
provide such social backgrounds, Nozick still cannot evade the non-contractual 
obligation. For there is no guarantee that those spontaneous organizations can provide 
such social background. I shall further elaborate this point shortly. 
The conclusion is that if Nozick believes in the value of being a rational and 
free person, he should also recognize that people in the state of nature have an 
obligation to promote it. Since certain form of society is a necessary condition to 
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nurture rational and free person, people should have non-contractual obligation to 
belong to and sustain those forms of society. 
Nozick would agree with Taylor that libertarian rights should be based on 
some significant moral values because he also identifies the capacity to lead meaning 
life as the foundation of libertarian rights. Although Nozick does not make a clear 
connection between the foundation and the type of rights people should have, he 
would share with Taylor that the notion of a rational and free person is the key to 
account for the importance of libertarian rights. Hence the real difference between 
Taylor and Nozick lies on whether people have an obligation to promote the capacity 
to be a rational and free person in society. 
This issue needs careful analysis because on the surface their difference is not 
clear. Nozick would agree that people in the state of nature have obligation to 
promote the capacity of leading a meaningful and autonomous life. However, we 
should note that the obligation is non-enforceable. It is at most a moral but not 
political obligation. If people fail to comply with it, they may be condemned, but not 
be penalized by political authority. This is because coercive enforcement would 
violate libertarian rights. Although Nozick acknowledges that there are other values 
other than rights, rights must be overriding. Therefore, when there is a conflict 
between rights and other values like charity, people do not have obligation to realize 
those values. Similarly, although Nozick recognizes the worth of the integration of 
society, he would not expect that individuals should have obligation to maintain the 
cultural form of that society. This is the real difference between Taylor and Nozick. 
Taylor complains that Nozick's position is inconsistent. For the obligation to 
sustain a societal culture is exactly drawn from libertarian rights. Rejecting such an 
obligation would undermine rather than preserving those rights. Therefore, the 
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obligation to belong to or sustain certain forms of society should not be overshadowed 
by libertarian rights. As Taylor puts, 
provided a social thesis of the right kind can be true, an assertion of the 
primacy of rights is impossible, for to assert the rights in question is to 
affirm the capacities, and granted the social thesis is true concerning 
these capacities, this commits us to an obligation to belong. This will be 
as fundamental as the assertion of rights, because it will be inseparable 
from it. So that it would be incoherent to try to assert the rights, while 
denying the obligation or giving it the status of optional extra which we 
may or may not contract... 
We could not, for instance, unreservedly assert out right in the face of, or 
at the expense of, such a society; in the event of conflict we should have 
to acknowledge that we were legitimately pulled both ways. For in 
undermining such a society we should be making the activity defended 
by the right assertion impossible of realization. But if we are justified in 
asserting the right, we cannot be justified in our undermining; for the 
same considerations which justify the first condemn the second. 
Nozick may concede that although there is such an obligation, it is not 
enforceable. This reply, however, misses Taylor's point. Taylor's argument is that the 
non-enforceable obligation cannot guarantee the survival and flourishing of the 
valuable forms of society. As a consequence, there is no guarantee that the value of 
libertarian right will be protected or realized. In other words, not forbidding people to 
undermine the value of society is equivalent to undermining the effective exercise of 
libertarian rights. Obviously Nozick would not allow the possibility of undermining 
libertarian rights. This implies that he should accept that people do have enforceable 
obligation to belong to and sustain certain forms of society. 
4.2.2 How Desert Helps Sustain Society 
What is the implication for Nozick to accept the obligation mentioned above? I 
will argue that such obligation will support the claim of desert and Nozick should 
139 “Atomism”，p. 198. 
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bring desert into his theory. My argument of this section is as follows. I will first 
argue that certain conception of desert shall exist in the kind of society described 
above. I will then claim that social anger would arise if the social reward mechanism 
radically violates the widely accepted conception of desert. Such social anger will 
weaken social bonding and undermine the sustainability of society. Since Nozick 
believes in the obligation to sustain a society, he should accept that there is an 
obligation to keep social reward mechanism in line with a reasonable conception of 
desert. Such obligation makes a strong case for including desert in entitlement theory. 
Finally, I will respond to a possible challenge to my position. 
To begin with, let me explain why people will use desert to judge distributions 
of rewards. We have just concluded that the capacity of leading a meaningful life can 
only be nurtured in certain forms of society with culture and civilization. In that 
society, people interpret and make sense of social activities. For example, people will 
conceive the point of education as to train human resources for society, government 
ruling as to promote the well-being of citizens, and work as a means to earn one's 
living through their effort. Since people give meaning to what they are doing, they 
will naturally develop conceptions of desert with regard to these activities. This is 
because the meaning of an activity would include an understanding of the worth of 
those activities. Such understanding provides a standard of judgment for rewards. 
Hence as long as people give meaning to social activities where rewards need to be 
distributed, the claim of desert will arise and people will apply the notion of desert to 
determine how to distribute rewards. 
I do not mean that people will interpret all existing activities in society. My 
point is only that people will often interpret important and widely practiced social 
丨 A fuller account is made in Chapter 1. 
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activities. Work is an example. Work is important because it occupies a large part of 
our lives and substantially affects our plans of life. It is common and natural for 
people to make sense of work and its reward. Desert thus plays an important role in 
the distribution of income. 
Before giving my account of conception of desert for work, I would like to 
explain why rewarding desert is required. For one thing, if a society rewards people in 
a ways deviated from a widely accepted conception of desert, it will create 
widespread anger and weaken social bonding. I have already explained in Chapter 1 
that desert is closely related to our reactive attitudes. Giving undeserved distribution 
would create resentment .� Research in social psychology can further strengthen my 
claim. A number of social psychologists have shown that people would feel resented 
if they witness or involve in an undeserved distribution. i42 For instance, Faye 
Crosby's research on young white workers indicates that when a person believes that 
other people get benefits more than they deserve, they will either resent the situation 
or resent those p e o p l e . � William Austin and Elaine Walster's study on University of 
Wiscosin undergraduates also confirms that "subjects who were treated equitably 
were more content and satisfied than were subjects who were either over- or under-
rewarded."'^' 
The empirical studies also find that people cannot endure this type of 
discontent for long. They will try various ways to get rid of it. J.S. Adams and Lemers 
� Feinberg, Doing and Deserving. Miller, Principles of Social Justice. 
142 G.C. Homans, Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms, rev. ed, (New York: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich Inc., 1974); E. Walster and E. Berscheid, "New Directions in Equity Research", Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 1973, 25，pp.151-176; J.S. Adams, "Inequity in Social Exchange", 
in L. Berkowitz ed., Advances in Experimental Social Psychology (vol. 2) (New York: Academic Press, 
1965), pp. 267-299. 
143 F. Crosby and A. Miren Gonzalez-Intal, "Relative Deprivation and Equity Theories" in The Sense of 
Injustice: Social Psychological Perspectives, Robert Folger ed., (New York: Plenum Press, 1984), pp. 
141-166. 
144 W. Austin and E. Walter "Reactions to Confirmations and Disconfirmations of Expectancies of 
Equity and Inequity" Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 30, (1974), pp. 208-216. 
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suggests that people who are in a game or workplace may try to leave the field if they 
face undeserved treatment. These studies do not show whether people would distant 
themselves from the society if undeserved treatments are widely found at a societal 
level. However, it seems reasonable to assume that the desire to distant oneself from 
undeservingness would not disappear. If people in a workplace want to leave the field 
where there is undeserved reward, they may leave other workplaces if situations 
remain the same. 
Imagine a situation where rewards in many spheres of life and in most 
workplace are undeserved. Although people cannot leave society, the desire to distant 
from undeservingness will generate a strong feeling of detachment from these spheres 
of life and workplaces. In this case, up to a certain degree, they will also feel detached 
from society. 
Apart from detachment, people who are treated undeservedly will have hostile 
feeling and a desire to retaliate the party which gives the treatment. ^^ ^ If 
undeservingness and those feelings are widespread, social stability will be 
undermined. By social stability I mean a good social order and social unity, as well as 
a continuity of social development. Social stability is important for the development 
of a civilization and culture which in turn is necessary for nurturing the value of 
meaningful life and libertarian rights. Social stability does not mean there is no 
transformation. Yet any change should not be based on immense destruction of the 
present culture and civilization. The reason is simple. Civilization and culture take a 
long time to develop. Constant social unrest and ever changing cultural structures 
leave no space for such development. 
145 Homans, Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms, p.268; E, Walster et. al., "New Directions in 
Equity Research", pp. 165-166. 
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I have shown that wide spread undeservingness creates an environment 
unfavorable for development of civilizations and cultures that cultivates people's 
capacity to be rational and free persons. To avoid this consequence, Nozick has a 
strong reason to introduce desert in his theory. I shall show how Nozick can 
incorporate desert in entitlement theory without sacrificing fundamental values in 
entitlement theory in the next chapter. Now I would like to respond to one possible 
challenge against my argument. 
Since my argument holds that it is undesirable if social reward mechanism 
radically deviates from the conception of desert people endorses, I need to assume 
that there is a shared conception of desert in society. It may be challenged that, as a 
matter of fact, people hold different conceptions of desert. It is therefore pointless to 
argue for or against certain forms of reward mechanism. Whatever form of reward 
will deviate from many other forms, social anger and weakening of social unity 
among certain parties cannot be avoided. Critics may further challenge that even if it 
is a problem to be addressed, desert is not the solution. 
This is a threat to my argument. Instead of empirically proving people do have 
agreement on one conception of desert, I respond to this challenge by arguing that it is 
possible to come up with one reasonable conception of desert. Claiming the 
conception as reasonable, I mean it is reasonable for people against certain social and 
economic background to have that conception of desert. If they actually do not share 
that conception of desert, they would agree with it so long as they make rational 
inquiry upon the suitable conception of desert. 
4.2.3 The Possibility of a Reasonable Conception of Desert 
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To begin with, I would like to state the limit of significance of my search for a 
reasonable conception of desert. As mentioned in Chapter 1, desert bases for different 
activities are different. For example, desert base for a race is speed, and for education 
is academic excellence. Hence there are indeed different conceptions of desert in 
society and this fact seems unavoidable. Admitting this fact, 1 would like to make my 
argument clear. My belief is that for each activity, there is one reasonable conception 
of desert. It is only my belief because I will not try to argue for this proposition. To 
argue for it requires a large-scale study on every important social activity, and explain 
how a single reasonable conception of desert is plausible. The workload of such a 
project well exceeds that of a dissertation. However, to open for a possibility of that 
proposition, showing how it can be done, and to respond to the criticism above, I will 
choose one activity to show how a reasonable conception of desert with regard to that 
activity is possible. This activity is work and salary as a reward for work. Note that I 
only choose salary, but not all forms of monetary income. I exclude business profit, 
investment gains and lottery because somehow they are not in nature rewards to what 
one has done. 
I would like to make one more qualification about my argument. I do not hold 
that there is only one reasonable conception of desert about work across time and 
space. Any reasonable conception of desert shall be justified against social and 
economic backgrounds. My task here is to show that, given the background condition 
we are living in, i.e. modem capitalistic society, why one conception of desert about 
work is reasonable. 
I contend that the reasonable desert base of work in modem capitalistic society 
is the contribution a person makes to achieve the goals and tasks. A piece of work is 
more worthwhile if it contributes more to achieve those tasks. A worker who 
121 
contributes more to achieve the tasks is a better worker and therefore deserves better 
rewards. By contribution I mean the endeavors a worker has done to finish the tasks 
set by the company. A greater contribution means a larger share or greater importance 
in leading to achieving those tasks and goals. 
My position can be explained by the social and economic background we are 
living against. In modem capitalism, there are scarcely purely self-subsistence 
families in which members produce all goods and services they need. Nor are there 
any communal organizations that take care of all needs of households. In a market 
society, everyone is free, and not assisted, to find their own needs and have them 
served. People have to find their own means to satisfy their needs. 
One important feature of market economy is the division of labor. Individuals 
tend to specialize in producing a few types of goods and services. A household cannot 
satisfy all their needs on their own. While people have needs that cannot be satisfied 
on their own, they depend on other individuals as they exchange products one another. 
Everyone is connected with other people in a complex network where one's work is to 
serve part of others' need, and one's need is to be served by other people's work. 
Work is not an activity only to serve one's own needs. In order to work for one's need, 
one must work for others and serve other's interests. 
Again, with division of labor, we do not directly serve other people's needs. 
We usually work in a company or work units, where many people work together to 
produce goods and services that serve people's need. What people directly work for is 
companies and work units. Instead of grabbing what we need from the end users of 
what we produced, workers receive monetary payment from companies. They often 
do not concern whether their product can really serve people's need. What they care 
for is to accomplish companies' task so that they can earn income which then satisfies 
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their needs. At least from the perspective of workers, work is in fact a process to help 
companies and organizations to achieve their goals. 
This story can be explained from the other side. Entrepreneurs and 
government set up companies or work units with a purpose. They planned to make a 
profit by selling certain products or provide social services. To achieve their goals, 
they need people to execute their plans. Yet nowadays, we do not expect that many 
people would do that for free. Entrepreneurs and governments need to give people 
remuneration for their labour. Remuneration is thus meant to be rewards for workers 
who have helped companies or work units achieve their goals. This is why I claim 
salary is to reward workers for their contributions. 
After explaining why contribution is a reasonable desert base of work, I would 
like to argue against two other popular candidates for deserving salary. First, I want to 
object a common idea that compensation is a basis for deserving salary. "6 
Compensatory desert grants that one deserves because one should receive rewards as 
compensation for the cost that one has paid for, or for loss that one has suffered from. 
In economic activity, the cost is usually referred to as pain, unpleasantness suffered 
from working in a disgusting environment, or performing an extremely arduous 
work. 147 David Miller, however, has convincingly argued that loss is not a desert basis 
because it is not a characteristic or action of a person that is to be favored. Besides, 
Olsaretti points out that compensatory desert is not desert as it does not express an 
independent demand of desert. Compensatory desert only implies that we should not 
receive treatments that we do not deserve; or after receiving an undeserved loss, we 
should be compensated to return to the original state of affair. But compensatory 
146 Feinberg, "Justice and Personal Desert"; W. Sadurski, Giving Desert its Due, (Dordrecht: Reidel, 
1985). 
Miller, Social Justice, p. 112. 
148 Ibid., p. 103. 
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desert does not tell what the original state of affairs should be. Nor can it tell whether 
the original state of affairs is deserved or not. It needs an independent standard of 
justice or another conception of economic desert to justify the original state of affairs. 
It is not desert because it does not tell us what we d e s e r v e . " 9 
Second, it is often thought that effort is a standard of deserving wages. 
Indeed, work is a process where an individual put an effort to produce things that are 
either for his own enjoyment or for means of living. If one has not paid any effort, one 
is hardly working. If one has paid more effort, one is then doing more work. The 
intimate relationship between effort and work is further proved by that effort is a 
crucial factor to determine the quality of work and the reward from work. We do 
believe that paying more effort is generally an effective means to enhance the quality 
of work and also to obtain more reward from work. Since in general more diligent a 
worker is, the better the quality the work is, it is generally held that a diligent worker 
is a good worker. Seeing wages as a kind of reward for worker, effort is then 
understood as a basis of deserving wages. 
In retrospect, effort is not a proper base for wages. The literal meaning of 
effort is "a conscious exertion of power and energy".'^' But the idea of effort in those 
beliefs means more than this literal meaning because we do not believe that all types 
of power or energy deserve wages as a reward. In the context of work, effort is more 
restrictive that it refers to those energy or power that is directed to perform the duty of 
or facilitate the goal of work. The belief that effort should be a desert basis of wage is 
based on a presumption that the effort paid is valuable or contributive to the goal of 
work. Consider two persons, who both made the same amount of effort and time in 
accomplishing a team task for a company. Person A brought up sharp ideas and 
149 Olsaretti, Liberty, Desert and the Market, pp.50-51. 
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151 Merriam- Webster Dictionary Online, retrieved at www.M-W.com, on 10/9/2006. 
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provided efficient execution, and eventually greatly facilitated the completion of the 
task. Person B, however, committed mistakes in execution. Not only his work turned 
out to be useless, but also he needs other colleagues to take up his job. If a sum of 
money is given to the team as reward for completing the task, should person A and 
person B share the same amount because they made the same amount of effort? 
Consider a similar case. Person C and person D made the same contribution to 
completing a team task for a company. Person C spent more time and effort than D to 
achieve the same result. Is it fair for the company to give C higher monetary reward 
simply because C has paid more effort than D? I think a reasonable answer to both 
cases is negative. It is plainly because effort is not a reasonable desert base for salary. 
On the other hand, I think it is reasonable to hold that person A deserves more reward 
than person B whereas person C and person D should have the same amount of 
reward. The rationale behind such a position is that a reasonable desert base for work 
should be contribution. 
I have explained why contribution is a reasonable conception of desert for 
work. This example showed that there is a reasonable conception of desert in a 
particular activity. My argument, if valid, would then remove a doubt that social 
argument does not work. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have offered two Nozickean arguments for desert. Shall they be 
plausible, they give strong reasons for Nozick to include desert in the entitlement 
theory. They start with the value of a meaningful life and of libertarian rights, both of 
which have fundamental importance in Nozick's theory. 
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Accepting my argument, Nozick should then consider how to include desert in 
entitlement theory. Nozick may worry that doing so would significantly alter the 
outlook of entitlement theory. Worse still, it would conflict with some other 
fundamental values of entitlement theory, e.g. the notion of self-ownership. I agree 
that we need to address these worries, and show that bringing desert in would not 
destroy the theory. In the next chapter, I will sketch some theoretical implications of 
accepting desert in entitlement theory. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS OF A DESERT-INCLUSIVE 
ENTITLEMENT THEORY 
In the last two chapters, I have argued that Nozick has no reason to reject desert 
and has good reasons to take desert into account. If a Nozickean accepts my 
arguments, he then needs to consider the consequence of including desert in 
entitlement theory. They may worry that doing so would significantly transform the 
outlook of entitlement theory and sacrificing some of its important values. In this case, 
Nozickeans are forced to choose between them. 
I think these worries need to be addressed so as to make the central thesis of 
this dissertation more plausible. Recall that this dissertation starts with a question: 
should Nozick include desert in entitlement theory? Throughout these pages I have 
argued for a positive answer. It makes my argument more persuasive if I can show 
that desert and entitlement theory are not mutually exclusive. 
A Nozickean worry is that desert is a patterned principle, whereas entitlement 
theory is non-pattemed. Introducing desert in entitlement theory will transform the 
latter into a type of patterned principle. This will fundamentally change the structure 
of entitlement theory, and damage its great appeal. People either are not free to 
transfer holdings in ways they desire, or become forced labour when they are taxed to 
maintain that pattern. In Chapter 3, I have already illustrated that a Nozickean would 
criticize desert because it is a patterned principle. I have also shown that Nozick's 
objection to patterned principle is unjustified. In this chapter, the critique I need to 
deal with here is different. The problem at issue is that desert would conflict with 
some fundamental values embodied in entitlement theory. Bringing desert in will 
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undermine the essence and the appeal of entitlement theory. The consequence is that a 
desert-inclusive entitlement theory is either theoretically impossible or unattractive. 
This chapter is divided into two parts. In the first part, I address the critique by 
showing that a desert-inclusive entitlement theory is not necessarily a type of 
patterned principle. For desert is not a comprehensive theory of justice. It does not 
apply to all types of transfer, but only to rewards. In other types of transfer, people 
can still give and take holdings as how they agree to. Hence, in Nozick's terminology, 
desert is not a pattern but only a strand. Still, Nozickeans may worry that even a 
strand will bring undesirable effects as a pattern does. Responding to this concern, I 
shall show that, even in distribution of rewards, desert will not lead to forced labour. 
For imposing that strand does not require taxation which aims to ensure that every 
piece of reward is deserved. On the contrary, desert only requires that undeserved 
rewards should be forbidden. By banning undeserved rewards, the overall 
deservingness of rewards can be largely maintained. 
My suggestion leads to another challenge from the Nozickeans. Since it 
implies that people are not free to give or receive any reward, Nozickeans would 
contend that desert would lead to certain loss of freedom. I admit that this critique is 
valid, yet it is not significant to object to desert. I would argue that it is a trade off 
Nozickean should commit to for two reasons. First, the loss of freedom is limited. 
Second, as I have claimed in Chapter 4, enduring such loss of limited freedom, 
Nozickeans will find that the fundamental value they endorse, i.e. that every person is 
able to pursue a meaningful life, can be better preserved. Hence introducing desert in 
the entitlement theory will not undermine its attractiveness even from a Nozickean 
point of view. 
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In the second part of this chapter, I will articulate the theoretical affinity 
between desert and entitlement theory. I show that they share some basic 
understanding on a just distribution. Ending that part, I will give a sketch of the 
desert-inclusive entitlement theory, with a view to showing that such a theory still 
retains a basic outlook of Nozick's entitlement theory. 
5.1 Desert: Pattern or a Strand of Pattern? 
In this section, I argue that desert is not a pattern, but only a strand of pattern. 
This distinction is important because Nozick only objects to a pattern but not a strand 
of p a t t e r n . Equally, what entitlement theory is incompatible with is a pattern, but 
not a strand of pattern. In other words, Nozick does not object to a strand of pattern 
and it is perfectly compatible with the entitlement theory. If my argument that desert 
is a strand is sound, then it is neither theoretically impossible nor undesirable to 
include desert in entitlement theory. In this way, Nozickeans' worry can be addressed. 
In the following, I will first articulate the difference between a pattern and a strand of 
pattern. Then I will argue that Nozick does not think strands of pattern as 
incompatible with entitlement theory. The argument then proceeds to explain why 
desert is a strand of pattern but not a pattern. 
According to Nozick, there are two conditions that make a distribution 
patterned. First, the overall distribution of holding in society is to vary along a natural 
dimension, or a weighted sum of some natural dimensions.Second, there is no a 
single or a combination of natural dimensions for the overall distribution. Yet, 
152 Hereafter, I shall use strand, strand of pattern and patterned strand interchangeably. Nozick also uses 
these expressions in ASU. I assume he also uses these expressions interchangeably. 
N o z i c k ， p . 156 
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different sectors in society operate independent natural dimensions or a weighted sum 
of many natural dimensions. As he says, 
the distribution on a society, however, may be composed of such 
simple patterned distributions, without itself being simply patterned. 
Different sectors may operate different patterns, or some combination 
of patterns may operate in different proportions across a society. A 
distribution composed in this manner, from a small number of 
patterned distributions, we also shall term "patterned". 
Quoting these lines, I would like to point out that, for Nozick, distribution is patterned 
if the pattern is comprehensive or quasi-comprehensive. A pattern, a combination of 
patterns or an add up of a number of patterns is comprehensive or quasi-
comprehensive if it applies to all or most of the holdings in society respectively. I 
conjecture that a patterned distribution only refers to comprehensive or quasi-
comprehensive patterns for two reasons. First, besides overall distribution, Nozick 
emphasizes that a patterned distribution needs to involve "different sectors across 
society". It implies that a patterned distribution shall apply to a large set of 
distribution in society. It leaves a possibility that if a pattern only applies to a small 
part of the overall distribution, i.e. when the pattern is incomprehensive, the 
distribution is not patterned. 
The second reason why I think a distribution is patterned only if the pattern is 
comprehensive or quasi-comprehensive is that Nozick recognizes that even in 
entitlement theory, there will be a part of holdings decided by strands of pattern. 




The principle of entitlement we have sketched is not patterned. There is 
no one natural dimension or weighted sum or combination of a small 
number of natural dimensions that yields the distributions generated in 
accordance with the principle of entitlement. The set of holdings that 
results when some persons receive their marginal products, others win at 
gambling...Heavy strands of patterns will run through it; significant 
portions of the variance in holdings will be accounted for by pattem-
variables.i55 
Elsewhere, when Nozick discusses Hayek's view on patterning, he also makes 
a distinction between a strand and a pattern. Hayek holds that in a free market 
economy, distribution will be accorded with the benefits brought to other people, 
which can be regarded as a pattern. However, Nozick thinks that they are different. 
Distribution according to benefits to others is a major patterned strand in a 
free capitalist society, as Hayek correctly points out, but it is only a strand 
and does not constitute the whole pattern of a system of entitlements. ^ ^^  
From these extractions, I would like to draw two conclusions. First, a strand of pattern 
is a mode or way of distributing holdings in a sector in a society. As Nozick claims, 
apart from market in which distribution is accorded to perceived value of a person's 
actions and services to others, there are other sectors of distribution. For instance, 
inheritance, gifts for arbitrary reasons, charity and etc.'^^ Distribution according to 
perceived values created for others is only a strand because it applies only in market, 
but not in other sectors in society. A strand is different from a pattern as a pattern 
applies extensively to a number of sectors or the overall distributions in a society. Or, 
in my own term, a strand is an incomprehensive mode of distribution; a pattern is 
comprehensive or quasi-comprehensive mode of distribution. 
155 Nozick,/iSt/, p. 157. 
/况t/., p. 158. 
'''Ibid. 
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The second conclusion is that there are still strands of pattern in entitlement 
theory. It shows that a strand of pattern is compatible with entitlement theory and that 
Nozick does not object to strands but only to patterns. 
It seems strange that Nozick objects to pattern but accept strands. I think there 
are three reasons to account for Nozick's position. First, it is unavoidable that certain 
strands will guide the distribution in particular sectors. For example, Nozick 
recognizes that in a free market, people tend to use holdings in exchange for valuable 
products and services. In general, the distribution of holdings in the market sector will 
be accorded with the theory of marginal p r o d u c t . H e n c e even in a society where 
entitlement theory is applied, there will still be strands of pattern. The second reason 
is that it is undesirable if there is no strand of pattern in the overall distribution of 
holdings. Discussing the application of entitlement theory, Nozick notes that an 
unpatented distribution of holdings will still be comprehensible and intelligible 
because they can be accounted for by a number of strands. Nozick addresses the 
question of intelligibility of distribution of holdings because it is a noteworthy issue. 
He understands that people will feel more comfortable with a distribution of holdings 
if it is resulted from transfers done for r e a s o n s . I n other words, it is better if those 
transfers are purposeful. For Nozick, those purposes or reasons are just strands. Thus 
Nozick would welcome the inclusion of strands in entitlement theory. Third, unlike 
pattern, a strand brings far less undesirable consequences as a pattern does. For the 
former does not apply to the overall or most of the distribution of holdings. ^ ^^  Even a 
strand is applied, in many other sectors, people can still make a lot of voluntary 
158 N o z i c k , p . 157. 
1601 shall make a fuller account on this point when I discuss why Nozick would not object to desert as a 
strand. 
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transactions. There is no need for the authority to intervene with the final distribution 
of holdings. 
Now I turn to explain why desert is only a strand but not a pattern. The main 
reason is that desert is only applicable to areas that distribute rewards. It applies to 
distribution of salary in work, grades in school and prizes in sports. It applies to a 
sector or a small part of a large sector, but not the overall distribution of holdings. In 
other words, it is not a comprehensive theory of justice. It does not dictate how many 
holdings an individual or a group should have. It does not answer this question 
because rewards only account for a small part of one's holdings. Even if rewards have 
to be given according to what people deserve, in other sectors, people are free to 
transfer holdings as they wish to. They are free to give gifts, receive heritance, earn 
from the stock market and keep those holdings in their pockets. Desert would not 
demand any redistribution of holdings generated in those sectors. It would not 
command redistribution of the overall set of holdings if it does not fit the strand of 
desert after voluntary transfers either. In sum, desert does not command that every 
piece of holdings must be deserved. It just commands that rewards should be given 
according to desert. This is why desert is an incomprehensive mode of distribution, 
and why it is only a strand but not a pattern. Given Nozick's position on a strand and 
a pattern, we can conclude that Nozick does not have to object to desert, and desert is 
compatible with the entitlement theory. 
I foresee two objections from Nozickeans. First, they may dismiss the 
significance of the difference between a pattern and a strand. They may claim that the 
difference is only that a strand applies to a smaller area than a pattern. A strand leads 
to undesirable consequences as a pattern does. Though the effect a strand brings is 
perhaps smaller, it still violates some libertarian values. Hence a strand and a pattern 
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are equally objectionable. There is then no point to argue that desert is acceptable and 
compatible with the entitlement theory because it is a strand. 
Second, they may disagree with my interpretation of a strand and argue that 
desert is in fact a pattern, but not a strand. My distinction between strand and pattern 
is that a strand applies to a sector whereas a pattern applies to a large set of or the 
overall set of holdings. Disagreeing with my distinction, they may hold that a strand is 
used to describe the distribution of holdings flowing from voluntary transfers, 
whereas a pattern is to prescribe the distribution of holding by using coercive force 
from the authority. In other words, the difference is that a strand is the result of 
voluntary transfers while pattern is a guide to restrict voluntary transfers. According 
to this interpretation, my account of desert is indeed a pattern because desert forbids 
voluntary but undeserved rewards. 
Let me respond to the second critique first. The distinction between a strand 
and a pattern is not that one is resulted from voluntary transfers and another is used to 
maintain a mandatory set of holdings. There are two reasons for this. First, according 
to Nozick's definition of pattern, there is no specification that the distribution that 
varies along some natural dimension needs to be voluntary or mandatory. Second, in 
an argument against patterning, Nozick retains a possibility that certain patterns can 
be maintained by some invisible-hand p r o c e s s . I n other words, it is possible that 
those patterns are results of voluntary transfers. Hence pattern must not be defined as 
a mode of distribution, the maintaining of which necessarily involves the use of 
coercive force. The distinction between a strand and a pattern must not be that one is 
the result of voluntary actions and another is the result of compulsory action. 
161 Nozick, p. 165. 
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Now let me turn to the first critique. Recall Nozick's critique of pattern 
principle. As Nozick claims, a distribution resulted from a series of voluntary 
transfers probably would not fit a pattern. There are two ways to maintain a pattern. 
First, voluntary transfers that do not fit the pattern must be forbidden. Second, 
voluntary transfers are allowed; yet the authority needs to intervene by taxing some 
people occasionally so that the distribution of holdings will fit the pattern from time to 
time. Nozickeans would complain that both ways, forbidding voluntary transfers or 
taxation, are not compatible with the entitlement theory. For entitlement theory claims 
that distribution flowing from voluntary transfers is justified. The theory also claims 
that taxing people amounts to making them forced labour. Nozickeans would argue 
that a strand would be as problematic as a pattern. For within a sector, if the 
distribution is to match the strand, people are either stopped to transfer voluntarily or 
taxed after voluntarily transactions, so that the final distribution in that sector will 
match the strand. Hence, a Nozickean would claim, beside the scope of influence, a 
strand is essentially as problematic as a pattern. 
Let me explain why desert would not fall against the Nozickean critique. My 
point is that desert can be understood and applied in a way that would not lead to 
taxation and forced labour. I propose it because I want to avoid taxing undeserved 
rewards and redistribute them to people who deserve it, for two reasons. First, 
taxation can only be applied to areas where rewards can be quantified such as salary. 
In distribution of other kinds of rewards, like grades or prize, it is impossible to apply. 
How can a gold medal be taxed like 30% and be redistributed to the runner up of a 
competition? Second, taxation would undermine people's ability to reflect and build 
up their sense of self-respect, which is an important ground of desert. Imagine the 
scenario of applying desert through taxation. A person receives undeserved salary 
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from employers in the beginning and receives the adjustment later from the 
government. In practice, that adjustment would come a period of time later. The effect 
is that the person may perceive the initial salary as what he deserves and as how the 
company value him. This will affect how a person values his worth. It is indeed 
doubtful that later adjustment from the government would be effective to re-impose 
self-image on the person. However, even if the remedy is effective, the mistake and 
possible damager had already been done. It then seems that taxation is not a good way 
to help reward desert. 
As a result, I suggest that desert should be applied by forbidding undeserved 
rewards. Rewards can be given only if they are what the receivers deserve. In this way, 
it can guarantee that rewards given will be deserved. However, Nozickeans would 
contend that people lose the freedom to give reward as they want to. While it restricts 
voluntary transfers in distribution of rewards, I hold that Nozickeans should commit 
to this restriction for two reasons. First, the effect of such restriction is limited only to 
a sector among many others. People can still freely transfer holdings in most of other 
sectors. Hence, freedom is not extensively curtailed, but only one particular kind of 
freedom is affected. 
I want to argue that restricting this kind of freedom is not significant. In 
Chapter 3, I have argued that not all loss of freedom is equally objectionable and 
undesirable. Whether a restriction of freedom is objectionable depends on the value of 
the kind of freedom at stake. The greater value of that kind of freedom, the more 
objectionable the restriction of that kind of freedom would be. The value of a kind of 
freedom is decided by how far that freedom is to promote people's well-being. For 
Nozick, freedom is important because it enables people to form and execute their life 
plans, which is a way to help people realize a meaningful life. Then the value of each 
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kind of freedom should be assessed as how important that freedom would help people 
form and execute their conception of good life. 
The kind of freedom at stake is the freedom to give and receive rewards. 
Instead of putting forward that it is not a significant kind of freedom, I will argue 
against two claims which hold that this is an important kind of freedom. First, critics 
may contend that the freedom to give and receive rewards is significant, because, as I 
have said, reward is important to help a person find his own worth. If reward is not 
given or received freely, but has to undergone some assessment process, probably the 
number of rewards will decrease. As a result, it perhaps becomes rare or more 
difficult for a person to receive reward and hence build up his worth. 
Second, that a person is able to receive reward freely implies that he is able to 
choose to receive that reward or not. This reflects the person's autonomy. More 
importantly, the person is able to involve in the building up of his own worth. In other 
words, a person's own worth is not entirely decided by other people or the reward 
giver. Instead, it is partly controlled by the subject. The worth built up in this way is 
even far more valuable. For a person's worth does not entirely depend on how other 
people value him. The worth expresses the person's autonomy. 
In response to the first critique that the freedom to go and receive reward is 
important, I would like to make it clear that the value of reward is that it can reflect 
the worth of the benefactor. Yet, this value is obtained only if the reward can 
appropriately reflect the worth of the receiver. In other words, the reward must be 
deserved by the receiver. Otherwise, the benefactor cannot build up a correct sense of 
worth upon himself and other people. He may either undervalue or overvalue the 
worth of himself and of other people. Comparing this with reducing the number of 
rewards and the chance for people to have his worth reflected, I think the latter is a 
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lesser of two evils. After all, if any reflection is distorted or incorrect, it does not help 
to create a clear and correct sense of worth. An under-estimation of the worth of a 
person may harm his self-respect. In this regard, it is better to reduce the chance of 
receiving rewards because greater but unexamined chances would create undesirable 
consequences. 
Let me restate my position on the building up self-respect and personal worth 
in the beginning of the reply to the second critique. Throughout I do not hold that self-
respect and personal worth must entirely be obtained by recognition from other people. 
This is not a plausible account. Such a person would lack confidence in himself 
because the only source of self-respect is from outside. Instead, a more plausible 
picture should be, as I have said, that a sense of one's own worth must involve a 
person's confidence in himself. The build-up of this confidence involves his judgment 
of his ability and the worth of what he has done. 
However, how a person conceives his own worth is also affected by how other 
people recognize him. For the person may have confidence crisis over his own 
judgment. 162 That is why recognition from other people is important as well. I think a 
deserved reward is important in this part. Since the person must rely on other parties' 
judgement to confirm his own value, it does not make sense at all to argue that he 
should be able to take part in the build up in this part of his self-respect. The person 
will take part in it, but not in this part. In other words, this should be entirely left to 
other people. Hence I do not object that autonomy should be involved in the build up 
of self-respect or personal worth. It is just that there must be some part the person 
himself cannot involve in the build-up process. This is why a deserved reward, 
representing a proper recognition by some significant parties, is important. There is no 
丨62 A fuller account is made in Chapter 4. 
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point to argue that the freedom to receive reward is important because autonomy is 
important or because the subject should be allowed to decide his own worth and self-
respect. 
There is one more point to explain why losing the freedom to give and receive 
reward is not significant. Note that imposing desert in the entitlement theory, the 
freedom to give and receive reward is not entirely abolished. Rather, people only lose 
the freedom to give and receive undeserved reward. In other words, people can still 
give and receive deserved rewards. The practice of giving reward is not forbidden and 
hence the effect of it should be limited. 
Given the loss of freedom to give and receive undeserved reward is not 
significant, it opens a possibility that Nozickeans should consider including desert in 
entitlement theory. Indeed, Nozickeans should consider that because, as I have 
mentioned in Chapter 4, rewarding desert can substantially help to lead a meaningful 
life, a fundamental value that Nozickeans should value. Consequently, comparing the 
loss and gain of applying desert, there is no reason why Nozickean should object to it. 
Concluding this part, I would like to emphasize that applying desert in the 
entitlement theory would only make little impact on the overall loss of freedom. For 
one thing, as I have just explained, limiting people's freedom to give and receive 
reward is not a significant loss of freedom. And, on the other hand, desert as a strand 
only interferes with the freedom to distribute rewards. It does not interfere with other 
sectors in the society. Even if desert is applied, people can still freely transfer 
holdings as they wish in aspects other than distributing rewards. Obviously, 
distribution of rewards is only a small part of the overall transfers. Hence even if 
desert is applied, people still in general enjoy a large extent of freedom. 
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5.2 Desert and Property Right 
I believe that Nozickeans who endorse a neutralized view of freedom would 
agree with my conclusion. However, those who endorse a right-defined freedom may 
not agree with my viewpoint. It is because, they believe, those limitations on the 
freedom to receive and give reward would infringe people's rights. Therefore, it does 
not make the interference more justifiable if the freedom at stake is not significant or 
if the freedom is sacrificed for a more important value. The infringement is not 
justifiable because, at least those Nozickeans hold, rights are non-violable. In this case, 
the property right of holdings, which is infringed when one is not allowed to use those 
holdings to distribute undeserved rewards. The right of the receiver is also infringed 
as they are supposed to have right to do anything they want, including receive any 
kinds of reward, given they do not harm other people's right. 
I think of two ways to reply to Nozickeans' critique. The first reply would be 
the same as the one to the criticism about freedom. There are two points. One, just 
like freedom, right is not absolutely non-violable. The inviolability of a right should 
depend on how significant the right is. And the significance of the right depends on 
the significance of the activities that the right protect. Since the significance of every 
activity is different, the significance of every kind of right is different. As a result, 
every right is not equally absolutely non-violable. If the violation of a certain kind of 
comparatively insignificant right can bring about great advancement of some 
important values, there is no reason why right cannot be sacrificed as a trade-off. Two, 
the right to distribute rewards as one wish is not significant. It is because the distribute 
rewards is only one of many ways that one can dispose his holdings. Therefore a 
person only loses a small part of the property right. Also, distribution of reward is 
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significant only because the reward is deserved. Hence, the right to distribute reward 
as one wish is not a significant kind of right. Given the right is not significant, 
Nozickeans should think it reasonable to apply desert, even though that would violate 
that particular kind of right. It is reasonable because applying desert would help foster 
an important value that Nozickeans endorse, i.e. the ability to strive for a meaningful 
life. 
There is another way of reply, however. This main idea of this reply holds that 
it does not infringe property right at all even if people are not allowed to distribute or 
receive rewards freely. It is because people do not have property right over 
undeserved rewards. There are two things to be explained about this argument. First, 
why do people not have property right over undeserved rewards? Second, why that 
people do not have property right over undeserved rewards will legitimately authorize 
restriction on distributing and receiving rewards? Yet, before invoking these questions, 
let me state the significance of subsequent analysis. 
I think subsequent analysis will eventually embark on an adjustment on 
entitlement theory. It is an adjustment on some important elements of the theory, i.e. 
what is a property, the condition of legitimate transfer and the scope of property right. 
These adjustments are made in consideration of including desert in the entitlement 
theory. As a result, these adjustments will show that a possible form of entitlement 
theory that contains an element of desert. There is one characteristic of this inclusion. 
The characteristic is that it tries to maintain some basic elements and structure of the 
entitlement theory, so that Nozickeans would find it most comfortable to accept the 
inclusion of desert. In this way, I believe that this reply to those right critiques is 
better than the first one. Since entitlement theory is primarily built upon the 
inviolability of libertarian rights, this reply aims to explain how desert can be included 
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and meanwhile property right will not be violated. Indeed, this reply also serves the 
second purpose of this chapter, namely, to outline the outlook of a desert-inclusive 
entitlement theory. Towards the end of this reply, it will be clear how such a theory 
will look like. And it will be followed by an outline of such a theory in the next 
section. 
Now, let me return to the reply by answering the first question. I hold that 
people do not have property right over undeserved rewards. It is because undeserved 
reward is not a legitimate property. Or, in other words, an undeserved reward should 
not be a person's property. The reason is simply that, as the notion of desert already 
implies, one should not have an undeserved reward. If one should not have a piece of 
reward, the same reason dictates that a piece of reward should not be his property. I 
mentioned earlier in Chapter 1 that desert is just one of the moral reasons that one 
should have a property. Therefore, desert is not always a conclusive reason. However, 
in the realm of reward, I hold that, desert is a conclusive moral reason. In other words, 
I hold that when a person deserves a piece of reward, he should obtain it. Contrarily, 
when a piece of reward is undeserved, a person should not have it, even if other moral 
reasons support that he should have it. 
My positions lead to several implications that need further explanation, if my 
claim is to be more solid. For example, my claim says that a particular type of reason 
is conclusive in deciding the distribution of a type of holding. It implies that different 
types of holdings or transfers are sensitive to different kinds of reasons and that there 
is no one over-arching principle or value that justify the distribution of overall 
holdings. This is close to a kind of pluralism. It follows that I should defend a certain 
kind of pluralism if my claim is to look more solid. However, I will not make any 
defence for pluralism here. This is a large topic that cannot be discussed here and 
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should be taken up by another project. I just assume that certain kind of pluralism is 
reasonable. And I also hold that, without describing the full picture of this pluralism, 
this pluralism holds that desert is a conclusive reason in distribution of reward. The 
prima facie reason to justify this kind of pluralism is that the argument I have made, 
namely, it is a reasonable hold that desert is a conclusive reason to allocate rewards. 
Let me restate how I justify the last statement. The reason is that reward has a 
special point or purpose, i.e. to award the owner some valuable goods in return for 
some valuable things he has done. Hence the reward is given solely because the 
person has created those values. And the amount of reward should then be 
proportional to the value the person has provided. These are exactly what desert 
means and requires. Accepting reasons other than desert in distributing rewards will 
include consideration that is irrelevant to the point of reward. Reward shall lose its 
meaning and the function of giving recognition to what people have done. To 
maintain the meaning and the function of desert is important and morally valuable. It 
is for this moral reason why I say desert should be the conclusive reason in deciding 
rewards. 
I have just stopped at why an undeserved reward should not be a person's 
property. I now go on to explain why people do not have property right over 
undeserved rewards. The answer is indeed straightforward. If a holding should not be 
a person's property, how can the person have property right over it? The notion of 
property right is to delineate a set constraint on what can and cannot be done on one's 
p r o p e r t y . 163 Therefore, to answer if a person has property right over a certain holding, 
we must know beforehand if the holding should be the person's property. The reason 
is that one does not have property right over illegitimate holdings. An example is that 
163 By property I mean a legitimate holding. Hence the usage of property here is normative. It implies 
that a property owner is justified to own that. In contrast, holding does not have the normative 
implication as property does. 
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a thief does not have property right over stolen holdings just because those holdings 
are not legitimate. They are not legitimate because stealing is not a justified act to 
obtain holdings. 
Nozickeans may object to my argument in the following way. They claim that 
whether a piece of holding is a person's property is defined by if the person has 
property right over it, not the reverse. They would say a stolen good is not the thief s 
property because he does not have property right over it. And that the thief does not 
have property right over the stolen good is because the original owner possesses an 
exclusive property right over the stolen good. The difference between Nozickeans' 
and my position is not only verbal. I think their position implies a view that the 
legitimacy of a holding is only defined by right-based reasons. No other types of 
reason can define who has what property. Desert, illustrated so far, is not a right. Nor 
can desert decide if a person has property right over a piece of holding. Nozickeans 
would claim desert should not decide whether one should have a particular holding. 
This is what I think the difference between their and my positions. 
To be more precise, Nozickeans would have that view because they think it is 
the right to ownership of a holding that determines who has that property. Their view 
can be explained by the following example. Property right includes a set of rights over 
a holding, like the right of ownership, the right of usage, right of gaining profit from 
that holding, etc. A property is transferred from the original owner to the new 
receiver's only if the original owner transfers the right of ownership to the new owner. 
If the original owner does not transfer right of ownership, but only, for instance, the 
right to use the holding to the receiver, then the holding still is not the receiver's 
property. The property should still belong to the original owner. Nozickeans would 
conclude then, what actually determines who has a property is the right to ownership. 
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And they may think that, in entitlement theory, only right-based reasons determine if 
a holding is a person's property. Since desert is not a right, nor does it imply a right to 
ownership, so desert could not justify if a person should have a holding as property. 
Yet I think this contention is unjustified, for there is no reason to hold that 
factors determining a holding as a person's property must be right-based. First, the 
claim that only right to ownership of a holding determines who should have the 
property is misconceived. Indeed, to have the right to ownership of a holding is just a 
definition of owning a property, but not a justification of it. In other words, a person 
should have a property is not because he has the ownership right of it. That a holding 
should be a person's property means that the person has right of ownership over the 
holding. Yet why the person should have that property is not justified by his having 
right of ownership over it. Instead, in entitlement theory, it is justified by the principle 
of transfer and the principle of initial acquisition. Nozickeans may insist that, 
according to the principle of transfer, the generation of property must be right 
preserving. Thus, it is still the right of ownership that determines who has a property. 
Yet, the principle of transfer is only part of the story. Another half of the story 
is the principle of initial acquisition. This principle shows that property and the right 
to ownership can be generated from non-right based reason. Recall that the principle 
of initial acquisition. The principle says that a property can be generated so long as an 
unowned material is obtained in accordance with the Lockean Proviso, i.e. there are 
enough and as good materials left for others. In Chapter 3,1 have already claimed that 
this reason is not right-based. It is undesirable for Nozickeans to argue that the 
Lockean proviso is a right-based reason. For it means that other people have right to 
unowned materials. And this view entails two consequences Nozick could not accept. 
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One, it introduce positive right in the entitlement theory. Two, it implies a positive 
right to life that Nozick rejects. 
The significance of the principle of initial acquisition is that a property 
together with the right to ownership can be justified by non-right based reasons. It 
opens a possibility that non-right values other than abiding by the Lockean Proviso 
can also generate property and the right to ownership. I want to argue that desert is 
one of those reasons. Given the significance of desert and the connection of desert 
with the fundamental value that Nozick endorses, there are sufficient reasons to 
justify such a right. And once this is accepted, the inclusion of desert in the 
entitlement theory shall be much easier. The worry that forbidding undeserved 
rewards would violate people's property right will be very much alleviated. For 
people in the first place do not have right to undeserved rewards. Therefore it is not 
right violating to forbid a person to receive undeserved rewards. This can be further 
illustrated by the following example. Suppose a thief wants to transfers a stolen 
holding to his children. And the police intervene to stop that transfer. In this case, is 
children's right to receive holding be violated? No, it is not. The reason is that those 
stolen goods should not be the children's property. And they do not have property 
right over those goods even if the transfer is voluntary. Consequently, they do not 
have the right to receive those stolen goods. And the police's intervention is not right 
violating. 
I understand that this analogy is somehow different from desert. The 
difference is that the thief does not have property right over those stolen good whereas 
the distributor of rewards does have property right over the holdings. Yet this 
difference will not ruin my analogy. The point of my analogy is that the receivers 
should not have the property and right of ownership of one holding. The reason why 
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they should not have it is just irrelevant. And the point I want to make is that, given 
the receiver should not have the property and should not have property right over the 
holding being transferred, it does not violate the receiver's property right to stop the 
transfer. 
The right of the distributor of the transfer is a bit complicated. First of all, the 
analogy of thief and stolen goods cannot be used here. It is because the distributor 
indeed has property right over those holdings. How can we then explain the 
distributor have all but the right to use those holdings to distribute undeserved 
rewards? In entitlement theory if a person is not allowed to use a holding in a 
particular way, it must be that the action is right violating. Hence if desert wants to 
forbid undeserved rewards and retain the basic structure of entitlement theory, it must 
argue that the act of rewarding giving is right violating. Yet, in the case of distributing 
undeserved reward, whose right is being violated? I conjecture that it is the right of 
the people who deserve their own rewards is violated. Now, I would like to introduce 
an important adjustment of the entitlement theory, in consideration of the inclusion of 
desert. The adjustment is to grant people a right to ownership over deserved rewards. 
The point of 'inventing' this right is to make it impermissible to distribute undeserved 
reward in entitlement theory. 
Before explaining how inventing this right would help incorporate desert in 
entitlement theory, let me briefly state what this right entails and the ground for this 
right. The right to deserved reward means that the right holder has a claim right to the 
deserved reward. This right entails that the distributor has an obligation to give right 
holder deserved reward. The ground for this right comes from the normative force of 
desert, which explains that people should have deserved rewards. The reason that 
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justifies people should have deserved reward also justifies that people should have the 
right to deserved reward. 
I would like to make a brief note on the implication of this right. This right 
only grants people a claim on the distributor only if there is a practice of reward. If 
there is no practice of reward, the right does not entail that the practice should be 
established. Hence this right is applied only upon certain conditions. Yet, I do not 
mean this right is conditional. Indeed, in this aspect, this right is just the same as 
Nozickean property right. Property right over material holdings is a natural right. 
Everyone has this right without fulfilment of any condition. Yet a person can 
effectively enjoy property right only if the person has property. Hence property right 
is only effective and is applied on the condition that a person has a property. On the 
other hand, property right does not grant the right owner a claim that his right must be 
exercised. The right does not entail that the right holder must have a property. It only 
says that the right holder's right will be protected so long as the person has a property, 
which has no guarantee. In this regard, the right to deserved reward, just like 
Nozickean property right, is a negative right. 
Now let me back to the role of this right in my argument. The argument I want 
to make is that rewarding the undeserved reward will harm people's right to receive 
deserved rewards. Thus the distributor should be forbidden to give undeserved reward. 
This restriction does not violate the right of the distributor, because he, as everyone 
else in entitlement theory, has no freedom nor right to perform any action that violates 
other people's right. To support my argument, I need to further explain why people 
who deserve certain rewards would have their rights violated if undeserved rewards 
are being given. There are two scenarios. 
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The first is that awarding undeserved rewards casually lead to a fact that 
another person's cannot receive deserved reward. In such a scenario, the good to be 
distributed is limited. And all of them will be allocated to the members in accordance 
with their level of desert. An example is distribution of prize. Suppose a first prize is 
being distributed to the 2nd best performer. And the 1st runner up prize is awarded to 
the best performer. In this case, the undeserved reward of the first prize to the 2nd 
best performer causes the best performer unable to get the reward he deserves. The 
award of the first prize to the 2nd best then violates the best performer's right to 
receive rewards. 
The second scenario is comparatively subtle. It does not involve the 
distribution of very limited resources. The award of undeserved rewards will not 
directly take away other people's chances to receive deserved rewards. An example is 
the distribution of salary. Suppose the contribution of worker Al , A2...A100 are 10 
units and that of AlOl is 5 units. Suppose, concerning the profit made by the 
company and the total contribution all workers made, the deserved reward for a unit 
of contribution is $1000. Then the deserved reward for worker Al to A100 is $10000 
each. And the deserved reward for AlOl is $5000. 
Now, the company decides to give $8000 to AlOl and $10000 for workers Al 
to A100. At first, it seems that giving undeserved reward to AlOl does not alter Al to 
AlOO's reward. Al to A100 still receive what they deserve if AlOl is awarded $5000. 
Then it also seems that giving undeserved reward to AlOl does not violate Al to 
AlOO's right to receive deserved reward. However, this is not true. The point is that as 
AlOl is rewarded $8000, Al and A100 should deserve more than $10000. The reason 
is that desert consists of proportionality constraint. The amount reward should reflect 
the worth of a person's action. In order to reflect the fact that the contribution of Al to 
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A100 is twice of AlOl, the reward of A1 to A100 shall be added up to $16000. The 
point is that, although the absolute amount of rewards of Al to A100 remains 
unchanged, the value of their reward has decreased. It has decreased because a better 
reward now reflects the same level of worth, as shown in the reward of AlOl. 
Consistently, the same amount of reward received by Al to A100 shall reflect less 
worth than before. It is in this way Al to A100 are under-rewarded. They lose their 
deserved reward because the award of AlOl has led to the inflation of reward. 
I have just shown that, in two ways, rewarding undeserved rewards may cause 
other people unable to obtain the amount of reward they deserve. Given people have 
the right to have deserved reward, the distributor should be forbidden to give 
undeserved reward. As I have claimed, the restriction shall not violate the distributor's 
right. This is true even though he has property right over the prize, because he has no 
right to use his property to perform actions that violate other people's right. 
So far I have shown how desert can be included in a modified entitlement 
theory the outlook and structure of which is largely maintained. The emphasis has 
been on how reward the deserved and forbidding the undeserved to be rewarded can 
be explained in terms of right. So long as they can be explained in terms of right, 
desert can fit into structure in the entitlement theory. The emphasis is on right because 
entitlement theory is a right-based theory. Right accounts for an important role in the 
theory in the sense that it delineates what can and cannot be done in the theory. Hence 
if any other non-right value has to be incorporated in entitlement theory, it must prove 
to be able to be explained in terms of right. And also the value must not conflict with 
the original right system in entitlement theory. The above analysis of how desert 
creates right is such an attempt. 
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The above analysis should have shown a bit how entitlement theory need to be 
modified if desert is included. Yet, before elaborating it in the next section, now I 
would like to make a final remark on the theoretical affinity between desert and 
entitlement theory. I have discussed the relationship between desert and freedom, as 
well as that between desert and right. I think I should also to make a brief note on the 
relationship between right and self-ownership, for self-ownership is an important 
value in the entitlement theory. Desert indeed entails the same ethos as self-ownership. 
For one point, desert is a value that takes the personal deeds of a subject seriously. For 
what a person deserves must be the result of what a person has done. And the reward 
is primarily decided by the worth of the contribution made by the subject. This echoes 
the idea of self-ownership that a person's life and the incidents the person will face in 
life should be primarily determined by the person himself. 
The close connection between self-ownership and desert will be even clearer if 
desert is compared with Rawlsian liberalism. Nozick criticizes Rawlsian liberalism 
that does not take the separateness of persons seriously. For Rawls's theory treats 
people's natural talent as common asset. And people's talent are used mainly with a 
view to raising the condition of the least advantaged. Yet desert is very different from 
Rawls，s theory. Desert recognizes that people owns their talent and recognize the fact 
that people should be able to direct their life and improve their condition by using 
their own talents. In other words, desert respect and supports the fact that as a person 
uses his talent, he is mainly for the sake of himself. This is why desert aims to reward 
people based on the worth of what a person has done, without questioning whether the 
factors that contribute to the deeds are deserved or not. Nor does desert requires any 
kind of compensation for the least talented. In this sense, desert and Nozick shares a 
similar view on the role of natural talent on deciding one's well-being. 
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There is a final dimension I would like to mention. Desert and entitlement 
theory are both historical theories. They both decides who should have what based on 
events happened in the past. In this regard, as Nozick would agree, desert is a 
reasonable kind of principle. 
5.3 A Desert-inclusive Entitlement Theory 
In the final section of this research, let me conclude this chapter by sketching the 
outlook of a desert-inclusive entitlement theory. According to Nozick, the basic idea 
of entitlement theory is that the distribution is just if everyone is entitled to the 
holdings they possess under the distribution. And entitlement is created in only two 
ways.164 
1. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of justice in 
acquisition is entitled to that holding. 
2. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of justice in 
transfer, from someone else entitled to the holding, is entitled to the holding. 
If holdings are created not in accordance with these two principles, they are 
unjustified and needs to be remedied by the third principle, the rectification of 
injustice in holdings. 
These are the three main components of entitlement theory. With the inclusion of 
desert, only the component about transfers needs to be adjusted. Desert in distributive 
164 N o z i c k , p . 151. 
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justice is mostly concerned with the distribution of rewards, which is an issue about 
transfer of holdings. It is irrelevant to the problem of acquisition. On the other hand, 
the inclusion of desert shall not affect how the injustice will be rectified. Even if it 
does affect, I cannot tell the difference, for Nozick almost says nothing about the way 
to rectify past injustice. Now, let me illustrate how the inclusion of desert will alter 
the principle of transfer. 
There are two focal points about the principle of transfer. A desert-inclusive 
entitlement theory will retain these points. One is that it aims to design a way of 
transferring holdings which is just and legitimate. It is so designed so as to correspond 
to the spirit of the entitlement theory. Recall Nozick claims that a distribution is just if 
it arises from another just distribution by legitimate means. And whatever arises from 
a just situation by just steps is itself just.�65 The speciality of this theory is that it is 
mainly procedural. It does not count the result of the transfers. It only counts the 
means by which the current distribution of holdings is created. A desert-inclusive 
entitlement theory will stick to this characteristic. It does not require that the overall 
distribution of holdings must be deserved. Even in realms of reward, it ensures that 
the reward must be deserved not by checking if the resulting distribution of reward is 
deserved. It does not have this characteristic because it does not command 
redistribution of rewards so as to fit the 'pattern' of distribution. Instead, a desert-
inclusive entitlement theory focuses on procedural legitimacy. It can be shown from 
the fact that, the theory classifies the act of rewarding the undeserved as illegitimate 
means of transfer and claims that it should be forbidden. It is through banning giving 
undeserved rewards that the theory ensures that the rewards distributed will only be 
Nozick, p. 151 
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deserved. In this way, the theory does not alter this characteristic of the entitlement 
theory. 
What needs to be changed is the reason to define if an act or transfer is 
illegitimate. Note that Nozick holds that an illegitimate transfer or act is a right-
violating one. And it is right-violating if voluntary transaction between consenting 
adults is interfered. Contrarily, if an act or transfer is voluntary, it is both legitimate 
and right preserving. A desert-inclusive entitlement theory alters what is a legitimate 
and a right preserving transfer. Different from the original theory, that a transfer is 
voluntary does not necessarily make it legitimate. It is not necessary as it depends on 
what types of transfer are at stake. There are two scenarios. One is that transfers are 
not about reward giving. In these transfers, voluntariness is necessary and sufficient to 
make them legitimate. Two is that transfers are about reward giving. That a reward is 
given and received voluntarily is not sufficient to make it legitimate. The only 
necessary and sufficient condition of making a transfer in realms of reward legitimate 
is that the reward is deserved by the receiver. 
I have offered a Nozickean reason to tell why a voluntary reward is not 
legitimate. The reason is that giving an undeserved reward will violate people's right 
to receive deserved rewards. This right is newly added in the desert-inclusive 
entitlement theory. I have noted that this right negative in nature. It means it does not 
demand that a reward must be given. However, it demands that if a reward is given, it 
must be deserved so as not to violate people's right. On the other hand, this right is 
added based on the normative significance of desert and on the Nozickean values that 
desert help foster. Therefore, the reason to add this right is also Nozickean. 
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All things considered, towards the end of this project, let me state the outlook 
of a desert-inclusive entitlement theory. 
1. A desert-inclusive entitlement theory claims that a distribution is 
just if everyone is entitled to the holding they possess under the 
distribution. 
2. A distribution is just if it arises from another just distribution by 
legitimate means. 
3. The legitimate first moves are specified by the principle of justice in 
acquisition. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the 
principle of justice in acquisition is entitled to that holding. 
4. The principle of justice in acquisition contains a weak version of the 
Lockean Proviso. Any acquisition of unowned materials is just only 
if it leaves enough and as good for others. 
5. The legitimate means of moving from one distribution to another 
are specified by the principle of justice in transfer, which contains 
two sub-principles. A person who acquires a holding in accordance 
with the principle of justice in transfer is entitled to the holding. 
6. The first part of the principle of transfer says that, in transfers other 
than reward giving or reward distribution, a transfer is legitimate if 
it is voluntarily agreed by consenting individuals. 
7. The second part of the principle of transfer says that, in transfers of 
reward giving or reward distribution, a transfer is legitimate if the 
reward is deserved by the receiver. 
丨66 References have been made from Nozick, ASU, p.151. 
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8. No one is entitled to a holding except by (repeated) application of 
the principle of justice in acquisition and the principle of justice in 
transfer. 
9. Injustice in the distribution holdings is rectified by the principle of 
rectification of injustice in holdings. 
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CONCLUSION 
This project aims to argue that Nozick should include the claim of desert in his 
entitlement theory. Throughout my thesis, I have tried to answer a number of 
questions in order to justify my position. 
In Chapter 1,1 set out to delineate a conception of desert. I argue that desert is 
a distinctive moral value that can be used to justify certain arrangement in distributive 
justice. The primary distinct feature of desert is that it aims to reward people based on 
the deeds they have done. Therefore, desert is an affective notion. It demands to give 
good treatment based on something good a person has done. In other words, it 
demands the congruence of good treatment and virtues. In deciding distribution of 
holdings, the most important elements of desert is to decide what good qualifies as 
desert bases. I have argued that desert base should be decided by the meaning and the 
point of the activity where the distribution of reward is located. With regard to its 
relationship with justice, I have stated that desert is only one of the reasons why 
people should possess a holding. It is not a comprehensive doctrine of justice. It does 
not make conclusive claim as to who should have what holdings. 
The discussion then turns to the moral significance of desert. In Chapter 2, I 
have claimed that there are two general appeals of desert. One is that rewarding desert 
shows respects to the value of autonomy because desert is closely connected with the 
idea of autonomy and responsibility. Another one is that rewarding desert fits the 
moral appeal of the congruence between good treatments and virtues. The congruence 
matters because it can maintain the meaning of activities in society. 
After two preparatory chapters setting the stage for later discussion, Chapter 3 
explores the reasons of Nozick's denial of desert. I argue that it is because desert is 
regarded as a type of patterned principle. Nozick has put three arguments against it, 
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namely, the arguments of freedom, of right, and of self-ownership. I have shown that 
all of them are invalid. Therefore, Nozick has no justifiable reason to reject desert in 
entitlement theory. 
In Chapter 4, which is the most important part of my essay, I offer two 
original Nozickean arguments to show that Nozick has good reasons to adopt desert in 
his theory. They are Nozickean because they start with the premises that Nozick 
himself endorses. Both the individual and the social argument point to the fact that 
desert can help a person achieve a meaningful life. It is because rewarding desert 
provides social recognition on what people have done, which is important for people 
to understand the worth of their life plans. Furthermore, desert can sustain the unity of 
society which provides a stable social environment for people to make meaningful life 
plans. 
In Chapter 5, I address Nozickean，s concern that desert is theoretically 
incompatible with the entitlement theory. I argued that desert can be included in 
entitlement theory in two ways. One is to show that desert is only a strand, but not a 
pattern principle. Desert only applies to the realm of rewards even though it will 
forbid some voluntary transfers, a kind of restriction not really morally significant. 
Considering the benefit resulted from the inclusion of desert, I argue that it should 
override the loss of freedom. In another way, I have tried to reformulate the 
requirements of desert, showing that they can fit the structure of entitlement theory. 
The most important move is to invent a new right, namely, a right to deserved reward. 
With this new right, I have shown that forbidding distribution of undeserved rewards 
does not violate libertarian rights. Moreover, after adding this right, the requirement 
imposed by desert can be well explained with the structure of entitlement theory. 
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